Palestine
Part I: Forcing the Canal

The Suez Canal (TR: Süveyş Kanalı) was one of the most important objectives in the war plans of the German High Command. Seizing the Canal would mean denying the use of the waterway to the Allies, which would be a great blow to the British who were transferring troops from India and other dominions to support fronts in Europe.

Britain was controlling Egypt’s government since 1882, although the nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire had continued. In 1914, Egypt decided to enter into the war in support of the British and Britain in turn declared a protectorate over Egypt and deposed the Governor Abbas Hilmi Paşa, replacing him with Hüseyin Kamil Paşa who was appointed Sultan of Egypt. The British were now facing two threats: the anti-British sentiment felt by many Arab citizens of Egypt and the possibility of attack from the Ottoman Army. From the Ottoman point of view, however, it was more like a matter of prestige. An early victory in the war and the re-capture of Egypt would increase the Ottoman influence on the Muslim world.

In November 1914, the Turkish High Command decided to establish a new formation in Syria in preparation for a major offensive. The problem was that the Second Army and the VI Corps, which were originally located in Syria, were already moving towards their war stations around Istanbul. The Suez project was not a foreseen one and with the absence of the Second Army and the VI Corps there now existed a requirement to establish a new formation to launch the attack. Hence, a new army headquarters, the Fourth, was established in Syria and the XII Corps was deployed from Iraq to Syria. 8th, 10th and 22nd infantry divisions we ordered to move to Syria and Palestine from their original positions in Thrace, Izmir and Hejaz respectively. A new division, the 25th, was formed and added to the VIII Corps.

A few days after the Turkish declaration of war, Enver Paşa asked Cemal Paşa, who was then the Minister of Marine, to see him. Enver, who was lying on his bed because of an injured foot, told Cemal that he wants him to replace General Halepli Zeki Paşa as the commander of the Fourth Army, because the latter was demanding reinforcements for the defence of Syria instead of executing Enver’s orders for an attack on Egypt without questioning. Cemal Paşa accepted the offer and left Istanbul on 21 November 1914 for Syria.

After a long and adventurous trip through Anatolia, Cemal Paşa arrived Aleppo (TR: Halep) in Syria. He was truly disappointed by the transportation infrastructure. The roads were far from being suitable for the transportation of an army. In act they were no different than swamps. The road between Alexandretta (TR: İskenderun) and Aleppo was flooded and automobiles could not be used. He had to proceed on horseback and sometimes even on the back of a soldier. He said to himself: “Here we are! This is the only road connecting my army to the motherland. So much work to do!”

The Attack on the Suez Canal
 
After inspecting the XII Corps, commanded by Colonel Fahri Bey, in Aleppo, Cemal Paşa arrived Damascus (TR: Şam) in early December. He established his headquarters at the Hotel Damascus Palace and began to work on campaign plans with Mersinli Cemal Paşa (commander of the VIII Corps), Colonel von Frankenberg (chief of staff of the Fourth Army) and Colonel von Kressenstein (chief of staff of the VIII Corps).
 
By the time Cemal Paşa arrived in Syria, Britain had assembled some 70,000 troops in Egypt. Major-General Sir John Maxwell was commander-in-chief and led mostly Indian divisions, as well as the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, local formations and the I Anzac Corps. 30,000 of the troops stationed in Egypt manned defences along the Suez Canal. However the desert was unoccupied. The British were not interested in the region east to the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, members and gunmen of the Turkish secret service were also arriving in the region and planning their operations.

The plan envisioned the 25th Division of the VII Corps and a regiment made up from elements of the 23rd and 27th divisions thrust across the Sinai Desert to cut the Suez Canal at its midpoint of Ismailia (TR: İsmailiye). This was to be the first echelon and would be accompanied by 8 batteries of field artillery, 1,000 horses, 300 oxen and 12,000 camels. The second echelon comprised the 10th Infantry Division and flank guards were provided by the 23rd Infantry Division. Remainder of the VIII Corps would guard the long Lebanese coast and other units of the Fourth Army would garrison Syria and Palestine.

The gathering point for the VIII Corps was Beersheba (TR: Birüssebi), which was inland, well away from the reach of British naval artillery. From there, 25,000 men would march 300 kilometres across the desert and reach Ismailia. However, this was nothing but a mission impossible. Moreover, every man was allowed one kilogram of food and drink water per day and this meant that they needed 15,000 camels. But what they had was just 2,000. Cemil Paşa mentioned this problem in his memoirs as follows: “I think there are many people who are wandering why we couldn’t find the required 15,000 camels in a place like Syria and Hejaz. I want to tell them that it is not as it seems. Not every camel is suitable to be used as carriage and the number of those, which are suitable, is limited. I am the one who knows the problems we faced when we had to find 14,000 camels within one month.”

Water posed a particular problem. The rain season was spanning December and January and the march had to be contemplated during this period because in the dry season it was not possible even to take a single battalion across the desert, let alone a 25,000 strong army. In the desert, the temperatures were going up to 50 degrees Celsius during the day, falling to minus 10 at night.
 
