Having their aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina thwarted by the Austrian annexation, the Serbs focused their attention to Kosovo and to the south for expansion and the revival of the Serbian Kingdom of the 14th century. Since the annexation of Bosnia meant that their road to the Adriatic was blocked, the Serbs were now targeting Macedonia for an opening into the Aegean.

From this point on, a series of alliances have either brought together the Balkan states or confronted them with each other. Bulgaria, for instance, was enjoying the support of Russia, and had designs on Macedonia. In Greece, a progressive government was appointed under Eleftherios Venizelos and “Megali Idea”, the goal of establishing a Greek state that would encompass all ethnic Greeks and incorporating Ottoman territories with large Greek populations (including those in Anatolia) topped its agenda, together with the issue of Crete. Greek bands were as active in Macedonia as the Bulgarians were. Meanwhile, in August 1910, Montenegro followed Bulgaria's precedent by becoming a kingdom.

There were clear differences of opinion among Balkan states with regard to Macedonia. Bulgaria wanted for the province to become autonomous whereas Serbia and Greece wanted partition. However, when Italy invaded Tripolitania, Balkan states decided that it was time for leaving differences aside and taking action against the ailing Empire. In the spring of 1912, consultations between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece resulted in a network of military alliances, which became known as the Balkan League. Montenegro joined later.

There were clear differences of opinion among Balkan states with regard to Macedonia. Bulgaria wanted for the province to become autonomous whereas Serbia and Greece wanted partition. However, when Italy invaded Tripolitania, Balkan states decided that it was time for leaving differences aside and taking action against the ailing Empire. In the spring of 1912, consultations between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece resulted in a network of military alliances, which became known as the Balkan League. Montenegro joined later.

The Great Powers of Europe were favoring a preservation of status quo in the Balkans, because as long as the Ottoman Empire survived, they could preserve their benefits in the region. The second option, if there was no way to keep the Ottoman Empire intact, would be to have the Balkans partitioned among smaller nations rather than facing a large power controlling the entire area. In other words, if the Ottoman Empire were to leave the scene, Britain and France would prefer to see a Balkan alliance under the patronage of Russia rather than the German Empire in the Balkans.2 They did not want war, but they were not opposing a Balkan alliance against the Ottoman Empire either.

Meanwhile the Sublime Porte was in deep negligence. Ottoman politicians were so deeply involved in internal struggles and so deceived by the Russians’ and Bulgarians’ false pretensions of peace, that they could not be aware what was really going on in the Balkans. Two months after the alliances were concluded among Balkan States, Grand Vizier Sait Paşa could make the following statements: “Our relations with the Balkan governments are very favorable… As a good statesman, Monsieur Venizelos is working for peace rather than war…. The fact that a visionary person who appreciates our common relations like Monsieur Sazanov occupied the post of the Russian Foreign Minister is a sufficient guarantee for us to be in good terms with Russia.3 After the Sait Paşa government was replaced by the high-profile “Grand Cabinet” under Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, the negligence went on even stronger. The new Foreign Minister, Gabriel Norandunkian would assert that “he could ensure the Parliament that the Balkan States are by no means going to attack the Ottoman Empire”.4

Certain acts of the Sublime Porte clearly demonstrate the scale of the negligence of Sublime Porte. At a time when it was concluding alliances with other Balkan states, Serbia bought artillery guns from Germany, however Austria-Hungary refused to allow the guns to be transported through its territories. In complete naïveté, the Sait Paşa government agreed for the guns to be brought to Salonica by sea and from there to Serbia on train. Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa later realized what was going on and terminated the permission, however Serbia had by then enough guns to be used against the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in August 1912 the government disbanded 120,000 well-trained and experienced troops stationed in the Balkans in a show of peaceful intentions and also sent a contingent of 35 battalions from the Balkans to Yemen to suppress an uprising there.

In summer 1912, as a major uprising was in place in Albania, bands in Macedonia intensified their hostile acts in order to create a pretext for going to war against the Empire. Eventually, a bomb that went off in the town of Kocana in Kosovo pulled the trigger. 28 people died in the explosion, after which the local Turks attacked the Bulgarians for retaliation and killed 21 of them, giving Bulgaria the opportunity to protest against the Ottoman Empire. Another bomb that exploded on the island of Samos caused the same effect in Greece.

