Mesopotamia
Part II: Dreams versus Realities

What the Ottoman High Command should have done after the victory in Kut-al-Amara was to strengthen its positions and reinforce the units. In this way, a renewed British offensive could be repulsed and Iraq could be kept in Turkish hands. However, instead of doing this, Enver Paşa decided to use the existing troops in Mesopotamia for a campaign in Iran against the Russians.

Halil Paşa was strongly opposed to this plan. He thought this was nothing but an adventure, which can only end in disaster. He sent several letters and cables to Enver criticizing his decision.  Since it was Enver who was in power, the XIII Corps was deployed to Iran.

At this point, one should browse through Halil Paşa’s memoirs to find out what he was thinking about the overall situation: “At that time we had won a magnificent victory in Iraq. But what we won was just a battle. The war was still going on. Therefore we should have left the victory behind and plan what we should be doing next. It was obvious that the British would not let us get away with it. There would be surely a revenge, a bigger settlement…. However, it was not the logic, which was working, it was dreams. Some German officers in Baghdad were playing some weird games. It was all about Iran!… One day I received an order from the High Command in Istanbul. It was asking me to leave sufficient forces to defend Tigris and to use the rest of my forces to reinforce the Iranian front and capture the town of Kermanşah. Yes, it was only dreams!… This would be nothing but an adventure. I immediately replied to the High Command. I said that the British, who didn’t forget their defeat at Kut, have now gathered a force of 100,000 rifles only 110 kilometers south of Baghdad. When they are doing this, it would be only an ignorant and bloody adventure if we move our forces from the Tigris to some place in the middle of Iran. However, the Deputy Head Commander was insisting on operations in Iran. When they were insisting, I was refusing…”

On 23 February, Maude launched an attack on both flanks, crossing the Tigris river. Realizing the threat of being encircled, Halil Paşa authorized immediate withdrawal. Rear guard actions bought enough time for Turks to evacuate most of the infantry.

The new Turkish defensive line was along the Diyala River, 15 kilometers below Baghdad. Halil Paşa had only 12,500 men left for the defense of Baghdad. Turkish High Command had realized the mistake of sending the XIII Corps to Persia after the victory in Kut. Under the command of Ali Ihsan Bey, was called back to Mesopotamia. However it was too late. XIII Corps could reach Hanekin on the border between Iraq and Iran on 14 March after walking 400 kilometers in 3 weeks. By that time Baghdad was already lost.

General Maude restarted his advance on 5 March along the east bank of the Tigris.  Three days later the British had reached the Diyala.  An immediate British attempt to cross the heavy rapid-flowing river failed, although night-crossings did succeed in establishing a small bridgehead the following evening. Maude’s aim was to outflank the Turkish forces and move directly to Baghdad.

On the morning of 10 March, Halil Paşa decided to retire from his position to instead protect the Baghdad-Berlin railway.  Sandstorms ended operations for the day; by the time the weather had settled Halil Paşa had decided upon a general retreat from Baghdad itself.  Thus at 8:00 pm on 10 March the evacuation of Baghdad was underway.

The next day, General Maude entered Baghdad amidst celebrations of the local Arabs. Baghdad was lost. It was a city, which was held by the Ottoman Empire for centuries. It had a huge emotional importance for Turks. Losing Baghdad was not an important strategic loss, but it was a psychological catastrophe.

Halil Paşa took his army about 60 kilometers up the Tigris. Now the right flank of the Sixth Army was resting at Ramadiye on the Euphrates and the left flank in Persia. He moved his headquarters to Mosul. General Maude did not pause to celebrate his victory in Baghdad and continued onwards to seek the capture of the railway at Samarrah, after which wide-scale operations were largely halted until the autumn.

British supply lines were inadequate, Mesopotamian summer was too tough and Maude was worried that Halil Paşa was preparing new armies for an offensive to take back Baghdad. Thus, by late March 1917, the situation in Mesopotamia was stabilized. Baghdad had left the Turkish history for good.

In September 1917, General Maude renewed operations and his first target was Ramadiye. The Turkish garrison was encircled as the British seized numerous ridges above the town.  An attempt to escape by Turkish forces on the night of 28 September was stopped by the British cavalry.  Having realized that they had no options, Turks surrendered on 29 September.

Maude dispatched General Alexander Cobbe at the head of two divisions further up the River Tigris to tackle newly established Turkish defensive positions some 13 kilometers north of Samarrah. Cobbe attacked Turkish lines on 5 November and succeeded after three hours fighting in taking the Turkish front line, although heavy British cavalry losses were incurred during a charge on the Turkish second lines. Turkish troops had to withdraw.

General Maude, who had successfully commanded British operations in the Mesopotamian theater so far, died of cholera on 18 November. He was replaced by General Sir William Marshall.
 
For most of the year 1918, the Mesopotamian theater remained  quiet. The British had to move troops to Palestine and the Turks were enabled to receive reinforcements. Nobody wanted to fight in Mesopotamia anymore.

Meanwhile the war was coming to an end and London was thinking about post-war arrangements. They saw a great interest in the seizure of Mosul and its oil resources. In addition to the oil, the area had to be cleared of the remaining Turkish influence, before the armistice was signed.

General Cobbe commanded a British force from Baghdad on 23 October 1918.  Within two days it covered 120 kilometers, reaching Little Zap River, where it expected to meet and engage the Turkish Sixth Army operating under Ismail Hakkı Bey.