Gallipoli
Part III: Trenches in Arıburnu and the Battle of Kirte

In the morning of 26 April 1915, the total Turkish strength at the northern part of the peninsula, the Arıburnu sector, was around 10 thousand men supported by 16 machine guns and 28 pieces of artillery. They were to face 20 thousand Anzacs, but they began the day significantly disadvantaged, because the 77. Regiment had left its position at Kanlısırt (400 Plateau). Fortunately, Anzacs had only been digging during the night, instead of taking advantage of this weakness. Mustafa Kemal’s immediate response was to move two battalions of the 72. Regiment to the left wing in order to fill the gap.

The Anzac offensive commenced in the early hours of the day, aimed at the Turks’ right wing and supported by heavy naval gunfire focusing on Kabaksırtı (Sniper’s Nest). This attack was successfully stopped by the Turks, however Anzacs managed to take Kılıçbayırı (Baby 700) with a renewed attack.  In the afternoon, they forced the left wing, at Kanlısırt, only to be thrown back by the 27. Regiment.

Mustafa Kemal was planning an large scaled counterattack, which he launched at 7:30 am on 27 April. Turkish forces attacked from the centre and their left wing. In around one hour, units from 27., 72. and 77. Regiments forced the enemy to retreat to the seaward side of Kanlısırt-Kırmızısırt Plateau.

Meanwhile reinforcements were also coming in. 33. Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmet Şevki Bey, supported the Kanlısırt-Kırmızısırt (Johnston's Jolly) line whereas the 64. Regiment, commanded by Major Servet Bey, joined the 57. Regiment in an attack from the right wing. This part of the front witnessed fierce fighting throughout the day and some key positions repeatedly changed hands. Finally, Anzacs were repulsed to the south side of Cesarettepe (The Nek) and Bombasırtı (Hill 60).

After a failed attack by the Turks on the night of 27/28 April, positions in this sector almost stabilized. During the following days, Turkish reinforcements continued to arrive. Regiments from the 5th and 11th Divisions were brought to this sector and as the situation on the Asian side of the Dardanelles had already stabilized, units from the 3rd Division were also deployed there. Turkish commanders were determined to hit a decisive blow to the enemy and a major offensive was scheduled for 1 May.

The Turkish strength at Arıburnu was now 15,500 men supported by 6 mountain batteries and 2 field batteries totalling 34 guns, as well as 28 machine guns. Anzacs had 24 battalions with more than 100 machine guns located at critical positions. Mustafa Kemal’s plan was to attack from the centre towards Merkeztepe (MacLaurin’s Hill).

At 5:00 am on 1 May 1915, Turkish guns began to shell the entire area between the ridges of Yükseksırt (Russell’s Top) and Kanlısırt. 14. Regiment was the first to attack the enemy and it managed to approach the Anzac trenches by 200 meters. At 10:30 am, the 125. Regiment joined the attack, however the flanks were not able to support the centre. Anzacs had dug in well and Turkish efforts to break through their lines produced no results. A Turkish night attack failed as well. As Göncü and Aldoğan  wrote, Turks could not move forward but neither could they retreat. At the end of the day, Turkish casualties were no less than 6,000. 1

Eight Meters Between the Trenches

Following this failed attempt, Turks began to dig deep trenches just as the Anzacs did. In some parts of this sector, Turkish and Anzac trenches were extremely close to each other. Both sides could get very close to each other’s lines and over the following two weeks there have been several night attacks from both Turks and Anzacs, especially at Bombasırtı (Quinn’s Post), Korkuderesi (Monash Valley) and Kanlısırt. During the Anzac night attacks of 9/10 May and 13/14 May, extraordinary human efforts were produced. As Mustafa Kemal later wrote in his memoirs: “The distance between the trenches is 8 meters, which means that death is inevitable. Those in the first trenches, they all fall without any survivors, but they are rapidly replaced by those in the second. Can you imagine what a distinguished determination and faith this is? He sees the fallen, he knows that he will die within three minutes, but he does not hesitate at all. There is no trembling whatsoever. Those who are literate have the Koran in their hands, preparing to get into the paradise; those who are not are saying prayers. This is an example showing the spiritual power of the Turkish soldier. You can be sure that this spirit is what brought the victory in Çanakkale.” 2

On 5 May 1915, General Liman von Sanders created corps level group headquarters in an attempt to weld together the disparate formations on the peninsula into coherent combat groups. The Northern Group that combined all the Turkish forces at Arıburnu and Anafartalar was given under the command of Esat Paşa, commander of III Corps. This group’s backbone consisted of three divisions: Mustafa Kemal’s 19th Division on the right, Lieutenant Colonel Hasan Sabri’s 5th Division in the centre and Colonel Rüştü’s 16th Division on the left.