The Great Powers, with the exception of Russia, were not favor in a war that could spread through Europe. France championed the initiative to prevent the war, given the fact that more than half of the Ottoman public debt at that time belonged to French capital and France had much to lose from a war. On 1 October 1912, President Raymond Poincaré, announced that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the status quo in the Balkans should be preserved. He suggested the Sublime Porte to launch a reform package for the Balkans. The government of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa whole-heartedly accepted this proposal, however the Balkan states continued to mobilize and the eventually Turks decided to do so as well. Ottoman mobilization began on 1 October 1912, albeit only on a limited scale, in order to avoid provocating the Balkan states and the Europeans.

The War Begins

However, the Balkan states really wanted war. On 8 October, Montenegro declared war against the Ottoman Empire reporting that it considered the demonstrations in front of the Montenegrin embassy in Istanbul as a hostile act. Two days later, the Great Powers, including Russia, sent an ultimatum to the four Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire stating that they are against any behavior that would disturb the peace, the ottoman Empire will undertake the reforms it has promised and if there is still a war between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers will not accept changes in the territorial stats of the Ottoman Empire.

On 12 October, the governments of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria gave an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte, which included demands they knew that could not be fulfilled. On 16 October, the Ottoman Empire declared war on the Balkan states. On 17 October, Bulgaria and Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Two days later, Greece followed suit. In a newspaper interview, the Ottoman Foreign Minister Norandunkian would say the following: “There is no other state in Europe that can have demonstrate the same patience and tolerance as we do. The more reforms we do, the more aggressive and insolent are the Balkan States… Now there is war. Let there be war. We have not asked for the war, nether have we worked to bring about its outbreak. However, we will fight this war with all our strength and patriotism, although history will never place its responsibility on us. If we enter enemy territory, we will behave the same as guests do in the host’s house. If we are defeated, we will face it with dignity. There will be neither bloodsheds nor lies from our side”.6

In fact, the Ottoman Empire was not ready for a war in the Balkans. It was already preoccupied with the Italian trouble in North Africa and the Aegean Sea. The army itself was not in a good shape. A series of attempts had been undertaken with the assistance of German military experts to reform the armed forces, however time was required to get the results. The most important development in this respect was that for the first time in the history of the Empire, non-Muslim male subjects were taken under arms along with the Muslims.

Meanwhile, there was a political turmoil in Istanbul as well. CUP had already left the government as of July 1912 and when the war broke out, the Grand Cabinet of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa resigned as well. The new government established by Kamil Paşa was anti-CUP, as was its predecessor, however the army was largely under the influence of CUP, which caused serious conflicts between the government and the army.

As the war began, the Minister of War Nazım Paşa assumed the command of Ottoman army forces on behalf of the Sultan and the armed forces that were going to fight in four different fronts in the Balkans were organized in two major armies: Eastern Army (or the Thrace Army) to face the Bulgarians and the Western Army (or the Macedonia Army) to face the Serbs. The Eastern Army, commanded by Abdullah Paşa, was composed of four army corps and one cavalry division to be deployed to the line between Didymoteicho (TR: Dimetoka) and Kırk Kilise (current-day Kırklareli). The III Corps positioned at Kırk Kilise was commanded by Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, who had left his position as the Minister of Navy and volunteered for this task, whereas the city of Edirne (formerly Adrianople) was to be defended by Şükrü Paşa and the IV Corps, positioned west to Edirne, was under the command of Abuk Ahmet Paşa. On the other hand, the Western Army headquartered in Salonica and commanded by Ali Rıza Paşa was composed of three groups, one to fight at the Serbo-Bulgarian border, the other at the Montenegrin front and the third at Epirus and Thessaly fronts.

However, as the war broke out, the Ottoman army was far from having completed its mobilization. The Eastern Army had around 115,000 men instead its normal wartime strength of 478,850, and the Western Army had 188,000 men instead of 418,900. In other words, the Ottoman army was entering the war with a force of around 300,000 facing the combined Balkan forces of around 610,000.7

An interesting point to mention is that at this early stage some German officers stationed in Istanbul informed the Ottoman High Command about their desire to join the war. Nazım Paşa was not sympathetic towards this idea, because he did not want to get the Germans involved and nether was the German Foreign Ministry. However, a solution was found and five officers, including Major Otto Stephan Hermann von Lossow and Major Gustav von Hochwächter, were naturalized as Ottoman citizens and joined the Ottoman army.

On 19 October, Bulgarian forces crossed the Ottoman border towards Edirne. The Bulgarian Second Army commanded by General Nikola Ivanov easily eliminated the weak Ottoman border units and encircled Şükrü Paşa’s forces in Edirne from north and west. Meanwhile the Bulgarian First Army commanded by General Vasil Kutinchev also crossed the border and engaged the Ottoman forces followed by the Third Army of General Radko Dimitriev that began to march towards Kırk Kilise.

