Gallipoli
Part IV: Defending the Heights

As of late July, the Allied decision makers found themselves at a critical point. The Gallipoli campaign had gone into stalemate and they were not able to break through the Turkish lines. After months of bloody trench warfare, they were still confined two small beachheads, which meant that they were either to pull out from the peninsula or bring new forces that would break the stalemate. They chose the latter. The plan was to launch a second amphibious operation, this time at Suvla Bay, northwest to Anafartalar, in order to outflank the Turks. In this way, they were hoping to be able to eliminate the Turkish Northern Group, which in turn would mean an isolation of the Southern Group, to reach the Kilitbahir Plateau, to silence the Dardanelles batteries and to open the way to Istanbul for the Allied navy.

As the plans were drawn by the Allies, the defenders of the peninsula were aware of what would come next, although they were not sure about where it will happen. Most of the commanders, including Liman von Sanders and Esat Paşa were thinking that the next Allied invasion would come from further north at the Gulf of Saros, where the 6th, 7th and 12th Divisions (35,000 men in total) and a cavalry brigade were stationed. The Anafartalar Region Command, of which the responsibility covered the Suvla Bay had a strength of only 3,000 troops, commanded by the German Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Willmer.

This was a very small force for such a critical area and Mustafa Kemal Bey was worried. He could foresee the Allied attack focusing on Anafartalar, the right wing of the Turkish defence, but he could not persuade his superiors. They would simply not listen to him, which would prove to be a big mistake. Göncü and Aldoğan  write about the situation: “The General Staff and the Fifth Army Command, which were still not able to empathise with the enemy, continued to fail to understand the importance of the Kilitbahir Plateau when it was already August. Even though it was clearly apparent that the Allies would execute a new landing, they completely ignored the shores of Anafartalar, the surrounding hills and the Kocaçimen mountain range and left them with extremely weak units. This was a mistake, which could only be compensated by equally serious mistakes done by the Allies in later phases.” 1

The Hell that they Called Suvla Bay

On the evening of 6 August 1915, at around 5:30 pm, after one hour of combined gunfire from the Allied warships and artillery guns in Arıburnu, British troops landed at Suvla Bay, to the north of the peninsula. They could come ashore in force very quickly, since the units of the 47. Regiment of the Turkish 16th Division, could not resist much, since they were already under-strength and weakened by the bombardment. Still, the Turks managed to make the enemy lose a substantial amount of time. Over the next two days, British forces remained within only one kilometer of the landing beaches. They could capture Mestantepe (Chocolate Hill) and Karakol Dağı, but failed to take the heights surrounding the Anafartalar plain.

Meanwhile, on the same day as the Britons were landing at Suvla, the Australians launched a bayonet charge and got into the first line of Turkish trenches. Heavy fighting went on for the whole day in a very small area and when the sun set down, the Turks had not only lost 1,000 men but also the Kanlısırt Plateau (400 Plateau). Two regiments of the 57. Regiment tried to recapture the trenches, but this attempt failed.

Turks launched consequent counterattacks at Kanlısırt (Lone Pine) for three days without any outcome. However, reinforcements were coming in quickly and soon 15,000 fresh troops had arrived the area of combat. Kanlısırt could be taken back on 11 August at a cost of 7,164 casualties for the Turks, including 2,280 dead. The Anzacs, who could penetrate only 150 m, lost 2,000 men.2 Meanwhile, two diversion attacks in the southern sector launched by the British and French, on 6 and 7 August respectively, failed against the defence of the well positioned Turkish units.

The main element of the Allied plan was the strategy to attack north of the Arıburnu front, to encircle the Turks and to take Conkbayırı (Chunuk Bair) and Kocaçimen (Sari Bair). In the late hours of 6 August, they managed to capture the Halit ve Rıza Tepesi (Old No.3 Post) and advanced to Ağıldere and Damakçılık Bayırı (first ridge north of Ağıldere). The Turkish 14. Regiment was helpless against this surprise attack. The next morning, Anzacs had approached 500 meters to Conkbayırı and they were going forward. However, that night there had been remarkable changes made in the Turkish defence line. New units had arrived and the 9th Division, commanded by the German Colonel Hans Kannengiesser was given the task to keep the Conkbayırı-Kocaçimen line. Turks managed to stop the Anzacs and repulse them to Şahinsırtı (Rhododendron Spur). Units from the 4th Division arrived this front as reinforcements, but the Anzacs managed to stay at Şahinsırtı. During the battle, in the morning, Colonel Kannengiesser was wounded. It was now Lieutenant Colonel Cemil Bey, commander of the 4th Division, who was in charge.