Allies Dreaming of Kirte

As trenches were being dug at Arıburnu, the southern part of the peninsula was also witnessing a heating up of the battle. After the heavy losses of the landing day, British forces recovered fast and in the early hours on the next day, units at Ertuğrul Bay (V Beach), began to advance to the village of Seddülbahir. Units of the 3. Battalion of the Turkish 26. Regiment, continued to defend the village bravely, as it did on the landing day, but they were dramatically outnumbered and running out of ammunition.

Major Mahmut Sabri Bey ordered a retreat and by 1:30 pm, the village as well as the outlying coastal stretch was in the hands of the British. Turks withdrew disorganised, but fortunately they were not chased by the British forces who occupied Harapkale Hill instead and began to dig trenches.

Worried about a strong Allied advance, commander of the 9th Division, Colonel Halil Sami Bey, reported to the headquarters of III Corps that a second defensive line had to be established further north to the village of Kirte (Krithia - modern day Alçıtepe). The headquarters rejected this proposal that would leave Kirte as well as Zığındere (Gully Ravine) and Kerevizdere to the enemy. The new defensive line was to be formed to the front, so that Kirte would remain within Turkish territory. 20. Regiment would keep the right wing and the 19. Regiment would stay on the left whereas the 25. and 26. Regiments would remain in reserve. The total strength of this defensive formation was nearly 8,000 men supported by 3 field batteries and 3 howitzer batteries, a total of 24 guns.

The primary objective of the British was to take the village of Kirte. They strengthened their beachhead for three days and although they were suffering from severe casualties, mainly inflicted on the landing day, they were planning a major breakthrough attempt that would take them to Kirte. Their total strength, including the French forces transferred across the Narrows, was nearly 17,500.

The Allied offensive, that would later came to be known as the First Battle of Kirte, began with heavy artillery fire in the early hours of 28 April 1915. At 9:00 am, Allied forces began to advance to north. Those units who attacked the right wing of the Turkish defence could approach the Pınariçi Bay (Y Beach), but they were stopped there thanks to the 20. Regiment’s intensive fire. However, at the centre and the left wing, the situation did not turn that favourable for the Turks. Units of the 25. and 26. Regiments could not hold their lines and they began to withdraw. Meanwhile the 19. Regiment, that was supposed to be the main force here, was still behind and could not approach the frontline because of the Allied naval gunfire. Colonel Halil Sami Bey ordered all units to retreat, but regiment commanders did not obey this order, because the enemy advance was already slowing down. Major Mahmut Sabri and his battalion halted the retreat and launched a successful counterattack. 20. Regiment repeated this success on the right wing and the Allied forces were driven to their starting points. The arrival of the 19. Regiment was a final blow for the Allies. At the end of the day, they had gained nothing, but suffered nearly 3,000 casualties. Turkish casualties were 2,378 men. 3

General Liman von Sanders could see that a reorganization was needed in this sector. The Southern Region Command was established under the command of German Colonel von Zodenstern. Von Sanders also asked for reinforcements, a request which was accepted by the Turkish General Staff that deployed the 15th Division to this front. This area command had two flanks: Halil Sami’s 9th Division on the right flank and the 7th Division commanded by Colonel Remzi Bey on the left flank.

At 3:30 pm on 1 May, Colonel von Zodenstern issued an order for a two-division night attack on Allied lines that would commence at 10:00 pm the same day, which meant that there was only a brief time for the units to prepare. The attack began and on the right wing, the 20. Regiment commanded by Major Halit Bey was repulsed by British machine gun fire. On the left, Colonel Halil’s 21. Regiment, 19. Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sabri Bey and the Bursa Gendarmerie Battalion commanded by Major Tahsin Bey engaged in fierce fighting and bayonet charges against the British. These attacks failed as well and suffering severe casualties, Turks returned to their initial lines. 6,000 men were lost in one night. Allied casualties were 3,000 men.