Panic at Kırk Kilise

Abdullah Paşa, commander of the Ottoman Eastern Army, was not in favor of a counter-offensive, however he was left with no option but to attack when he received a cable from the Minister of War Nazım Paşa during the late hours of 20 October. The Ottoman offensive began on 22 October, towards Bulgarian lines between Edirne and Kırk Kilise. Soon the Turks engaged the Bulgarians in what came to be known as the Battle of Kırk Kilise. After two days of fighting between the Ottoman Eastern Army and the Bulgarian First Army southwest of the town, soldiers of Mahmut Muhtar Paşa’s III Corps began to flee the battlefield in panic, thinking that they were losing the battle, although the situation was still indecisive. There was total chaos in Kırk Kilise. Meanwhile, Bulgarians were waiting for the Turks to attack, however realizing that this was not going to happen, they sent scouts to the town. Turkish troops and inhabitants of the city had already left the city, where the only people left were the Christians, who welcomed the Bulgarian occupation. The Battle of Kırk Kilise was a big shock for the Turks and an easy victory for the Bulgarians.

Why was there panic? Major Gustav von Hochwächter, a German officer fighting in Ottoman uniform, wrote the following in his memoirs: “I believe that the blame lies with those who have pushed the Turkish soldier to the front under these unfavorable circumstances. We should think about the morale of the Anatolian peasants from warm climates, who had to hit the roads of a country they had never seen in hunger and thirst, without knowing for what they were going to war, without knowing how to use the rifle they were handed. They were left on their own, walking falteringly through the mud inside something resembling shoes. After spending the cold night totally wet and without shelter, they are going back to the front with the sunrise… The man thinks about the miserable state of the wounded he had seen the day before. He feels fear and death, deep inside himself. He turns back and other follow him. They flee from the approaching enemy, first confused under the burden of the disaster, then running. This is how the panic that wiped everything away began. It is as if the roads have no end or beginning, it is impossible to move forward, the rivers have flooded, the bridges have collapsed, the villages are burning and the enemy fire is mowing down the lines. This mass flight is terrible. Man has become animal. All the gruesomeness and calamity of the war is here.” 8

Assisted by the Bulgarians’ decision not to chase the retreating Turks, Turkish commanders managed to stop the panicked flight of the troops at Lüleburgaz on 25 October. Abdullah Paşa was, however, still hesitant and sent a cable to Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, arguing that it is impossible to fight under these conditions and there a political solution had to be found for the Balkan issue.9 He wanted to retreat all the way to Çorlu, but Nazım Paşa, who arrived at the front of line on 26 October, was again not in disagreement with Abdullah Paşa. Nazım Paşa gave the order to establish a defensive line at Lüleburgaz and took three army corps from Abdullah Paşa and gave them to Abuk Ahmet Paşa’s command.

Meanwhile the Bulgarians had intensified their reconnaissance activities in order to find where the Turkish troops were. On 25 October, they easily occupied the town of Babaeski. Advancing towards the Turkish positions on the following days the First and Third Armies launched an offensive against the Turkish defensive line as of 29 October. Fighting went on for a couple of days around Lüleburgaz, and initially the Turkish troops that had fled Kırk Kilise were fighting with spirit.

However, the tide began to turn against the Turks very soon and as three corps wanted to retreat on Abdullah Paşa’s orders, panic began again, which jeopardized Hamdi Paşa’s offensive to the north of Lüleburgaz as well. On 2 November, Nazım Paşa ordered total retreat to Çatalca, 30 kilometers west of the Ottoman capital Istanbul.  Tens of thousands of soldiers and Muslim population began continued to flee from the advancing Bulgarians soldiers in cold weather and under heavy rain.

Mahmut Muhtar Paşa described the situation in his diary as follows: “On the roads soldiers were fleeing back in total disorder. Infantrymen were collapsing on the mud, due to hunger and exhaustion, never to stand up again. The crying and begging of these desperate people who were drowning in the mud was piercing our ears and hearts... The villages on the road were filled with soldiers. It was such a view that nobody could believe that soldiers, who were fighting successfully for days, ended up in this situation. As it was the case in Kırk Kilise, we were again facing an army that was fleeing without even looking back. But why? This question was too difficult to answer.” 10

The situation was no different in other fronts. The Serbs, who had crossed the border on 19 October, encountered the Vardar Army, one of the groups under the Ottoman Western Army, three days later. Turkish forces commanded by Halepli Zeki Paşa were gathered around the town of Kumanovo in Macedonia. The VII Corps of Fethi Paşa was on the left, VI Corps of Cavid Paşa was in the center and V Corps of Sait Paşa was on the right. On 23 October, Zeki Paşa launched the Turkish offensive and, outnumbering the Serbs, Turkish troops began to inflict serious damage on the Serbs’ First Army commanded by Crown Prince Alexander.

