The Ottoman Empire officially entered into the First World War as the result of a major naval operation, namely Yavuz and Midilli’s raid on Russian Black Sea ports in late October 1914. Although this first naval operation of the war was an offensive one, Turkish war efforts at the sea remained essentially defensive in character throughout the course of the war (though occasional sorties into Russian waters were undertaken) and they were almost exclusively restricted to the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. Despite several technical and tactical problems, especially a chronic shortage of food, the fleet provided valuable assistance to the Turkish efforts at Gallipoli and the Caucasus.

Yavuz and Midilli, the commander of the German Mediterranean Squadron (Mittelmeerdivision der Kaiserlichen Marine), Admiral Wilhelm Souchon was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Turkish Navy as of 18 August 1914. Souchon immediately launched reforms in the navy and began to prepare it for the approaching war. The Dardanelles were fortified, the Bosphorus and on 27 September 1914 the Turkish Straits were officially closed to all international shipping.

From the first day on, Souchon championed the idea of a Black Sea campaign against the Russians, which would serve Germany’s purpose of drawing Turkey into the war in order to open a new front. At the same time, Enver Paşa was discussing with Berlin proposals for Turkish intervention in the war, which included a fleet action to seize naval supremacy in the Black Sea without prior war declaration on Russia.1 Finally, on 25 October, Enver Paşa gave a sealed order to Souchon, which explicitly called for “Black Sea maneuvers with the entire fleet and an attack on the Russian fleet if a suitable opportunity presented itself.”2 Simultaneously, the Minister of Navy, Cemal Paşa, ordered Turkish ship commanders to comply with the orders of Souchon under any circumstances.

Souchon's Black Sea Raid

On 27 October, battle-cruisers Yavuz and Midilli; cruisers Hamidiye, Berk-i Satvet and Peyk-i Şevket; destroyers Gayret-i Vataniye, Muavenet-i Milliye, Taşoz and Samsun; and minelayers Nilüfer and Samsun assembled off the coast of Kilyos, north of Istanbul and set sail to the Black Sea. It was the first time after almost four decades that the Turkish fleet was entering the Black Sea for a mission. The operation was disguised as a drill, however during the same day, Souchon called a captains’ meeting aboard the Yavuz and unfolded the real plan of a series of closely coordinated attacks on Russian Black Sea ports, which deviated from Enver’s order of engaging the Russian fleet first. Accordingly, Yavuz would attack the Sevastopol port together with the destroyers Taşoz and Samsun and one minelayer; Midilli and Berk-i Satvet would attack Novorossiysk and lay mines at the Kerch Strait; Hamidiye would attack Feodosia; Gayret-i Vataniye and Muavenet-i Milliye together with a minelayer would attack Odessa and lay mines off the coast of Ochakiv; whereas Peyk-i Şevket’s job was to cut the underwater communication cable between Varna and Sevastopol.

The first ships to arrive their destination were Gayret-i Vataniye and Muavenet-i Milliye, which entered the port of Odessa at 3:00 am on 29 October. There was only minimal resistance by the Russians who were caught the surprise. A Russian gunboat, Donetsk, was sunk with a torpedo fired from Gayret-i Vataniye, another gunboat, Kubanets, was damaged by gunfire, the minelayer Beshtau was set on fire and four merchant ships were damaged. The two Turkish destroyers shelled the port for around one hour, destroying the power station and damaged the oil facilities. Meanwhile Samsun laid 28 mines between Odessa and Sevastopol. All the three ships then returned safely to Istanbul.

The main target of the Turkish fleet was the port of Sevastopol. At 5:00 am on 29 October, Yavuz approached the port of Sevastopol behind the destroyers Taşoz and Samsun, after Nilüfer had dropped mines in the harbor approaches under the cover of the darkness. Yavuz fired a total of 59 rounds, however since they were informed about the raid on Odessa, Russian commanders defending Sevastopol were well prepared and the Turkish fire was returned effectively by Russian coastal batteries. Yavuz received three hits and had to withdraw without achieving its target. On its way back, Yavuz met the Russian minelayer Prut accompanied by three torpedo boats led by Leitenant Pushkin. After a brief engagement, Prut was sunk and the Russian torpedo boats withdrew (According to Turkish sources Prut was loaded with 700 mines, whereas Russian sources state that there were 110 mines aboard).3 Later during the day Yavuz captured the Russian steamer Ida and Nilüfer managed to sink the steamer Velikii Kniaz Aleksandr. Meanwhile, the commander of The Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Eberhardt, tried to bring Yavuz into battle with his pre-dreadnaught force, however after two days of cruising the latter headed back home.