A renewed attack on the night of 3 May, this time with the support of the 15th Division that has just arrived from Istanbul, resulted in a failure of a similar scale. There was total disorder and chaos among the Turkish units and in one night, the 15th Division, which had to engage in battle without familiarising with the territory, lost half of its men. In one week, Turkish casualties had gone up to 10,000 at the Seddülbahir sector. On the next day, the Southern Group Command was established and German General Weber, commander of the XV Corps, assumed its command. The strength of the Turkish forces in this sector was down to 13,000 men in total, supported by 57 pieces of artillery and 24 machine guns.

Göncü and Aldoğan  state the following about the disastrous night attacks on the early days of May 1915: “In these attacks, a large number of Turkish soldiers lost their lives, not because of the Allies, but mainly due to the wrong decisions and practices of the Army and Region Commands.” The authors also point to a fatal mistake: “The 15th Division that came as reinforcement in the evening of 3 May, had arrived the battlefield after marching 25 km and the exhausted soldiers were sent to the frontline in smaller units. It was not clear which zone the division was responsible for, to which direction it would proceed, where and how it would engage in battle. There was no written order, only the divisional commander and the battalions were informed in word of mouth.” 4

A similar point was argued by Selahattin Adil Paşa in his memoirs: “What we were supposed to do was to ensure our defence by entrenching until the reservers arrived and prepare for offensives to be launched then. Unfortunately, the Army Command sticked to their own opinion, pushed all the fresh units to the front as soon as they arrived and started a period of consecutive night attacks that caused several valuable and well trained army units to perish and numerous valuable young officers to lose their lives in vain." 5

Hoping to take advantage of the weakened position of the Turks, Allies launched a new offensive on 6 May, which started with naval gunfire at 10:30 am. The Second Battle of Kirte began with British units pressing forward towards the right wing of the Turkish defence and French forces attacking the left wing. At both sides, Turkish fire managed to stop the enemy which could not advance more than 400 meters. The Allied attack was renewed on the next day, but it was only a repetition of the first, they could move only a few hundred meters and take some front trenches. 

For the Allies, this breakthrough attempt was doomed to failure. They pushed again on 8 May, but it did not change the outcome. With the exception of the fighting at Turks’ left flank, Allied forced did only proceed through the no-man’s-land and most of them died without even seeing a Turk. After three days of fighting, Allies were still 3 km from the village of Kirte, but they had lost 6,500 men. Their only gain of any significance was the capture of Hill 83 by the French.

Burying the Dead

The Turkish General Staff was insisting on a major offensive at the Arıburnu sector that would finish off the enemy and clean the peninsula, although both sides had by then dug in deep, trenches had been established and it was obvious that the end of the campaign was nowhere in sight. Enver Paşa came to Çanakkale on 11 May and held meetings with General von Sanders and Esat Paşa.  Colonel Kazım Bey, chief of staff of the Fifth Army, had sent a cable to Enver Paşa, which went unnoticed. In this cable, Kazım Bey was pointing to the intentions of the Allies: “The enemy wants to weaken us by forcing us to attack. If we get weaker by repeatedly attacking them, they will counter this with larger and fresh forces and they will catch us tired and weak. The army must not get deceived by this…”

Enver Paşa wanted to attack and annihilate the enemy, as soon as possible, and decided to dispatch the 2nd Division, which was then based in Istanbul and was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hasan Askeri Bey, to Gallipoli. The date for the major offensive was set as 19 May 1915.

According to the plan, Turks would attack the Anzac beachhead with 42,000 troops and Esat Paşa was extremely confident of a victory because of the Turks’ numerical superiority against the Anzacs, which numbered around 17,000. 19th Division was to attack to the north, 5th Division to the centre, 2nd Division through Kırmızısırt-Kanlısırt to the centre and south and 16th Division to Kanlısırt and south.

