After having ruled the waves for a very long time, the Ottoman Navy had entered a period as of the 18th century. Naval conquests had come to an end and defeats on the sea against rival powers were increasing in frequency, with the Battle of Çeşme in 1770 being the most disastrous of them, resulting in the destruction of the entire fleet.  During the 19th century, however, there have been attempts to revitalize the navy. Following the defeat at the Battle of Navarino in 1827, Sultan Mahmud II gave priority to develop a modern navy and to that end the first steamships of the Ottoman Navy were acquired from Europe.

During the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876), naval reforms continued at an increasing pace. It was a period of revolutionary progress in ship-building around the world and having encountered modern warships for the first time during the Crimean War, the Sublime Porte was aware of the fact that it should not stay behind in the naval race.  Not only were ships contracted to British, French and Austrian shipyards, but there was also local assembly made at shipyards in Istanbul, Izmit, Gemlik, Mudanya, Çanakkale, Sinop, Crete, Basra and Russe. At the end of Abdülaziz’s reign, the navy had 21 battleships and 173 other vessels, which made it the third largest navy in the world after the British and the French. However, this was achieved at the cost of imposing a significant burden on the already collapsing economy.

In contrast with Abdülaziz’s time, the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) was the darkest hours for the navy. He simply didn’t want the naval force, mainly because he was suspicious of the reformist admirals who had dethroned Abdülaziz.  Furthermore, for him the money spent for the navy was a waste and he was basing this argument on the fact that the navy was of no use at all during the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-78. Eventually, Abdülhamid ordered all the ships to remain anchored at the Golden Horn (TR: Haliç). They were not allowed to run their engines, to leave their bases or to undertake shooting practices without a permission from the sultan. Since there were not enough resources available, adequate maintenance was also not possible and the fleet rapidly became obsolete.

Although Abdülhamid is to be blamed for the long inactivity and the decay of the fleet, it was during his time when the Ottoman Empire purchased two submarines for its navy. In 1885, Greece had bought the first Nordenfeldt class submarine produced by Bolinders in Stockholm. In order to gain a competitive edge over the Greek navy, Sultan Abdülhamid bought the second and third Nordenfeldt class submarines for 11,000 pounds sterling each, despite a report by the Ottoman military attaché in Berlin, Major Halil Bey, who argued that these submarines could not be used in strong-current waters if their speed and torpedo capacity are not increased. Eventually, the submarines were built in pieces in Britain and assembled at the Taşkızak Naval Shipyard in Istanbul. The first one, named Abdülhamid, was launched on 6 September 1886 and the second, named Abdülmecid, on 4 August 1887. Although they suffered from stability problems and were too easy to swamp on the surface, both submarines were successfully tested, and having shot a target at the Bosphorus during a trial, Abdülmecid became first submarine in naval history to fire a torpedo while submerged under water. Still, these two submarines could not escape the fate of the rest of the Ottoman fleet. After a brief period of testing around Istanbul and Izmit, they anchored at the Golden Horn and left to decay.

During the Turco-Greek War of 1897, the navy was finally decided to leave the Golden Horn and sail to Çanakkale, in order to protect the straits. However, the attempt turned out to be a scandalous one, since after years of inactivity, the fleet was not in the shape even to move an inch, let alone to engage in battle. Of the 6 vessels that tried to sail out of the Golden Horn, one had its boilers exploding, another began to make water and the remaining ones lost their directions under the rain. Having no experience whatsoever, the sailors did not know what to do, as the admirals were quarrelling with each other.

Two weeks after the Turkish-Greek War ended, on 21 June 1897, the Commander of the Navy, Hasan Rami Paşa, submitted a report to the Sublime Porte, pointing to the urgent need to revive the navy by purchasing new vessels from European shipyards. Abdülhamid did not object, since he agreed that there should be at least the naval capacity to protect the Dardanelles. New ships were bought and existing ones were repaired. Among the new purchases, there were also two warships, Hamidiye and Mecidiye, bought in 1903 from Britain and the United States respectively.

Despite these attempts in the later years of Abdülhamid’s reign, the fleet was still in bad shape as the constitution was proclaimed in 1908. Most of the vessels were between 20 and 40 years old and the navy was incapable of defending even the Turkish homeland, let alone the overseas territories. Officers were trained on anchored ships; no maneuvers, no drills. Most sailors had never seen their ships, although they were receiving their salaries.