In the early hours of 29 October, as Berk-i Satvet approached Novorossiysk, Midilli was establishing a 60-piece mine barrage in front of the Kerch Strait. At 10 am, Berk-i Satvet opened fire at the port installations and later Midilli arrived and joined in. The shelling went on for two hours, Midilli alone fired 300 rounds and the damage in Novorossiysk was considerably greater than what had been inflicted on other target ports. Meanwhile, the mines laid by Midilli sank two Russian steamers.

As Novorossiysk was under attack, another Turkish cruiser, Hamidiye was shelling the port of Feodosia. After this operation, Hamidiye cruised for a while along the Crimean coast, sinking the steamer Shura and the merchant ship Svyatov Nikolai on the way. On the other hand, the least successful among all the Turkish ships taking part in the Black Sea campaign was Peyk-i Şevket, which failed to cut the underwater communication cable between Varna and Sevastopol due to engine problems

By the time Souchon had sailed to the Black Sea with its fleets, preparations were already completed to protect the Bosphorus from Russian attacks. Bosphorus Fortified Zone Command was responsible for the defense of the strait and in addition to the two battle cruisers (Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis) and four torpedo boats (Hamidabad, Sivrihisar, Sultanhisar and Demirhisar) patrolling the entrance of the Bosphorus, mines were laid and coastal batteries were strengthened.

Russian Minefields

On 2 November 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey and two days later the Russian Black Sea Fleet (Chernomorskiy Flot) set sail towards Istanbul. The purpose of this first operation of the Russian fleet was to lay an offensive minefield off the Bosphorus and if possible to entice Yavuz into it.4 Four new destroyers, Gnevnyi, Derzkii, Bespokoynyi and Pronzitelnyi, laid the minefield and the following morning the old battleship Rostislav, together with the cruiser Kagul and six older destroyers bombarded the port of Zonguldak, the largest provider of coal supplies for the Turkish Navy. The Russians were hoping that Yavuz and the other Turkish warships would leave the Bosphorus and en route to Zonguldak they would run into the newly laid minefield. However, this did not happen, because, unknown to the Russian commanders, Yavuz was already on the sea as Zonguldak was bombed.

As the news from Zonguldak arrived, Yavuz and Berk-i Satvet were sailing towards Crimea. They immediately changed their direction to Ereğli on the Turkish Black Sea coast, in order to keep the Russian fleet busy so that to prevent them from moving towards east where troops transportation to the Caucasus front was in progress.5 The Russian squadron, however, returned to Sevastopol, without encountering Yavuz. On the same day, 7 November, Midilli shelled the port of Poti on the Caucasian coast.

Turkish transports routes were indeed under threat. On 6 December, three Turkish ships carrying supplies to the Caucasian front, Mithatpaşa, Bahr-i Ahmer and Bezm-i Alem, were sailing without escort when they encountered the Russian fleet that has bombed Zonguldak. All of them were sunk by the Russians, losing not only the valuable supplies including two aircrafts and an air battalion, but also 203 men, of whom 120 were taken prisoner by the Russians.

Yavuz and Midilli sortied from the Bosphorus and sailed to the Crimean waters. On 18 November, around 12:00 noon, they sighted the Russian fleet off the Cape of Sarych. Russian ships were in line ahead formation with Sv. Evstafi (Eberhardt’s flagship) leading, followed by Ioann Zlatoust, Panteleimon and the two older battleships Tri Sviatitelya and Rostislav. Midilli remained outside the effective fire range, as were the Russian destroyers and the battle took the shape a duel between Yavuz and Sv. Evstafi. There was fourteen minutes of gunfire exchange and then the action was over due to the thickening of the fog. Both ships received hits and were damaged badly, but managed to return home safely. Not so lucky was the Turkish minelayer Nilüfer, which, one day after this battle, hit a mine off the Bosphorus and was lost with its 52 personnel.

On 20 November, Hamidiye shelled the port installations and oil tanks at Tuapse on the Caucasian coast, after which it embarked on a two-week operation, together with Midilli and Mecidiye, escorting transport ships carrying ammunition and other supplies to Trabzon. It was crucial to protect the supply lines against the Russians, however Souchon was pessimistic about this. He reported to the Turkish High Command that the Caucasus campaign should not rely on sea transportation, of which the smooth functioning could only be a result of luck, given the threat posed by the Russian fleet.

On 6 December, Yavuz accompanied by Berk-i Satvet, Peyk-i Şevket and Mecidiye set sail from Istanbul, escorting transport ships carrying troops and supplies for the Turkish army in the Caucasus. Enver Paşa was on board the Yavuz to see the situation himself. However, the main supply port, Trabzon, was found to be closed and therefore the convoy was diverted to Rize. Two weeks ago Russian minelayers Kseniya and Konstantin had established an offensive minefield off the eastern Anatolian coast, blocking not only Trabzon, but also Samsun, Ünye and Akçaabat.