The Turkish offensive commenced at 3:30 am, however it was not a surprise for the Anzacs, as Turkish commanders thought it would be, because they were warned by aerial reconnaissance and by observing the preparations in Turkish front line trenches. Additionally, prior to the attack, Turkish lines could not maintain silence, which meant that the Anzacs were already awake and waiting for them. The attack was a definitive failure for the Turks and it was concluded already by dawn. Most of the Turkish troops were taken down by machine gun fire as they were running towards the trenches. Only a few troops could reach the Anzac trenches, but their bayonets could not change anything.

Major Burhaneddin Bey, who took part in the offensive on 19 May, later wrote in his memoirs: “The enemy fire caused several casualties while we were still inside th trenches and when we were leaving trenches. This was because our trenches were not constructed in a way that would allow us to quickly jump out of them to launch an attack. Moreover, the connection trenches were overcrowded and under enemy fire. Despite all these difficulties the division attacked the enemy positions with great determination and sacrifice. However, the enemy fire did not allow this devoted mass to reach their positions alive. The space between the two trenches was filled with the bodies of martyrs.” 6

As the sun was going up that morning, half of the 2nd Division’s men were lying on the no-man’-land. The 19th Division could only advance 15-20 meters. The 5th Division struggled to reach Merkeztepe until 10:00 am but without any result. Some units tried to renew their attack during the day, but all hopes were killed by Anzac machine guns. In only four and a half hours, 3,855 Turkish soldiers died and 5,967 wounded. Anzac losses were 160 dead and 468 wounded. Turks had attack with a force two and a half times the size of the Anzacs, but at the end of the day their losses were 16 times greater.7 A poorly planned attack had resulted in a disaster.

After the 19 May attack, hundreds of corpses, mainly those of fallen Turkish soldiers, were lying in the no-man’s-land under the sun, out of the reach of either side and beginning to decompose. Commander of the Anzac forces, General Birdwood, asked for a supervised truce to bury the dead and General von Sanders agreed. As Esat Paşa later wrote in his memoirs: “The British were eagerly waiting for this. They were in a very difficult situation, because the wind of the Gallipoli peninsula, which usually blows from north to south, was taking the stench from the dead bodies directly to them.”8 The truce took place on 24 May, when soldiers from both sides buried the bodies in large mass graves under the supervision of Major Aubrey Herbert from the Allied side and Major Ohrili Kemal Bey from the Turkish side.

Meanwhile Turks began to employ a new technique, which was later also used by the Allies. Tunnels were dug from friendly territory to enemy lines and when the tunnel reached a point under the enemy trenches, explosives were installed there. It was very effective in damaging the enemy trenches and creating havoc there. The first such incident took place on 29 May at Bombasırtı.

After some minor attacks by both sides in late May, the Turkish 5th Division left the Arıburnu sector on 3 June. The area was now under the responsibility of the 19th Division commanded by Mustafa Kemal, who had been recently promoted to a Colonel. Anzacs attacked the next day in an attempt to prevent the Turks from supporting the defence of the village of Kirte in the southern part of the peninsula where British forces were trying to break through the Turkish lines and occupy this village which had a strategic position. New Zealanders managed to capture two trenches of the 57. Regiment, and the situation was worsening.

Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Şefik Bey, commander of the 27. Regiment, wrote in his report what happened next: “I asked the commander of the 3. Battalion to provide 3 courageous bombers. Three soldiers, Corporal Hasan, Corporal Süleyman and Corporal Mustafa came to me. We  filled their hands and pockets with grenades. I showed them what the situation of the enemy was and that they were firing from the captured trenches without showing their heads. I pointed to the location where the machine gun fire from the trenches and from Yükseksırt would not be effective and asked them to crouch there. I said that after reaching that location, they should throw their grenades to the trenches and they would be awarded for this. These three soldiers did exactly what I have asked them to do.” These trenches were taken back from the New Zealanders, however one of the three bombers was killed in action.

Bloodshed at Zığındere

On the same day, when trenches were changing hands at Arıburnu, British forces at Seddülbahir launched their third attempt to capture the village of Kirte. On 4 June 1915 at 8:00 am, Allied naval gunfire began to pound the Turkish defensive lines. After hours of shelling, Turkish lines were heavily damaged, but Turks had already established a wide network of deep trenches, so the damage did not reduce their defensive capability. After the shelling Turkish units took their positions and waited for the enemy to come.