However, the situation reversed when Serbian artillery guns arrived in the front. Within half a day the Vardar Army lost its momentum and began to retreat. The Ottoman plan for an offensive war had failed and the Vardar Army was forced to abandon much territory and lost a significant number of artillery pieces without the possibility to reinforce because the supply routes from Anatolia were cut. The Vardar Army was also not able to organize the defense on Vardar River and was forced to abandon Skopje (TR: Üsküp), which was occupied by the Serbian army on 26 October. After the capture of Kumanovo, the Serbs began to advance towards Monastir (TR: Manastır, current-day Bitola), to which Zeki Paşa’s forced had retreated. Meanwhile the Montenegrin army captured the town of Tozi and attempted to siege Shkoder (TR: İşkodra).

Greece had two armies on the field. The larger Thessaly Army, commanded by Crown Prince Constantine in the east and the smaller Epirus Army, commanded by General Konstantinos Sapountzakis, in the east. On the Ottoman side, the Salonica region was to be defended by the VIII Corps commanded by Hasan Tahsin Paşa, whereas the defense of Ioannina (TR: Yanya) was under the responsibility of Esat Paşa’s Ioannina Corps.

Salonica Falls

Greeks launched their offensive on 18 October and three days later the Thessaly Army engaged the Ottoman VIII Corps in a major battle around the town of Sarantoporo (TR: Serfiçe). After a whole day of fighting, Hasan Tahsin Paşa ordered retreat towards Salonica in order to avoid being encircled. On 1-2 November, the Greek army beat the Turks once again, this time at the lake of Giannitsa (TR: Yenice) and approached further to Salonica.

Greek troops were closing in and Salonica was in great danger. As fighting was going on in Giannitsa, the ex-Sultan in exile, Abdülhamit II, was removed from Salonica back to Istanbul for his safety. Meanwhile, the Greeks supported the Thessaly Army from the sea. Troops were landed on the shores east of Salonica on 5 November and on the same day a Greek destroyer sunk the Ottoman warship Feth-i Bülent, which was anchored at the port of Salonica. The town was not only blockaded, but Greek warships, including Averof, were shelling the Turkish fortifications as well.

The Governor of Salonica, Nazım Bey, asked Hasan Tahsin Paşa not to fight in the suburbs in order to protect the city and its inhabitants from harm. The Turkish commander was desperate. He had only 25,000 men, encircled by more than 100,000 Greeks and Bulgarians, and he was thinking that surrender would be a better idea than futile bloodshed. An armistice was agreed by between Hasan Tahsin Paşa and Crown Prince Constantine and on 9 November, troops of the Thessaly Army occupied the city without facing resistance. One thousand Turkish officers, including Hasan Tahsin himself, and 25,000 men were taken prisoner and 70 artillery guns were confiscated. Two days later, the King of Greece, George I, entered Salonica amidst the cheers of the local Christian population. Meanwhile, the Struma Corps commanded by Ali Nadir Paşa, which was supposed to prevent the Serbian forces from reaching the Aegean shores, had surrendered as well.

Advancing Greek forces were also posing a threat against the Vardar Army, which was fighting the Serbs in the north. The threat was serious since the road to Monastir was left open by the Ottoman VIII Corps that had moved to Salonica. Crown Prince Constantine could advance either towards Monastir or Salonica, but since he preferred Salonica he had to protect his open flank and he did so by deploying the 5th Division of Thessaly Army to Monastir. Facing this threat, the commander of the Ottoman Western army, Ali Rıza Paşa, decided to assign the VI Corps of Cavid Paşa to engage the Greek forces approaching Monastir.

On 6-7 November, the VI Corps defeated the Greek 5th Division at Sorovits, midway between Salonica and Monastir. However, while the VI Corps was away, the Vardar Army lost the Battle of Prilepe against the Serbs and Cavid Paşa’s forced were called back to join the Turkish efforts against the Serbs approaching Monastir.

