Mesopotamia
Part I: British Advance and the Battles of Kut

The operational area of Mesopotamia in the First World War was composed of the lands watered by the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. Travel through the area was difficult because it was made of swamps and deserts. The Ottomans had conquered the region in early 16th century, but they could never establish an efficient system of administration there. The distance between Istanbul and the southernmost city in Mesopotamia, Basra, was 3470 kilometers, which meant a trip of four months for a caravan.

Before the war, there were two Turkish units stationed in Mesopotamia: XII Corps (35th and 36th Divisions) at Mosul  (TR: Musul) and XIII Corps (37th and 38th Divisions) at Baghdad  (TR: Bağdat).

The Turkish High Command was not expecting any major offensive in this region and therefore, by November 1914, the entire XII Corps was deployed to Syria, the headquarters and the 37th Division of the XIII Corps were en-route to the Caucasus. The Sixth Army Headquarters was scaled down and became the “Iraq Area Command” with the 38th Division under its command.
 
Meanwhile the British were planning to land troops in the Shatt-al-Arab region -where Tigris and Euphrates reached the Persian Gulf after merging with each other into one single river- in order to protect their oil interests. A reinforced infantry division from the Indian Army, the 6th Poona Division, was going to do this job. Having become aware of these plans, the Turks, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Süleyman Askeri Bey, redeployed portions of the 38th Division at the mouth of Shatt-al-Arab. The rest of the Turkish defensive force was stationed in Basra.

After this unexpected and easy success, British forces advanced further along the river. The Turks had withdrawn to Qurna  (TR: Kurna). After some regiment scale battles fought around the town, Kurna fell on 9 December. Turkish losses were 1200 prisoners and 9 cannons. The 38th Division was reduced to debris.
 
Enver Paşa had realized the mistake of underestimating the importance of the Mesopotamian theatre. The 35th Division, which was commanded by Mehmet Fazıl Paşa, was called back to Iraq and the 38th Division was reconstituted.
 
On 2 January 1915, Süleyman Askeri Bey, assumed the Iraq Area Command and the Governorship of Baghdad. His rank was too low for these duties, but he was a well known personality from the CUP and he was admired by Enver Paşa. Although he was brave and dedicated, his world view was sometimes too narrow and childish. Turkish historians quote him saying: “Deploying troops to Iraq is nothing but murder. We can easily draw the enemy to the sea using the local clans and we can use our forces to attack India and Beludjistan.” As soon as he took the command, Süleyman Askeri Bey sent letters to Arab sheikhs in an attempt to organize them to fight against the “infidels”.

The First Battle of Kut

Enver Paşa’s order to Süleyman Askeri Bey was to retake the Shatt-al-Arab region at any cost. Süleyman Askeri divided his forces in two. The Euphrates Wing was to be under his command and it would advance to Basra via Nasiriye. The Tigris Wing was given to the command of Mehmet Fazıl Paşa and it was composed of the 35th Division and Arab cavalry units.

The British maintained a cavalry brigade at Basra, which held the town of Shaiba  (TR: Şuaybiye) at the southern approach to the town of Basra. Süleyman Askeri’s forces first captured Nasiria  (TR: Nasıriye) and then entered the desert in the direction of Qurna.

On 12 April, early in the morning, Turks attacked the British camp at Shaiba with 3800 troops. Continuous attacks on that day and the next day failed to produce any results and after a British cavalry counterattack, the Turkish offensive was called off. Turkish casualties were 1000 men with another 400 taken prisoner.
 
British forces pursued the withdrawing Turks who were forced to retreat another 120 kilometers up the river, to Hamisiye. Meanwhile, Süleyman Askeri Bey, who was wounded at Shaiba, was trying to conduct the operation from his camp bed. He was briefly taken to hospital in Baghdad for treatment, but he wanted to be with his men. He was disappointed (especially about the performance of his Arab levies) and depressed. He shot himself.

Meanwhile in Istanbul, the General Staff did not even possess a proper map of Mesopotamia. First they tried to draw a map with the help of some people who used to work in Iraq before the war. When this failed, they bought two German maps scaled 1/1.500.000. Nurettin Paşa was appointed to the command of the Sixth Army (Iraq Area Command). He was given two orders by Enver Paşa: defending every inch of Iraq and launching an attack when the situation stabilizes. Reinforcements were flowing in too.