The Allied attack commenced around 12:00 noon. At the left wing of the Turkish defence, the 34. Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Ali Bey, successfully repulsed the French. At the centre left, 36. Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cemil Bey and 22. Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel İbrahim Bey stopped the British as did the units of 9th Division at the very centre of the line. The defence at the right wing held well too. At the end of the day, the farthest penetration of the Allied attack was no more than 1 km and these units had to retreat because they could not receive any support. By 8:00 pm, this front had stabilized .

It was now time for the Turks to stage a counter attack. Allied units were successfully thrown back with consecutive Turkish charges, including a bayonet charge from the units of the 2nd Division, which had a tragic experience at Arıburnu a few weeks ago, but performed brilliantly at Kirte. After three days of fighting Allies had only minor territorial gains in the centre and at the flanks they were back where they had started. The cost of the Third Battle of Kirte was 7,500 casualties for the Allies and nearly 10,000 casualties (including 3,000 dead) for the Turks. 9

The Allies had realized that it was no more possible for them to take Kirte and to reach the Kilitbahir Plateau. They decided to focus on smaller targets with limited scope. On 21 June, French forces attacked the western ridges of Kerevizdere. Although they were substantially weakened and not sufficiently reinforced, regiments of the 2nd Division defended the area. Fighting went on for two days and at the end the French had penetrated some 200 meters but failed to capture their objectives. Their casualties were 3,200 men, against a loss of 6,000 men for the Turks. The French stroke back on 30 June and this time managed to capture a key position on the western ridges of Kerevizdere, a point they called Quadrilatere.

The Seddülbahir sector was burning in flames. On 28 June, 15,000 British troops attacked at both sides of Zığındere, after two hours of naval gunfire. Those who were at the seaward side of Zığındere managed to capture some trenches while those on the other side were stopped by the Turks, who launched a counterattack in the afternoon. This battle went on until the early hours of 30 June. Although a retreat was under consideration by the Turks, the arrival of the 16. Regiment and the 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cafer Tayyar Bey changed the situation.

There were also changes in the command structure. Upon the request of Enver Paşa, the Second Army began to send replacements to Gallipoli. Commander of the II Corps, Faik Paşa assumed the responsibility of the right wing and commander of the I Corps, Mehmet Ali Paşa undertook the command of the left wing. 3rd and 5th Divisions also came in as reinforcements and a major counterattack was planned.

A Turkish force of 13,000 men began to attack from both sides of Zığındere at 3:45 am on 5 June. This attack was called off soon, in the face of heavy machine gun fire from the Allies. This was the end of the battles at Zığındere, which cost the Turks 16,000 men in just one week.

After Zığındere, Vehip Paşa, chief of staff of the Second Army, replaced General Weber as the commander of the Southern Group. He was planning a major structural change in the defensive formation, but he had no opportunity to realize this plan, because of a renewed Allied attack that commenced on 12 June. This offensive achieved it objectives and the British captured Turkish trenches, whereas the French took Yassıtepe (Rognon). In two days, Turks suffered 9,575 casualties and the Allied losses were 4,000. 10

By late July, fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula had gone into stalemate. Both sides had strong and deep entrenchments and both sides had realized that infantry charges against these trenches, which were defended by machine gun fire, were too costly. As a result, neither side had made any significant progress.

The main problem for the Turkish side was not the lack of manpower but that of artillery ammunition, as General von Sanders repeatedly reported to Enver Paşa. Turks had enough ammunition for artillery guns with low or flat trajectories, but these were not useful in trench warfare. Howitzers and mortars, which are the kinds of guns with high trajectories, were used against enemy trenches and there was a serious shortage in ammunition for these kinds of artillery.

Turkish casualties over the three months following the landings of 25 April was 115,000 (75,000 in south and 40,000 in north) including 35,000 dead. On the other hand, Allied casualties were 75,000 with 29,000 of them being dead. Many of the Turkish Fifth Army’s infantry divisions were depleted by continuous combat to regimental strength, but reinforcements, mainly from the Second Army, could prevent a further weakening of the Turkish defence. As of 28 July 1915, the Fifth Army had a total of 250,818 men under its command and although it had originally 6 divisions, this number had gone up to 17. 11