On 14 November, the Serbian Third Army commanded by General Bozidar Jankovic encountered the Turkish forces to the north of Monastir. The Battle of Monastir went on for four days. On the last day of the battle, Cavid Paşa’s VI Corps repulsed the Serbs with a successful offensive; the front was broken through in the sector of the VII Corps, because the Serbs took advantage of a gap in the line, caused by an irresponsible reserve regiment that left its position during the night due to heavy rain. On the night of 18 November, Zeki Paşa ordered retreat. Resne fell on 20 November and Ohrid on 21 November. After the Battle of Monastir, which was the last major of the Ottoman Western Army in the region, the five-century-long Ottoman rule of Macedonia was over.

The Balkan territories were lost only within a single month. Although the Ottoman army was undermanned and not in a good shape before the war, nobody had expected such a rapid collapse. A heated debate began in Istanbul about why this happened. Nazım Paşa was criticized for not correctly assessing the real strength of the army, ignoring the previously prepared war plans and adopting an offensive strategy rather than a defensive one. The Foreign Ministry was criticized of not being aware of the Balkan alliances in time, whereas Grand Vizier Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa was criticized of disbanding tens of thousands of troops right before the hostilities began. According to the critics, it was wrong to assign a too large area, which was too close to the border, for the Eastern Army and it was also wrong to deploy the Western Army over a very wide area in a disorderly manner.11

These were, of course, not the only problems. There were serious deficiencies with regard to logistics, communication and intelligence. Mahmut Muhtar Paşa later wrote in his memoirs that there was no problem with the Ottoman strategies; the defeat was rather caused by the inadequacy of the organization of the military establishment, insufficiency of the preparations before the war as well as the social, political and moral decay the Empire was suffering from.12

Another reason of the Balkan failure, also voiced by Mahmut Muhtar Paşa himself, is the fact that the confidence between officers and troops could not be re-established in the aftermath of the 31 March incident and the army was politicized. Lower ranking officers were CUP sympathizers, whereas the higher ranking ones and generals were mostly against the CUP. As a result, younger officers were frequently disobeying the orders and going their own way.

Meanwhile, the war was not over. The Balkan territories were gone, but now the capital was under threat. Eight days after the defeat in Lüleburgaz, the Turks were back at the 30 km wide Çatalca line. The troops were starving and thirsty and they were drinking whatever water they could find. In early November, cholera broke out among the troops of the Ottoman III Corps in Çatalca. Only in one single day, 15 November, a total 2,786 men were reported sick and 817 died of cholera.13 These figures continued to increase over the following days. The sick were sent to Istanbul, together with the wounded and the refugees fleeing from the Bulgarian advance. In only a few days, 50,000 people entered Istanbul, causing the cholera epidemic to spread in the city.

Istanbul was not only suffering from the disease, but there was also fear among the inhabitants due to the Bulgarian advance. Wilhelm Feldmann, a German journalist stationed in Istanbul, provided two pictures of the Istanbul: “The people got more anxious due to the news brought to Istanbul by the wounded and refugees. All of the trains arriving from the war zones were filled with the wounded and the refugees escaping from towns and villages occupied by the enemy. The roads between Istanbul and Çatalca were crowded with villagers fleeing with their oxcarts filled with women, children, animals and whatever possessions they could carry. Among these people, there were also fugitive soldiers coming to Istanbul in large numbers.” Feldmann’s description of Pera, the Levantine district of Istanbul is different than the misery he pictured: “The war was not felt in Pera. Greeks and Armenians were behaving as if the war was not their concern… The daily life in the streets of Pera did not reflect the nearby war either. The only problem was the lack of phaetons due to the government’s seizure of all available horses in the city.”14

On 12 November, the Sublime Porte asked the Bulgarian government for an armistice, which was rejected. Three days later, the commander-in-chief of the Bulgarian Army, General Mihail Savov came to Çatalca and investigated the front together with General Dimitriev. The Bulgarians were suffering from the same problems like the Turks, however Savov and Dimitriev were still considering an attack because they were so close to Istanbul and they did not want to miss this opportunity of capturing the Ottoman capital consulting with Tsar Ferdinand, General Savov ordered the attack. By that time, Nazım Paşa had dismissed Abdullah Paşa and assumed the command of the Eastern Army himself.