Due to the unexpected success in Mesopotamia, the British (i.e. the Indian Office and the Indian General Staff) decided to continue to advance up the river. General Townshend arrived in Kurna to assume the command. Driving onward, the British compared the river port of Amara on 3 May. After a brief pause due to the seasonal flooding, British forces took Nasiriye on Euphrates on 24 July and 1800 Turks were taken prisoner.

The rapid advance of the British up the river influenced the Arabs as well. They were realizing that the British had the upper-hand and therefore changing sides and joining the British efforts against the Turkish Army. In Amara, Arabs raided the military hospitals and massacred the Turkish soldiers there.

General Townshend knew that the opposition was weak. The Mesopotamian summer was over, the river was low and all conditions were favorable for a British advance. On 1 September they began to move, arriving the river town of Kut-al-Amara on 26 September. The town was defended by 12 Turkish battalions, which included a high number of Arab soldiers. 38 guns were providing artillery support. Early on 28 September, Townshend attacked on Turkish positions. At the end of the day Turks were in retreat. Kut-al-Amara was now in British hands and Turks suffered 1,700 casualties and lost 1,300 prisoners and 17 cannons to the British. After the loss of Kut-al-Amara, Turkish forces retreated a distance of 150 kilometers up the Tigris river and positioned themselves in Selman-ı Pak (the ancient Persian town of Ctesiphon), 35 kilometers south of Baghdad.

Defending Selman-ı Pak (Ctesiphon)
 
Ctesiphon was on the river of Tigris and it was also close to the holy city of Kerbela. The fortified zone was on the left bank of Tigris and it was occupying a front line of 10 kilometers. Nurettin Paşa was building his defensive formations there. He established two defense lines with three kilometers between them and his right flank was secured by the river.

In Ctesiphon, the 45th Division joined Nurettin Paşa’s forces and by 17 November the 51st Division also arrived with its 7 infantry battalions and a Schneider howitzer battalion. Nurettin Paşa was relying on 20,000 men armed with 19 machine guns, 52 artillery guns and some cavalry. 38th and 45th Divisions garrisoned the first defense line, whereas the 51st Division held the second one.

Early morning on 22 November, Townshend’s British and Indian forced attacked the Turkish lines in Ctesiphon, supported by artillery fire and naval gunfire from armed river boats. He had divided his forces in 4 columns. 3 of them would make a frontal attack, and one (mixed cavalry and infantry) would sweep around the east to outflank the position and move on Baghdad itself.

The column nearest to the river immediately ran into heavy rifle and artillery fire, and was brought to a standstill before they reached the first Turkish line. To the right, another columns reached its first objectives by capturing the first defensive line, but suffered heavy losses.
 
Around noon that day, the British cavalry attempted to outflank the Turks, but did not succeed. However, the British were gaining the upper-hand and Nurettin Paşa ordered a counter attack to be launched by the 51st Division which was lying in reserve. Fighting continued until late evening and both sides suffered heavy casualties.

The next day, another attempt by Townshend to flank the Turks through a cavalry attack failed, mainly because of a fierce sandstorm. Nurettin Paşa was trying to resist by sending whatever troops he had against the British. He could only capture back some of the territory lost the previous day. Townshend was equally hopeless. He had seized the first line, but it seemed impossible to break through. He had already suffered extreme losses and the Indians were surrendering in panic.

On 25 November, Townshend ordered withdrawal. The retreat was followed by the Turks and harassed by Arabs. The exhausted and depleted British force was urged back to the defenses of Kut-al-Amara, which was reached on 3 December. In Ctesiphon, the British suffered 4,500 casualties. Turkish losses were 9,500 out of 35,000 men in total. The 45th Division lost 65 percent of its troops.

The Second Battle of Kut
 
In the meantime, the Turkish Sixth Army was reorganized into 2 corps, the XIII and the XVIII. Nurettin Paşa, was given to the command of the 72-years old German Field Marshal Colmar von der Goltz. Nurettin was not happy and he expressed his feelings in a cable he sent to the Ottoman High Command in Istanbul: “The Iraq Army has already proven that it does not need the military knowledge of Goltz Paşa… The dilemma of sending a non-Muslim general to Iraq, which has a Muslim population and where we declared a Holy War, is remarkable.”

The Turkish Sixth Army pursued the retreating British forces into Kut. The siege of Kut began on 7 December 1915, with Turkish divisions encircling the town, digging a series of trenches across the neck of the bend in Tigris in which the town was located and cutting it off from Basra.