In 1909, the tide began to change, when Sultan Mehmet Reşad ascended to the Ottoman throne. He was aware of the urgent need for the strengthening and reactivation of the navy; however the problem was that the Empire did not have any naval experts.

British Naval Mission

For the modernization of his Navy, Sultan Mehmet Reşad appealed to Britain, which in turn sent a Naval Mission to Turkey.  Admiral Douglas Gamble, head of the first British naval mission, started from scratch and tried to reform and to reinforce the navy, during his tenure between January 1909 and February 1910. He organized the fleet, reduced the number of officers and sent some young naval officers to Britain for training. As a part of his reform program, the first maneuver of the active fleet took place in the Sea of Marmara on 27 May 1909 followed by a major maneuver was held in the Mediterranean Sea in September same year.

Gamble had a series of clashes with various Ottoman ministers regarding the organization of the fleet and finances. He was insisting that all decision in these matters should be left to himself. Following serious disagreements he resigned on 26 January 1910.

Gamble was followed by Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams (May 1910-February 1911), who went ahead with maneuvers in the Sea of Marmara. It was during his tenure, when the two battleships ordered from Germany joined the fleet. However the Sublime Porte was annoyed since the work of modernizing and enlarging the fleet was laying in the hands of foreigners. Consequently, the Ministry of Navy decided to “appoint an independent and fully authorized Turkish officer who will take over the command of the fleet in case of war” and on 2 January 1911, Colonel Tahir Bey was appointed as the Vice Commander of the Navy. Admiral Williams was in London at the time. He resigned in protest and the next time he came to Turkey was on board the Irresistible that forced the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915. 

After Williams, the Ministry of Navy did not employ British officers. Later, Admiral Gamble was approached again, but he rejected the offer. Upon the recommendation of the British Admiralty, Admiral Arthur Limpus came to Istanbul on 6 June 1912. Limpus took the fleet all the way to Beirut on a maneuver, which was a great success at that time. His program was interrupted by the Turkish-Italian and Balkan Wars. In 1914, when Turkey allied with Germany and the command of the Turkish Navy was given to a German Admiral, Limpus left Turkey.

It was the end of a century long British influence on Turkish navy. The British naval mission has an important share in reviving the fleet and naval organization. The Minister of Navy, Cemal Paşa, wrote in his memoirs: “It is a moral obligation for me to stress once again that Admiral Limpus, his officers and all of the British engineers and officers, who worked to rehabilitate the Haliç shipyards, have decently fulfilled their duties.”1

Turco-Italian War and Balkan Wars

Although there were new vessels and the British naval mission was working to restructure the Turkish Navy, in 1911 it was still inferior to the Greek Navy, which was ruling the waves in the Aegean Sea.  If the Empire had a strong navy at that time, Italians could be stopped on their way to Libya, invasion of Aegean islands could be prevented and the forces in West Thrace could be supported with naval artillery fire.

In December 1912 and January 1913, the Turkish Navy dared to leave the Dardanelles and came face to face with the Greek Navy, first off the Island of Imbros and then around the island of Mudros. In both cases, the Turkish fleet had to withdraw back to the straits. The only remarkable achievement of the Turkish Navy in the Balkan Wars was the heroic journey of the cruiser Hamidiye, which sailed around the Eastern Mediterranean for 7.5 months disturbing the operations of the Greek Navy. Although it could not change the course of the war, the world followed the cruise of Hamidiye and its captain Rauf Bey with great admiration.

Dreadnoughts Seized by Britain

There was still no vessel in the Turkish Navy that was as strong as the Averov, and therefore Turkey was determined to buy dreadnaughts. The Ministry of Navy placed an order with the British shipyard Vickers Ltd. The 27,500-ton ship was to be named Reşadiye and its price was 2.3 million liras, to be paid in installments. A commission was appointed to monitor the construction of the dreadnought and this commission led by Major Vasıf Ahmet Bey went to Britain in 1912.

Meanwhile, a naval rivalry between Argentina and Brazil led the latter to order a dreadnought from the British shipyard Armstrong Whitworth in the spring of 1911, to be named Rio de Janeiro. However, by 1913 the two nations had solved their conflicts and Brazil ceased her payments. Turkey took over the contract for Rio de Janeiro, renaming her Sultan Osman. Both dreadnaughts were supposed to be delivered by mid-1914. A third battleship, to be named Fatih, was ordered from Vickers Ltd. in 1914.