The Bulgarian offensive at Çatalca began during the early hours 17 November with intensive artillery fire. Turkish guns returned fire and at around 09:00 am that day, the Bulgarian infantry began to march. In the left flank, the I Corps commanded by Ömer Yaver Paşa defended its positions successfully against the Bulgarians, with the help of naval artillery fire from the Turkish warships in the Sea of Marmara and the Bay of Büyük Çekmece, including Barbaros Hayreddin. Bulgarians had no option but to withdraw. In the center, Hamdi Paşa’s II Corps managed to repulse the Bulgarians as well. Meanwhile, there was fierce fighting in the right flank held by the III Corps of Mahmut Muhtar Paşa. Bayonet charges went on the whole day and at the end the Bulgarians had to retreat in this sector too.

On the night of 17/18 November, the Bulgarian 29th Infantry Regiment captured one of the Turkish positions with a surprise bayonet charge. However, neither the Turks nor the Bulgarians realized what was happening. The weather was foggy and there was poor visibility. In the morning, Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, who rode to this area for inspection, was wounded with a Bulgarian bullet. Turkish troops accompanying Mahmut Muhtar Paşa realized that the position was captured by the enemy and re-captured it before Bulgarian reinforcements arrived.

Armistice

By 22 November, Ottoman forces in Çatalca had completely repulsed the Bulgarians. This was a huge encouragement for the Turks, however both sides were exhausted and nobody wanted to fight anymore. Fearing from a spread of the war into the rest of Europe, Britain and France took the initiative for an armistice, which was eventually signed on 3 December 1912 in Çatalca by Ottoman, Serbian and Bulgarian delegations. Insisting for Ioannina to be evacuated, Greece was unsatisfied with the terms and refused to sign, continuing with its siege of Ioannina and the blockade in the Aegean and the Adriatic Seas.

According to the terms of the armistice, Ottoman units would maintain their positions as of 3 December, however they would not be allowed to send relief material to the three cities that were under siege. Moreover, in order to ensure the flow of supplies for the Bulgarian forces at Çatalca, the Ottoman government was to lift the blockade on Bulgarian Black Sea ports and also allow to the Bulgarians to use the railroad passing through Edirne for this purpose.

Following the armistice, a peace conference convened in London, attended by delegates from the Balkan allies, including Greece who had not signed the previous armistice, as well as the Ottoman Empire. The conference opened on 16 December 1912 and at the same time a Conference of Ambassadors, consisting of Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, and the London representatives of all the powers, was also in session. The Ottoman delegation was led by the Minister of Public Works Mustafa Reşid Paşa.

The Balkan allies demanded a war indemnity and the cession of all European territories of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of Albania. Crete and the islands in the Aegean Sea were to be ceded as well. The Ottoman Empire was to be allowed to retain Istanbul, Constantinople, together with a strip of territory extending from Midia (TR:Midye) on the Black Sea to Rodosto (TR: Tekirdağ) on the Sea of Marmara, as also the peninsula of Gallipoli.

The Sublime Porte was unwilling to give up Edirne, a sacrifice insisted upon by Bulgaria. Ambassadors of the great Powers stated that if the conference failed due to the issue of Edirne, Armenians would be likely to cause unrest in Anatolia and it could also be possible for the Great Powers to send a fleet to Istanbul and for Russia to send troops to Kars.

Meanwhile, as the negotiations were in progress in London, Captain Rauf Bey, commander of the cruiser Hamidiye, took a personal intiative and sailed with his warship to the Aegean in an attempt to weaken the Greek blockade and change the mood in the country. He broke through the blockade and tried to create a diversion that draw the Greek flagship Averof in pursuit and leave the remainder of the Greek fleet weakened. However, Averof did not chase Hamidiye and the plan failed. Hamidiye still managed to score a few successes, sinking a number of Greek ships and bombarding Greek ports.

In London, the Ottoman delegation brought its own proposal on 28 December. Accordingly, Edirne would remain within the Empire. Macedonia was to become a principate under Ottoman patronage, and the city of Salonica would be its capital. The prince would be appointed by the Ottoman sultan from among the candidates suggested by the Balkan states. Albania would have an autonomous status and it would be ruled by an Ottoman crown prince. All the Aegean islands would remain Ottoman and the Crete issue would be discussed separately between the Sublime Porte and the Great Powers.

Deadlock in London

The Ottoman proposal was rejected and negotiations in London soon went into a deadlock because Bulgaria insisted on having Edirne and the islands of Thassos (TR: Taşoz) and Samothrace (TR: Semadirek) and Greece wanted Imbros (TR: Gökçeada), Tenedos (TR: Bozcaada) and Limnos (TR: Limni). The Ottoman delegation argued that Edirne and the four islands other than Thassos were crucial for the defense of Istanbul and the Straits, hence they were indispensable.