Meanwhile Townshend calculated that there were supplies in Kut for a month. He suggested an attempt to break out and retire, but this was rejected by Sir John Nixon, commander of British forces in Mesopotamia, who ordered him to remain and hold as many Turkish troops around Kut as possible. A relief force, under the command of General Aylmer was to be sent to Kut.

Turkish forces launched several attacks during December 1915 but they were all repulsed. Meanwhile some additional reinforcements arrived in Mesopotamia from the Third Army. The year 1916 began with the Turkish XVIII Corps, composed of 45th and 51st Divisions, encircling the town and the XIII Corps with the 35th and 52nd Divisions blocking the British relief force about 30 km down the Tigris.

Meanwhile, on 20 January, Enver Paşa replaced Nurettin Paşa with his own uncle, Colonel Halil Bey. Field-Marshal von der Goltz was technically in command of the whole Mesopotamian campaign, but he left the daily operations to Turkish commanders.

During January 1916, both Townshend and Aylmer launched several attacks in an attempt to break through the Turkish lines. All of them failed. Halil Bey knew the conditions in which the British had to live. He did not want to waste his troops when he had the advantage. He simply wanted to force to choose between starving or surrendering. In February, he received the 2nd Infantry Division as reinforcement. This unit joined the XIII Corps.

March and April 1916 witnessed a series of British attempts to break through the encirclement and General Aylmer’s attempts to relieve Kut. None of these attempts succeeded and their costs were too heavy. Both sides suffered high casualties. Food and hopes were running out for Townshend in Kut-al-Amara. Diseases were spreading rapidly and could not be cured.
 
On 24 April, an attempt by the paddle steamer “Julnar” to reach the town by river failed. At around 7:00 pm that day, Julnar, which was loaded with 270 tons of supplies, left the port of Felahiye. Its lights were switched off and the British artillery was firing upon the Turkish coast batteries, so that the engines of the ship could not be heard. Julnar managed to pass through the first defense lines without any trouble and it was sailing towards Kut. However, when it reached the Maxis Pass, elements of the Turkish 3rd and 7th Regiments opened fire. There were explosions on board, which cost the lives of many sailors, including the Captain himself. After one and a half hour, Julnar ran ashore and survivors were taken prisoner. The ship was full with flour, rice, biscuits and canned meat. This “booty” was welcomed by Turkish troops who were also suffering from food shortage.

Only very small quantities of supplies could be dropped from the air to Kut, but they were far from meeting the needs of the British.

Field Marshal von der Goltz died of cholera on 19 April. A few days later, Townshend decided to surrender. On 26 April he asked for a 6-day armistice and permission for 10 days food to be sent into the town. Halil Bey requested talks with Townshend the next day. During the talks, the Turkish side demanded unconditional surrender but Townshend offered a sum of 1 million pounds sterling, all the guns in the town, and a promise that the men would not again engage in fighting the Turkish army. Meanwhile the British garrison in Kut used the armistice time to destroy anything useful left in the town: howitzers, ammunition, stocks, etc.  At the end, Townshend was forced to surrender unconditionally.

At 1:00 pm on 29 April 1916, after a siege of 147 days, a Turkish infantry regiment entered Kut-al-Amara to receive the surrender. By 2:30 pm that day the Turkish flag was raised at the Town Hall. Overall, Townshend surrendered 13,309 men, including 272 British and 204 Indian officers, as well as 40 artillery pieces, 3 aircraft, 2 river steamers and 40 automobiles. The siege also cost them 1,000 KIA, 7,000 wounded and 731 died of diseases and starvation.
 
Turkish losses are mentioned by Colonel Halil Bey in his memoirs: “My army has lost more than 300 officers and 10,000 men during the siege of Kut and against the relief forces. However, on the other hand, it took 5 generals, 481 officers and 13,300 men from the British army as prisoners of war. Casualties of the British relief force total 30,000 men.”
 
General Townshend and his staff were sent to Baghdad on 1 May. After a brief stay in Baghdad, on 12 May, Townshend and some other British officers left Baghdad under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel İshak Bey. After a 20-day trip through Anatolia, Townshend arrived in Istanbul. On the way, in Pozanti, he met Enver Paşa who assured him proper treatment as a prisoner of war. General Townshend spent the rest of the war under house arrest on Büyükada, one of the Prince Islands on the Sea of Marmara.

Halil Bey, who became an overnight hero, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and received the honorific “Paşa”. He was 33 years old. After the capture of Kut-al-Amara, the campaign in Mesopotamia stalemated. Halil Paşa began to fortify the banks of Euphrates and Tigris. There was little action for the remainder of 1916.