Construction was going slower than what the Turks had hoped for. Sultan Osman was actually completed, but its weapon systems had to be installed. Reşadiye was brought to the sea with a ceremony on 3 September 1913, with Naile Hanım, daughter of the Turkish ambassador to London, Tevfik Paşa, breaking a bottle of rose water on the dreadnaught. Meanwhile, Sultan Osman was fully paid for, and only the last few instalments were remaining for Reşadiye.

On 8 January 1914, Captain Rauf Bey together with his staff went to Newcastle to supervise the final phases of the work on Sultan Osman and take the ship to Turkey. New weapon systems had to be installed, some facilities in the ship had to be converted to Turkish standards, engines and weapons had to be tested. Rauf Bey was unhappy. The work was going too slow and the Greeks were about to receive new battleships from the United States. The weapons were also unsatisfactory for him. In a letter dated 4 February 1914, he wrote to Istanbul: “The contract for Sultan Osman does not include any clauses requiring the ship to be equipped with anti-zeppelin guns. It would be appropriate for Sultan Osman to be equipped with four pieces of 76 mm guns, which have been tested on Reşadiye at Vickers shipyard. If the Ministry of Navy does not have an objection, it would be advisable to contact the Armstrong shipyard and place an order accordingly with our needs.”3

It was July 1914, and the dreadnoughts were still being tested on British waters and the Turks were losing their patience. Rauf Bey asked to run the Turkish flag on Sultan Osman with a ceremony on 2 August 1914 at 8 o’clock in the morning. Meanwhile the Turkish crew had arrived in Newcastle.

There was a reason why the British shipyards were so slow. As war approached, the British government could not risk such powerful vessels leaving British waters while Turkey was flirting with Germany. The First Lord of Admiralty Winston Churchill was aware that an embargo would mean a diplomatic crisis but he could not take the risk that these battleships would be engaged against the Royal Navy.

In the morning of 1 August 1914, officials of Armstrong shipyard had a meeting with the local military officers and in the afternoon same day, the docks were filled with British troops. Only 20 hours before the Turkish flag was to be hoisted on Sultan Osman, the ship was occupied and the Turkish crew was forced to evacuate the ship. On 3 August 1914, Churchill declared that the British government had embargoed the two battleships. When Britain declared war on 4 August 1914, the two ships were taken over by Britain without compensation because the Ottoman Empire was allied with Germany. Rauf Bey, Vasıf Ahmet Bey and the Turkish crew left Britain empty-handed and arrived in Istanbul on 22 August 1914.

On 5 August 1914, the Ottoman Ambassador to London, Tevfik Paşa, sent a telegram to Istanbul: “When I was informed that the British government has seized two battleships of ours and asked our officers to leave, I went to see the under-secretary of the Foreign Office. He said that these measures have been deemed necessary by the Admiralty. When I asked if it is a definitive seizure, he said that it was not an act that obliges the British government to buy the ships, and the government is free to buy them or to return them to us in the future. I tried to question the legitimacy of this arbitrary action, but he didn’t want to discuss and simply repeated what he said before.”4

The seizure of two dreadnaughts by Britain caused a shock in Istanbul. The Minister of Navy, Cemal Paşa, protested to Admiral Limpus, whereas Enver Paşa termed this act as a clear evidence of “British treachery.” Meanwhile, Reşadiye was commissioned in the Royal Navy as HMS Erin, and Sultan Osman became HMS Agincourt.

First Squadron
Yavuz (Colonel Richard Ackermann)
Barbaros Hayreddin (Colonel Muzaffer Bey)
Turgut Reis (Captain Namık Hasan Bey)
Mesudiye (Major Arif Nebi Bey)

Second Squadron
Midilli (Colonel Paul Kettner)
Hamidiye (Captain Vasıf Muhiddin Bey)
Peyk-i Şevket (Colonel İbrahim Cevat Bey)
Berk-i Satvet (Major Hamdi Bey)

First Destroyer Squadron
Numune-i Hamiyet (out of service)
Muavenet-i Milliye (Major Ahmet Saffet Bey)
Gayret-i Vayaniye (Captain Cemil Ali Bey)
Yadigar-ı Millet (Captain Rauf Sait Bey)