After completing this escort mission, Yavuz and Peyk-i Şevket detached from the group, proceeded to Batumi and bombed the port there. The Russian fleet sailed to intercept, but they could not find the Turkish ships.

On 20 December, Russian minelayers Kseniya, Aleksey, Georgyi and Konstantin departed from Sevastopol for Bosphorus. At the night of 21/22 December, they established the second and third offensive minefields off Bosphorus. One of them had 370 mines and was blocking the Bosphorus-Sevastopol route, while the other had 320 mines and blocking the Zonguldak-Bosphorus route. Mines were laid in deep water, between 165-200 meters and since the Turkish mine sweeping equipment were inadequate; Turks could not provide sufficient protection against these mines. Turkish vessels worked very hard until February 1915 in order to ensure the safety of the Bosphorus and fortunately for them, the fact that the Russians did not undertake another mining operation for the next 1.5 years prevented the situation from getting more complicated.

While the Russian minelayers were busy off the Bosphorus, Yavuz and Hamidiye were again escorting transports to the east. After completing this duty, Hamidiye shelled the Batumi port once again.

At this time, the Russians were launching another attempt to block the port of Zonguldak, this time by using block ships. On 23 December, these block ships were joined by the battle force as Midilli was leaving the Bosphorus for its rendezvous with Yavuz off Sinop. Early the next morning Midilli encountered one of the Russian block ships and opened fire. Rostislav responded to Midilli’s fire, however it could not prevent three block ships from being scuttled in deep water during action. Midilli later changed its direction in order to escape a possible engagement with the larger Russian battle fleet.

On the next day at 4:30 pm, Midilli met with Yavuz and received the order to turn to east to patrol the Anatolian coast. Yavuz headed home, however on 26 December, as it was entering the Bosphorus, it hit a Russian mine. The damage was severe; the ship took on over 600 tons of water, yet it survived, thanks to its sturdy construction. It was also lucky, because the damage occurred on both sides, preventing a strong list to one side. Yavuz managed to reach the docks and it was taken under repair.

At the Black Sea, the winter lull was a very short one, if there had been any. Russian mines were proving to be extremely effective and the year 1915 started with two Turkish ships hitting the mines, Berk-i Satvet on 2 January and the Burak Reis gunboat on 10 January. The good news on the Turkish side was that Yavuz could set sail again although part of her damages was still unrepaired. She sailed on 13 January, one day before the Russian Black Sea Fleet raided the Anatolian coast once again, sinking a steamer.

Meanwhile things were going downhill for the Turkish land troops on the Caucasian front. After the disaster of Sarıkamış, Enver Paşa, who was returning from the front to Istanbul sent a cable to the Navy command and asked for increased naval transportation of troops to this particular front where a renewed Russian offensive was imminent. Cemal Paşa, the Minister of Navy, was not sympathetic towards this idea. Not only was the danger of being intercepted on the way too high, but also a possible loss of Yavuz could not be tolerated. By the end of January 1915, the Turkish High Command had given up the idea of transporting reinforcements to the Caucasian front through Black Sea routes.8

On 6 February, Midilli appeared off the coast of Batumi and opened fire on the Russian torpedo boats in the harbor. Meanwhile, the Russian fleet was patrolling the east Black Sea and Midilli changed its direction to Crimea in order to avoid an engagement. After sinking three small ships off Yalta, she returned to Istanbul. Russians responded by shelling the port of Trabzon on 8 February.

This was a time when the Russian fleet was not only receiving newly commissioned large destroyers, but also the coastal defenses along the Russian Black Sea coastline were being strengthened. On 1 March, the Russian fleet, which now included the new submarine Nerpa that went into action for the first time, bombarded the ports of Zonguldak and Ereğli.

Mecidiye Lost

18 March 1915 was the fateful day when the Allied attempts to force the Dardanelles had failed. On the same day, the Russian Black Sea fleet carried out its first diversionary bombardment of the Bosphorus, undertaken with the purpose of attracting the Turks’ attention away from the Dardanelles.9 Only one run was made and there was no significant response from the Turkish coastal batteries. The next day, operation discontinued due to the thick fog and the Russian fleet commander decided to attack the coal producing areas instead. Meanwhile, on the very same day, Midilli appeared off Feodosia and shelled the torpedo factory there and successfully escaped the pursuit of two Russian cruisers.

In early 1916, as the Russian land forces in the Caucasian front were commencing an offensive against the Turks and advancing towards Erzurum, the Russian Black Sea Fleet stepped up its raids on the Turkish coastline in Trabzon area, with the purpose of interdicting the flow of Turkish supplies and reinforcements by sea. At the same time Russian raids against coal convoys continued in the western part of the Black Sea.