The rationing of food and water was specially designed for this campaign. The so called “desert ration” consisted of 600 grams of biscuits, 150 grams of palm fruit, 9 grams of tea and 4 kilograms of water per man per day. 5 kilograms of barley and 18 kilograms of water were allowed per horse and 3 kilograms of barley and 5 kilograms of water was allowed per camel. On the route from Beersheba to Ismailia there were no villages or towns. According to the calculations, the Turkish forces were supposed to have 4 days of rations left by the time they would arrive in Ismailia.

Movement forward began on 14 January 1915. Ali Fuad Bey, a staff officer from the headquarters of the Fourth Army, describes the scene in his memoirs: “Cemal Paşa was the leader of the group. He was mounted on a beautiful white horse and moving towards the point where the sun was going down: to Ismailia! ... The marching formation in the desert was good and so was the desert itself. An ocean of sands, stretching very far and shining brilliantly like melted gold under the sunshine. In the horizon, there are mountains which are coloured with the lights of the sun...Violet, red, pink... Mountains shining in many different colours... And above them all, the cloudless, dark blue sky! One can see the wild beauty of the nature in the Sinai Desert.”

For the first week they marched in daylight and moved huge water tanks with themselves. After the first week, Turkish units conducted their march at night in order to avoid being discovered by British reconnaissance planes. Pontoons and boats, which would be useful for crossing the canal, were also moved across the desert. The morale was high, the favourite chant was “Let the crescent rise over Cairo!”

On the way, contingents of Muslims, such as Bedouins, Kurds, Durzis and Arabs were recruited. Cemal Paşa was also hoping that the Egyptian patriots would revolt and hit the British from behind. Ali Fuad Bey wrote in his memoirs about how the Turks were impressed by the sight of the Canal: "On the other bank, projecters positioned at every 2-3 kilometers were cross-lighting the area and they were almost turning the night into day. Inside this flood of light, the Canal was shining like a silver corridor. The traffic was going on in the Canal and transatlantics were passing slowly and shiningly inside lights. On the other shore, the city of Ismailia and the towns of Tosum and Serapeom were offering quite a peaceful sight. Here nad there one could see the silhouettes of warships on the horizon."

On 31 January, the 25th Division, which was the centre column, as well as the right and left wing columns arrived in their assembly areas 10 kilometers east of the town of Ismailia.

Two days later, the 25th Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ali Fuad Bey and supported by 8 batteries of field artillery, moved forward to its assault position on the east bank of the canal. The right and left wing columns were to conduct feint attacks on Kuneytre and Suez, but major action was prevented by a sandstorm. The early hours of the following morning saw the main Turkish attack with inflatable pontoons and rafts, the Turkish made their way to the eastern bank of the canal and into the water, to be met by Anglo-Indian machine gun fire which cut the advancing ranks of boats to ribbons and tore through the massing Turkish troops on the water's edge.

Turkish troops were not well trained in water-crossing operations and they were also late. The sun was already going up when they were entering the water. Only two companies managed to reach the west bank. Others either left their boats and fled inland or gunned down by the British.

During the day of 3 February, Turks managed to hold a bridgehead but the opponent was simply to strong and there was no point in insisting to keep that position. There was also heavy artillery fire from British naval units in Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah (Crocodile) and railroad guns. The army headquarters, which was positioned 3.5 km east of the canal on a sand hill also took direct hits. As of 3 PM on 3 February, there were only 3 pontoons left and forcing the canal and attempting to cross it was impossible. Cemal Paşa gathered his staff and discussed the situation.

The attack on the Suez Canal cost the Fourth Army total casualties of 1,300 men including 192 dead, 381 wounded and 727 missing or captured. British casualties were only 150.

A discussion between Cemal Paşa and Colonel von Kressenstein is worth to note here. Von Kressenstein, who could not accept this defeat said: “Dear Paşa, we might have failed in the offensive. However I think that today the task of our forces is to die in front of the canal!” Cemal’s reply was brief: “If there is no hope for success, I won’t let my forces perish just for the sake of honour.” He ordered withdrawal.

Cemal Paşa’s own account of this failure, which we can read in his memoir is very interesting: “I have never imagined that a force armed with 14,000 rifles, few mountain batteries and just a single howitzer battery, an army which has only 5-10 pontoons to cross the canal in less than 4 days, could ever manage to move across the canal and beat the enemy. Although this was the fact, I gave an opposite impression to the headquarters and to my units so that nobody could realise that this first campaign to the canal was nothing but a feint.”

Cemal Paşa further claims in his memoirs that actually the campaign was successful because after all it was only a reconnaissance attack which achieved the target of “exploring the canal and possibilities of crossing it”.
 
By 15 February, the VIII Corps was pulled back to Gaza (TR: Gazze) and the 10th Division was stationed at the end of a defensive line in Beersheba. Later in 1915, on the orders of Enver Paşa, 8th, 10th and 25th divisions were sent to Gallipoli and in their place three new divisions were raised: 41st, 43rd and 44th.
 