Second Destroyer Squadron
Samsun (Captain Nezir Abdullah Bey)
Taşoz (Captain Tevfik Halit Bey)
Basra (out of service)
Yarhisar (Captain Ahmet Hulusi Bey)

First Torpedo Boat Squadron
Draç (Captain Aziz Mahmut Bey)
Kütahya (Captain İbrahim Halil Bey)
Musul (Captain Ahmet Naim Bey)
Akhisar (out of service)

Second Torpedo Boat Squadron
Sultanhisar (Captain Rıza Mehmet Bey)
Demirhisar (Captain Ahmet Şefik Bey)
Sivrihisar (Captain Mehmet Sabri Bey)
Hamidabad (Captain İbrahim Kerim Bey)

Mine Group (Major Nazmi Emin Bey)
Yunus (Captain Ahmet Mahmut Bey)
Nusrat (Captain Hakkı Bey)
İntibah (Major Ahmet Halit Bey)
Nilüfer (Captain Hasan Murat Bey)

Rauf Bey’s memoirs reveal the fact that there has been a serious tension between Admiral Souchon and the Turkish officers. The Minister of Navy, Cemal Paşa, was in Palestine with the Fourth Army, and as Rauf Bey claims, Souchon took advantage of this absence and took the Ministry under his control in way that it would serve the German benefits. Rauf Bey, who was the new Chief of the Staff of the Navy, writes: “This admiral recognized none of us. He didn’t even report to Enver Paşa, insisting that he is only responsible to the German headquarters.”

Although the Turkish Navy was considerably weaker than those of the Allied nations, its performance during the world war has been much better than what it had accomplished in the Balkan War and it contributed remarkably to the Turkish war efforts. First of all, in the Russian-dominated Black Sea, the Turkish fleet protected the transportation lines, especially the supply routes to the Caucasus front and the coal transportation route between Zonguldak and Istanbul. It also defended the Bosphorus preventing possible intrusions by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, raided Russian coasts and supply lines. There have been several instances when Turkish battleships clashed with the Russian fleet in Black Sea. They managed to sink three Russian battleships with a total tonnage of 7,900 tons.

In the Sea of Marmara, the Turkish fleet guarded the supply lines between Istanbul and Çanakkale and fought the enemy submarines that attempted to break these lines. In the Gallipoli campaign, it played a significant role by laying mines and supporting the Turkish land units. Out of 16 British and French vessels (92,273 tons) sunk at the Dardanelles, 27,875 tons were sunk by German submarines in Turkish waters, 41,155 tons were sunk by mines, 13,150 tons were sunk by the destroyer Muavenet-i Milliye, 800 tons were sunk by the torpedo boat Sultanhisar and a further 1,115 tons were sunk by patrol boats.6   

At the Sinai front, during the assault on the Suez Canal, Turkish ships fought against British naval units with mines. In Mesopotamia, in addition to mine laying operations, a river flotilla was active. In all these operations, Turkish sailors cooperated with German experts who contributed substantially to Turkish naval capabilities.

The Turkish fleet suffered great losses during the war. In addition to the two dreadnaughts seized by the British government before the war, the Turkish Navy lost battleships with a total tonnage of 32,218 tons. These losses include Mecidiye, Yarhisar, Mesudiye, Barbaros, Gayret-i Vataniye, Yadigar-ı Millet and Midilli.  Furthermore, 7,124 tons of support vessels were lost and 7 battleships of a a total tonnage of 26,309 tons were damaged.

In September 1917, Admiral Souchon returned to Germany and was replaced by Admiral Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz. The latter planned a raid to the islands of Imbros and Lemnos. This raid was a failure with Midilli sinking after hitting a mine and Yavuz hardly surviving serious damages and returning to the Dardanelles. This was one of the last operations of the Turkish fleet.

Turkey’s war was over with the armistice signed at the port of Mudros on Lemnos on 30 October 1918. On 3 November 1918, the Navy Commander Arif Paşa ordered all flags to be struck on all the battleships lying at the Golden Horn in Istanbul. When the ensign was lowered, the Imperial Ottoman Navy ceased to exist. During the last weeks of 1918, the battleships were disarmed in accordance with the terms of the armistice, as the Allied fleet was anchoring at the Bosphorus.