On 17 January, the Great Powers delivered a new proposal to the Ottoman delegation. Accordingly, Edirne was to be yielded all European territories of the Empire beyond a line running from Enos (TR: Enez) on the Aegean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to Midia on the Black Sea was to be ceded. Five days later, the Sublime Porte convened an imperial council with the participation of current and former statesmen in order to discuss this proposal. Nobody could see any benefits in continuing with the war and the council agreed that peace should be made on the terms offered by the Great Powers.

The next day, the Ottoman government held a meeting to finalize the reply to be submitted to London. Meanwhile, there was unrest among certain circles, particularly those close to the CUP. As the meeting of the government was progress, on 23 January 1913, a group of CUP sympathizers led by the prominent orator Ömer Naci Bey marched towards Bab-ı Ali (Turkish word for the Sublime Porte) protesting the government for planning to leave Edirne to the enemy. When they arrived there, they met a group of armed officers including Enver Bey, Yakup Cemil, Necip Asım and Sapancalı Hakkı. Together they broke into the hall where the meeting was being held. It was a coup d’etat.

During the ‘Raid on the Sublime Porte’ several people including the Minister of War, Nazım Paşa were murdered by the putschists and the Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa was forced to resign at gunpoint. Although at that time the raid was shown to the public as a reaction to the government’s plans about Edirne, it was actually a previously planned event organized by the CUP to regain power. 15 Mahmut Şevket Paşa, who had to leave the government only a couple of months ago due to the pressure of the CUP, was assigned as the new Grand Vizier.

As the new government insisted on keeping Edirne –it had no other option because otherwise the coup could not have been justified- Bulgaria announced on 2 February that the armistice was over. However, the situation was now different than what it was three months ago. As negotiaiotns were on the way in London, Turks had strengthened the defenive line at Çatalca and it seemed almost impossible for the Bulgarians to break through. A second front was at Bulair (TR: Bolayır), north the Gallipoli peninsula, and this front was reinforced as well. At these two fronts, Turks had a total manpower of 200,000 men, against 150,000 Bulgarians.16 Meanwhile, Bulgarian First and Third Armies were stationed at Çatalca, whereas the Second Army was at Edirne continuing the siege there. A new army, the Fourth under the command of General Stilian Kovachev, was established for the Gallipoli front.

Mahmut Şevket Paşa and the new commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces, Ahmet İzzet Paşa, began immediately with the preparations for resuming the war. The situation was fragile, because nobody knew for how long Edirne could last. The city was under siege and their supplies were running out. There was a great pressure from the public. People wanted the former capital of the Ottoman Empire to be liberated.

The first operation in this phase of the war was launched in the early hours of 8 February 1913, when the X Corps, commanded by Hurşid Paşa whose chief of staff was Enver Bey, performed an amphibious landing at the shores of İnceburun and Şarköy on the Sea of Marmara. The plan was to encircle the Bulgarian Fourth Army, with the X Corps from the east and with the Dardanelles Combined Corps in Gallipoli, under the command of Fahri Paşa, with Major Fethi Bey as his chief of staff and Major Mustafa Kemal Bey his head of operation, from the south. The warship Mesudiye would provide naval artillery fire support from the sea. The next step would be marching together towards Edirne.

The operation could, however, not executed as planned. The landings began in the morning of 8 February with a delay. The Dardanelles Combined Corps was supposed to begin its offensive simultaneously with the landing, however, since he was not informed about the delay, Fahri Paşa commenced the attack too early. There was no naval fire support, because Hurşid Paşa decided to use Mecidiye for the landings, and Asar-ı Tevfik had hit a rock off Karaburun and sunk. Fahri Paşa’s corps was too weak to face the Bulgarians alone and the landings were not only late, 4 regiments were landed mistakenly in Şarköy rather than İnceburun, which was closer to the frontline in Bulair. By the next morning, half of the X Corps was ashore, but it was too late. The operation had to be aborted.

Losing Ioannina, Edirne and Shkoder

Meanwhile, having repulsed the troops of Esat Paşa in Epirus, the Greeks had laid siege on the city of Ioannina, which was defended by Colonel Vehib Bey, Esat’s brother. The Epirus Army attempted to take capture the city through a major offensive, but failed to accomplish this and suffered significant losses. It was General Sapountzakis, who paid for this failure; he was replaced by Crown Prince Constantine. Greeks landed fresh troops at Dalmatian shores, however these units were stopped by the Albanian militia. The siege of Ioannina was not as strong as the Bulgarian siege of Edirne. Vehib Bey’s troops were successfully defending the city and there were no shortages of supplies. However, to the surprise of the whole world, Vehib Bey surrendered. Ottoman forces and Albanian militia left the city to Constantine on 6 March.