Following a heavy Allied bombardment of the Conkbayırı-Düztepe (Battleship Hill) line, the New Zealanders launched a charge and captured the southern parts of Conkbayırı in the early hours of 8 August. Colonel Servet’s 64. Regiment inflicted casualties on the enemy, but failed to take the positions back. The rest of the day witnessed heavy fighting in which Turks managed to approach 30 meters to enemy lines.

Fighting for the Hills

While there was slaughter going on at Conkbayırı, there have been some changes in the command of the Turkish forces. German Lieutenant Colonel Pötrich was the new commander of the 9th Division whereas all the units in the area, including the reinforcements, were given to the newly established Anafartalar Group Command, commanded by Colonel Ahmet Feyzi Bey. There were now nearly 10,000 Turkish troops on the Kocaçimen-Conkbayırı line, the Allied advance had been stopped but Conkbayırı was still in enemy hands.

The situation was critical for the Turks, as the Allied pressure was growing every hour. General Liman von Sanders ordered a counter-attack in Anafartalar to be launched in the evening of 8 August. Ahmet Feyzi Bey objected. Göncü and Aldoğan  point out to his reasons and the consequences: “Units of the 7th and 12th Divisions have not completely arrived in this area, they were exhausted because they came from Saros on foot and this attack could not be supported by the 4th Division which was at the Kocaçimen-Abdurrahman Bayırı line, hence Feyzi Bey insisted that the attack could not be launched earlier than the morning of 9 August. Liman Paşa dismissed him.”3

Ahmet Feyzi’s successor was to be Colonel Mustafa Kemal, in whom Liman Paşa had great confidence. In his memoirs Fahrettin Altay wrote that Esat Paşa knew that the situation was dangerous and an efficient commander was needed, however he had doubts that Liman Paşa would accept to give Mustafa Kemal this task. On the phone, the latter told Liman’s chief of staff, Kazım Bey, the following: “Success is only possible if all the forces are commanded from one single point. I can only accept this task if all the forces arriving in Anafartalar would be given under my command as well.”Liman Paşa accepted this and Mustafa Kemal immediately assumed the group command. Şefik Bey, former commander of the 27. Regiment replaced him as the commander of the 19th Division.

9 August began with Allied bombardment followed by an attack, which was stopped by the Turks later during the day. Conkbayırı-Besimtepe (Hill Q)-Kocaçimen line was held by the Turks but the problem was still there: Conkbayırı could not be captured.

On the same day, 34. and 35. Regiments repulsed the British forces that were advancing from Mestantepe and the Gelibolu Gendarmerie Battalion stopped the British at Kireçtepe (range of hills parallel to the sea and overlooking the Anafartalar plain). Another Turkish attack launched by the 7. Division to the south of the area was stopped by machine gun fire.

Mustafa Kemal knew that Conkbayırı had to be taken at once and if no reinforcements would arrive the Turkish defence was likely to collapse. He planned his counter-offensive during the night. It was going to be a raid supported by bayonet charge, in which the 23. and 24. Regiments would attack towards Conkbayırı, 28. Regiment to Şahinsırtı and the 9th Division to the ridges that were connecting Kocaçimen with the sea.

The Turkish offensive began before the sun went up in the morning of 10 August. Mustafa Kemal later wrote in his memoirs: “All the soldiers and all the officers had left everything else aside, with their eyes and hearts focused solely on the signal that would be given. When I lowered my whip, soldiers with one foot and the bayonet ahead, officers with their pistols and swords, they all leaped forward as a mass in a fierce attack. In only one second, nothing else could be heard inside the enemy trenches but the heavenly uproar of ‘Allah, Allah’”

The attack proceeded well despite the Allied naval gunfire, land artillery support and the heavy machine gun fire from the top of Şahinsırtı. As the offensive was called off at noon, Conkbayırı was captured and the whole range of hills between Hill 261 and Kocaçimen, with the exception of the western slopes of Şahinsırtı, was in Turkish hands again.

During the battles of 10 August, when Allied casualties included generals, Mustafa Kemal was shot too. Fortunately, the bullet was stopped by his clock, saving him from possible death. The commander of the 64. Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Servet Bey, later wrote: “During the bayonet charge, I was at Conkbayırı with Mustafa Kemal. Right after the enemy’s heavy artillery fire began, I saw him rapidly moving his hand to his chest. He saw that I was panicked and raising his eyebrows he asked me to remain calm.”Later on, Mustafa Kemal gave the broken clock as a gift to Liman von Sanders.

Battles of Anafartalar

The fateful day of 10 August also saw action between Turks and the British, who attacked towards Küçük Anafartalar. In what came to be known as the First Battle of Anafartalar, repeated attacks were stopped at Yusufçuktepe by 34. and 35. Regiments and also in the south by the 17. Division and the Gelibolu Gendarmerie Battalion.