After Erzurum fell on 16 February, the Turkish High Command ordered Midilli to carry a machine gun detachment, as well as airplane bombs and general ammunition  to Trabzon. Midilli left Istanbul on 27 February and the next day she was informed that two Russian ships, Pronzitelnyi and Bespokoynyi were moving to the west after having bombed Giresun. Two sides encountered each other later that day, however Midilli refrained from an exchange of gunfire and retreated successfully.

The port of Trabzon fell to the Russian land forces on 18 April, which was heavy blow for Turkish war efforts both on the land and at Black Sea. This capture came as the result of successful cooperation between Russian land forces and navy, which had already began to bear fruits when Russians captured Pazar and Çayeli on 6 March and landed two brigade at Rize on 7 April. Amphibious operations continued after Trabzon fell. Troops landed at Kovata, 10 km east to Trabzon, on 7 May and at Terme on 2 November.

Russia Spiralling Down

Black Sea operations were now directly linked to the war on the land. From May onwards, both sides intensified their mine-laying and minesweeping operations in various parts of the Black Sea. Yavuz could not be very active in this period, because it was still undergoing reparations. The only significant action of hers took place on 4 July, when it attacked Tuapse and Lazarevskoje, simultaneously with Midilli’s attack on Sochi. It was to be the last operation of Yavuz at the Black Sea during the World War. These attacks were a substantial psychological blow to the Russians and led to the dismissal of Admiral Eberhardt, who was replaced by Admiral Kolchak as the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

On 21 July, Midilli set sail again on a mine-laying mission with 65 mines to be laid off Novorossiisk. The next day, as she was around 100 miles north of Sinop, she spotted four Russian vessels cruising on the Sevastopol-Trabzon route. The first ship to engage Midilli was the Shchastlivyi, who retreated after Midilli returned fire, drawing her close to Imperatritsa Maria. The dreadnaught opened fire and Midilli could save itself only by laying a smoke screen around herself. The engagement went on for the whole day and Midilli suffered damages, however managing to return safely back to Istanbul. The Russian destroyers that were ordered to chase Midilli could not do so because of heavy rain.

Russians received a heavy blow on 20 October 1916, when Imperatritsa Maria, anchored at the port of Sevastopol had a series of explosions and had to be flooded. The reason of these fatal explosions still remains a unknown and whereas a sabotage could be possible the most common explanation today is that it was a case of self-ignition of the cordite.13 This was immediately followed by a loss on the Turkish side. The destroyer Gayret-i Vataniye ran on uncharted rocks off the Bulgarian coast on 28 October and had to be abandoned.

Romania’s entry into the war shifted the focus of the war in this theatre to the western part of the Black Sea. German aircrafts and submarines began to concentrate their efforts on interrupting the Russian sea traffic to Romania and several sorties were made on the port of Constanta to this end. Midilli joined these efforts by laying mines off the Danube.

The year 1917 saw the continuation of action in all areas of the Black Sea, albeit at a decreasing rate. The revolution in Russia was felt in the Black Sea Fleet but it did not change the course of events and hostilities continued until the armistice was signed. Russian ships continued to raid the Turkish coasts and Russian commanders began to press harder on a possible Bosphorus landing in order to save the war efforts of the Entente in this theatre. However these landings never took place, because the effects of the revolution were weakening the Russian fleet. Supplies were not coming anymore and discipline was cracking.

Midilli entered the Black Sea on 24 June and laid 70 mines in the Danube delta, after which she landed a small landing party on Fidonisi Island (TR: Yılanadası) where a Russian wireless station was destroyed and 11 prisoners were taken. The next day, a group of Russian warships that were on a mine-laying mission sighted Midilli (and the accompanying Basra). Imperatritsa Ekaterina II (renamed as Svobodnaya Rossiya after the revolution) opened fire on her, however Midilli managed to remain outside the firing range and made it safely back to Istanbul.

The Turkish side lost two ships during the second half of the year. On 10 July, Yadigar-ı Millet was bombed by a British aircraft as it was anchored in Istanbul. Yavuz and Midilli, which were also at the port then, remained unharmed by this bombing attack.On 29 October, torpedo boat Hamidabad was attacked by two Russian destroyers and sunk as it was escorting a mine laying operation near İğneada.

After the loss of Hamidabad, Midilli undertook a series of enemy finding missions in the Black Sea during the first few weeks of November 1917.These were the last operations of the war at the Black Sea. By the end of 1917, the Russian Black Sea Fleet ceased to exist as a fighting force  After that, the task of the Turkish Navy was to oversee the disarming process of the Russian fleet, to clean the Bosphorus area from enemy mines and to ensure safe navigation. This task was completed by October 1918.