The reason of the decision to surrender was later revealed in a letter from the German ambassador in Athens to Berlin. According to the information he had received, the Sublime Porte was planning to take advantage of the animosity between Bulgarians and Greeks in order to survive the war with minimal losses. Vehib Bey was ordered by the Ottoman government to evacuate the city, in order to gain the sympathy of Greece and have them join forces together against Bulgaria. 17

On 17 March, another offensive was attempted by the Turks at Çatalca, but it yielded no results. Neither side wanted to engage in fighting. Bulgarians were waiting for Edirne to be captured before they force the Çatalca line.

What was feared by the Turks, was to happen soon. A Serbian contingent had arrived in Edirne to support the Bulgarians siege. The units involved were the Serbian Second Army under the command of General Stepa Stepanović and French Creusot artillery dispatched because the Bulgarians lacked heavy artillery. Bulgarian forces were under the overall command of General Nikola Ivanov and the commander of the Bulgarian forces on the eastern sector of the fortress was General Georgi Vazov.

Hostilities began on 3 February with the artillery fire opened by the Bulgarian Second Army. Şükrü Paşa heroically defended the city, however the final offensive launched by the combined Bulgarian and Serbian forces on 24 March was simply too strong. Edirne fell on 26 March 1913, after a siege of 155 days, during which the Turks lost 13,000 men killed or wounded and 28,500 taken prisoner, whereas Bulgarians lost 16,000 men and Serbs 1,900 men.18 The next day, Tsar Ferdinand entered Edirne and returned to Şükrü Paşa his sword, which had been seized by Ivanov the day before. All the Turkish officers, including Şükrü Paşa himself were sent to Sofia and the Turkish prisoners of war were kept in the city for one more month before they were dispatched to prisoner camps in Bulgaria.

The only city that remained under siege was Shkoder, defended by Colonel Hasan Rıza Bey. He resisted for seven months, but the end was near for Shkoder as well. On 30 January 1913, Hasan Rıza went to see the archbishop of Albanian Catholics. As he was on his way back home in the evening, he was attacked by three assassins and did not manage to survive wounds he received. After his death, the defense of Shkoder was assumed by Esat Toptani Paşa, an Albanian feudal, who had gained favors from Abdülhamit II and was made the commander of the fortified zone in Shkoder by Hasan Rıza Bey, who wanted to get the support of Muslim Albanians.

Meanwhile, on 4 April, armistice was signed between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. The Great Powers wanted now to solve the problem in Shkoder to and began to pressurize Montenegro to lift its siege. An Allied fleet under the command of the British admiral Burney anchored off the Montenegrin coast to increase the pressure on Montenegro. However, as King Nikola was preparing to lift the siege, something unexpected happened. Esat Toptani surrendered the city to the Montenegrins on 22 April in return for a safe passage for Ottoman troops and the Muslim population. Not only the Sublime Porte, but also the Great Powers were outraged by this act. According to the reports of the German ambassadors in Cetince and the Austrian military attaché in Paris, Russia had encouraged Esat Toptani and King Nikola to shake hands. Nikola had promised Esat Toptani to make him the King of Albania and also arranged for Russian financial assistance. After a series of diplomatic efforts, Shkoder was eventually left to international forces on 8 May.

Meanwhile, another question was raised by Romania, who hoped to gain Silistria and a more advantageous military frontier for her Dobrudja region. Bulgaria refused these suggestions as to compensation for neutrality. War almost resulted, but was averted by a conference in Petrograd on 7 May, which gave Romania Silistria without fortifications.

The Balkan War ended with the Treaty of London signed at St. James Palace on 30 May 1913. Accordingly; (1) Ottoman Empire ceded to the Balkan allies her European territories beyond a line drawn from Enos near the mouth of the Maritza River on the Aegean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea; (2) The status and boundaries of Albania were to be fixed by the Great Powers; (3) Ottoman Empire ceded Crete to the Balkan allies in whose favor all rights of sovereignty were renounced;  (4) The decision upon the fate of the islands in the Aegean Sea (with the exception of Crete) and the status of Mount Athos were left to the Great Powers.