The next day, 10,000 fresh British troops landed at Suvla and advanced to Tekketepe (Hill 882) as reinforcements. Their attack on 12 August at the Kavaktepe (Hill 900)-Tekketepe was successfully repulsed by the Turks. The British headquarters had to cancel its major offensive scheduled for 13 August.

The battle of Anafartalar that took place between the Turkish defenders and the British forces over the period of 7-13 August, parallel to the battles around Conkbayırı between the Turks and Anzacs, caused 4,000 casualties for the Turkish side. Allied casualties were twice as much.4

Having failed to establish hegemony on the Anafartalar plain, the British decided to focus on the right wing of the Turkish defence, Kireçtepe. Fighting commenced on 14 August with the British forces advancing from Sivritepe (Jephson’s Post) to be faced by Gelibolu Gendarmerie Battalion supported by units of the 19. and 39. Regiments. The British first captured Aslantepe and Projektörtepe (both hills on Kireçtepe range), forcing the Turks to retreat back to Kanlıtepe. Thanks to the reinforcements from 1., 17., 19, and 127. Regiments, Aslantepe could be recaptured, only to be taken back by the British. After two days of fighting, the British retreated back to Sivritepe. Turkish casualties were 1,700, including the commander of the Gelibolu Gendarmerie Regiment, Captain Kadri Bey, who was killed in action, whereas the British lost 2,000 men. 5

After Kireçtepe, the peninsula was relatively calm for a few days. There was a major restructuring in the Turkish defensive formation. The 5th Division was re-established under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Willmer and positioned at the right flank in Kireçtepe. Then from right to left, the units to establish the Turkish defensive line were the 12th Division in İsmailoğlutepe, 7th Division at Bombatepe (Hill 60), 4th Division at Abdurrahman Bayırı, 8th Division at Kocaçimen-Conkbayırı-Hill 261 line. Two regiments from each of the 6th and 9th Divisions were in reserve and the whole force was supported by 97 pieces of artillery. Gulf of Saros was excluded from the responsibility of the Fifth Army.

Last efforts of the Allies

At the same time, the Allies were planning a large scaled operation. Their number had reached 30,000 with the troops moved from Sedüülbahir (Cape Helles) and they had 85 pieces of artillery. Mustafa Kemal could foresee what they were planning to do and he moved the reserves closer to the frontline. The Allied attack began in the afternoon of 21 August, to the direction of Yusufçuktepe (Scimitar Hill) and its south. They managed to capture the front trenches but had to retreat because of the effective Turkish fire.

Later in the evening Allied forces attacked to Bombatepe and captured a few trenches from the 7th Division. Fighting went on during the night and trenches changed hands several times. This battle later came to be known as the Second Battle of Anafartalar in which the Allies lost 8,000 men in one day. Turkish casualties were 2,000. Bloodshed in this part of the peninsula ceased with the Allied attempt on 27 August to capture Bombatepe, which succeeded partially.

In their well researched account of the Gallipoli campaign, Göncü and Aldoğan provide also a list of the regimental level Turkish commanders, who were killed in action during the battles in Arıburnu and Anafartalar over the three week period between 6-28 August: Major Ahmet Tevfik Bey (47. Regiment), Lieutenant Colonel İbrahim Şükrü Bey (15. Regiment), Lieutenant Colonel Recai Bey (23. Regiment), Lieutenant Colonel Nail Bey (25. Regiment), Major İsmail Hakkı Bey (14. Regiment), Lieutenant Colonel Ziya Bey (21. Regiment), Lieutenant Colonel Hakkı Bey (16. Regiment), Lieutenant Colonel Halit Bey (20. Regiment) and Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Avni Bey (57. Regiment).

Both sides were now exhausted and there was a stalemate with no end in sight, although the corpses were piling up very fast. There were 20 Turkish infantry divisions on the peninsula, occupying the key terrain in every sector. All the hope was gone for the Allies.

Conkbayırı and Anafartalar marked a decisive victory for the Turks. They were not well prepared, there were deficiencies in plans, however the abilities and determination of Mustafa Kemal and commanders of units linked to him as well as the extraordinary resistance and efforts of the Turkish soldiers brought this result for the Turks.

Göncü and Aldoğan  also point to the operational shortcomings of the Allies: “On 8 August, when the Turkish reserves were still far from the frontline, the Allies remained static, with the exception of Conkbayırı and doomed themselves to failure. It would not be a speculation to say that the destiny of the campaign would change if the British gathered all of their forces and launched a major attack in Anafartalar on 8 August." 6

And what if the Allied would have managed to keep Conkbayırı, strengthen their positions and resume their offensive? There is clearly a consensus now among historians that in such a case it would be inevitable for the Turkish defence to break down.