For the remainder of 1915, Cemal Paşa contented himself with the organisation of his forces. He established the “Desert Force Headquarters” which would command the forces in Sinai. This headquarters was located in Beersheba and placed under the command of the German Colonel Von Kressenstein, who conducted raids against the Canal defenders. The idea was to keep British attention on Ottoman army and try to increase the standing forces in Egypt, and thus decrease available manpower for offensives such as Gallipoli.

Meanwhile, a railroad line of 264 km connecting Beersheba to Sinai was built. New wells were opened to increase the water supply and a telegram line of 100 km was installed for improved communication.

Second Canal Expedition

Cemal Paşa’s opinion was that the German High Command did not really care for the Sinai campaign. In November 1915, he made a trip to Istanbul and shared his thoughts with Enver Paşa, who was relieved because the troubles of Gallipoli were over. In February 1916, Enver made an expedition trip to Syria, Palestine, Sinai and Medina. Meanwhile German and Austro-Hungarian help began to arrive: 6 machine gun detachments, one 15 cm howitzer battery, one 10 cm artillery battery, 4 anti-aircraft detachments, an aircraft group, trucks, one 21 cm mortar detachment, 2 field hospitals and one mountain howitzer battalion with 12 guns.

In early 1916, the commander of the Allied forces in Egypt was General Sir Archibald Murray. His available forces comprised two British infantry divisions (the 42nd Division and the 52nd Division) and the Anzac Mounted Division, under General H.G. Chauvel, containing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the 5th Mounted Brigade. They had began to move left of the Canal towards Palestine in order to establish a fresh defensive line some 160 km away. 

Meanwhile the Turks were mooting a fresh attack upon the Canal. This time, the objective was not to capture the Canal itself but to establish control on its east banks. Soon they would realize that even this goal was hardly achievable with a desert operation in summer and they would concentrate on forcing the British to maintain large amounts of forces in this theatre of war.

On 23 April 1916, the Turks raided a British outpost at Katia, with 2 infantry battalions, 1 mountain howitzer battery and 1 volunteer camel cavalry regiment. It was a successful attempt and the British cavalry unit in Katia was taken prisoner together with its commander, 23 officers and 257 troopers. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir claims that the British soldiers were in the middle of a soccer match when Turks arrived. Katia was one of the outposts built on the east side of the Canal. There was no British existence there during the first Turkish attempt to take the Canal the previous year.
 
Reinforcements from Gallipoli arrived in late April, which increased the numbers of Ottoman forces to 11,873 men, 3,293 rifles, 56 machines gun, 30 artillery guns. However, a great disappointment emerged when the Arab Revolt broke out in June. Cemal Paşa had to send reinforcements to Hejaz, which weakened the Turkish strength in Palestine. Mecca, the holy city of Islam, fell on 9 July.

Being chased by the Allied forces, Turks had retreated to Al-Arish (TR: El Ariş). On 16 December, they evacuated El-Arish as well and moved along the coast to Rafa and inland up the valley to Magdhaba (TR: Magdaba). The Australian light horse that advanced to Al-Arish on 21 December found it abandoned by the Turks and was ordered to move onto Magdhaba).

When Colonel Von Kressenstein inspected the Turkish forces in Maghdaba he saw the shortcomings, but he was satisfied that the Magdhaba garrison could withstand any assault. The Allied assault on Magdhaba was made by the 1st and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade supported by three batteries of horse artillery. They reached the town shortly before dawn on 23 December. Australian aircraft attacked the Turkish defences at 6.30 am revealing the location of Turkish machine guns and trenches to the horsemen. The main line of the attack was made from the north and east, which faced heavy Turkish machine gun fire. However, the defenders could not resist long against mounted charges and by 4.30 pm all the Turkish redoubts had surrendered.

The British were keen to complete the advance across the north of the Sinai, believing this would compel the Turks to abandon their inland outposts as well. On the evening of 8 January 1917 the Anzac Mounted Division rode out of Al-Arish towards Rafa where a Turkish garrison was based.

The attack commenced with the dismounted troops advancing from the east and south. The Turks were in a strong defensive position and their redoubts were ideally placed to provide supporting fire for each other. The British advance was brought to a halt with the attackers up to a mile from their objectives. At the same time, a Turkish relief force was approaching from the east and British commanders decided to call off the attack and retreat back towards Al-Arish. However, as evening approached two brigades mounted final assaults in an attempt to get amongst the Turkish redoubts. In all cases when the attackers got into the Turkish trenches, the defenders surrendered and by nightfall the entire position had been captured. The British had suffered 71 killed and 415 wounded while the Turks lost about 200 killed, 168 wounded and 1,434 prisoners. The remaining Turkish garrisons in the Sinai at Al-Hassana (near Magdhaba) and Nekhl were captured or expelled in mid-February.