Gallipoli
Part II: The First Day on the Peninsula

After the failed attempt of the Allied fleet to break through the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915, the Ottoman General Staff decided to widen and strengthen the defences of the Straits against renewed Allied operations that were to come sooner or later. The Allies were apparently preparing for a major amphibious invasion and according to an intelligence report prepared by the headquarters of the III Corps, the most likely zone for Allied landings was the stretch between Kabatepe and Seddülbahir, whereas Bolayır and the Asian shores were deemed to be of secondary importance.

Enver Paşa had already issued a plan for the defence of the two Turkish straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles, on 20 February. Accordingly, the First Army was to defend the European sides of both straits, whereas the Second Army was responsible for the Asian sides, which meant that both armies had responsibilities in both straits, an approach contradictory to the principle of unity in command. The commander of the First Army, General Otto Liman von Sanders, protested but it was only after 18 March, when this plan was revised. Eventually a new army headquarters, the Fifth, was established, incorporating the III and XV Corps as well as the 5th Division and a cavalry brigade. This force, a total of 80,935 men, brought the number of the defenders in this theatre to 93,512 (including the Çanakkale Fortified Zone Command). On 25 March, General Von Sanders assumed the command of this new army.

General von Sanders believed that the coasts of the peninsula and the Asian shores were simply too long to establish a defensive wall and therefore the defence should be established inland. Here, he disagreed with Turkish commanders, mainly with Esat Paşa, who thought the defence should be established at the coast and the enemy had to be halted there at the beaches. At the end of the day, as Erickson wrote: “The Fifth Army deployed a light infantry screen in outposts sited on the dominating terrain overlooking potential landing beaches. These forces were usually in platoon strength and were well dug in with wire and prepared trenches. The Turks did not intend to stop the Allies on the beaches with these troops. Instead, regiment-sized forces were positioned three to five kilometres behind the beaches in protected ground. As the outposts slowed the enemy landing and channelled their advance, these larger forces would counterattack the enemy. It was hoped that these counterattacks, conducted immediately or as soon as possible, would throw the unwary invaders back to the sea. At all levels the Turkish commanders rehearsed these counterattacks in detail. The Fifth Army was ready to receive the enemy.”

About the possible landing points, Von Sanders disagreed with the report of the III Corps and judged that there were three areas of particular danger, which were the Beşike Bay on the Asian side, Bolayır in the north and the southern tip of the peninsula.  The plans were prepared accordingly:

Meanwhile, the Allies were preparing for the invasion. After the failure of the naval attacks, it had become clear to them that ground troops were necessary to eliminate the Turkish defenders. The task was given to the British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force commanded by General Ian Hamilton. Australian and New Zealand volunteer soldiers, who were undergoing training in Egypt, were formed into the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) and General Hamilton also had the British 29th Division, the Royal Naval Division as well as the French Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient under his command.

Turks were ready to face the invaders. They had taken their position, their equipment was inadequate but they were high in spirit. The only thing to do now was to wait for the Allied amphibious operations to begin. This waiting ended in the early hours 25 April 1915, when the Allied forces landed at six different locations on the peninsula as well as at Kumkale on the Asian shore.

The Landing Begins

The Allied ships that had left the port of Mudros the day before met at the assembly point, 9 km from the landing beaches, at 1:30 am on 25 April. From there, a force of 1,500 soldiers, the Anzacs, sailed towards the peninsula. Faik Efendi, a company commander with the Turkish 27. Regiment was looking through his binoculars. He could see the ships coming: “After some time the moon went down, it was dark and the ships could not be seen anymore. The reserves were alarmed and they were ready for action. I was waiting for the outcome and watching the distance. Soon we heard the roaring of the guns.”

The Arıburnu landing area (Anzac sector) was a broad, 6 km stretch of beach, from 1.5 km north of Kabatepe to a point near Fisherman's Hut, north of Anzac Cove. It was officially designated as Z Beach. The first troops to land were two companies of the Australian 3. Brigade. This covering force began to go ashore shortly before dawn at 4:30 am on 25 April. Its intended landing zone was a broad front centered about a mile north of Kabatepe, however for reasons that are still debated, the landing went awry and the boats concentrated about 2 km further north than intended in a shallow cove between Arıburnu to the north and Küçük Arıburnu (Hell Spit) to the south.

The Anzacs were confronted by a confusing tangle of ravines and spurs that descended from the heights of the Sarıbayır range to the sea. That part of the peninsula was defended by 80 Turkish soldiers, whose number soon doubled thanks to the reinforcements, however they were still outnumbered by 1 to 10. They defended bravely and managed to stop the advance of the invaders, however the Anzacs kept on coming in and they were also supported by naval gunfire. They managed to establish a beachhead of 1.8 km and by 5:30 am the number of the troops on the shore was 4,000. Commander of the Turkish 9th Division, Halil Sami Bey, gave his order: “The British are landing their troops at Arıburnu and Kabatepe. The 27. Regiment, together with the mountain battery at Çamburnu, will move towards Kabatepe to drive back the enemy to the sea.”

Fighting at the beach ended at 6:00 am when the Haintepe (Plugge's Plateau)-Yükseksırt (Russell's Top) line fell to the Anzacs. The total number of Turkish troops involved in fighting was no more than 600 and by that time it was already halved. Only three of the 80 Turkish soldiers from the 8. Company of the 27. Regiment, who had first encountered the enemy, survived.

The Anzacs were taking the ridges, though not as fast they originally planned. The Turkish defence was fiercer than they thought it would be and they had landed 2 km north of where they were supposed to land. Meanwhile the 27. Regiment was coming to the Turks’ rescue. Two battalions of 2,000 men and a machine gun detachment arrived in Kavaktepe at 7:00 am and the regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Şefik Bey saw that Kanlısırt (400 Plateau) that had a superior position to that of the Turks, was taken by the Australians. He wrote in his memoirs: "Enemy soldiers were clearly visible at Kanlısırt and other ridges to the north. From the sounds of gunfire and the movements one could tell that some fighting was going on there. To the east, the terrain was more rugged and covered with bushes. Nothing much could be seen there. It was difficult to tell where the flanks and the advance units of the enemy were." 1  Şefik Bey launched the counterattack at 8:00 am and managed to drive back the enemy to Edirnesırtı (Mortar Ridge)-Kanlısırt Plateau.

Anzacs were halted and the Turks were holding their ground, but the situation was dangerous, because the total number of the enemy was by then as high as 10,000 and a new wave of enemy attack was just a matter of time. Commander of the 9th Division, Colonel Albay Halil Sami Bey ordered the 19th Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal Bey, to move to Kocaçimen, to encircle the enemy from the north and to support the 27. Regiment.

Australians were making for the high ground dominating the narrows, Kocaçimen and Conkbayırı (Chunuk Bair). Mustafa Kemal Bey, arriving with at Conkbayırı at 9:40 am and setting up his headquarters on the ridge at Kemal Yeri (Scrubby Knoll), made a decision that doomed the Anzac landing to failure. Without waiting for orders, he led the entire 57. Regiment forward to counter-attack and cabled the corps headquarters: "The strength of the enemy that has evidently landed between Kabatepe and Arıburnu is not clear yet. In order to prevent the enemy from occupying the ridges west of Kocadere, I am moving the 57. Regiment and a mountain battery to that direction. I leave the Chief of Staff of the division at the headquarters and proceed to that zone myself to see the position of the enemy and take the necessary measures. I inform you that I will be back in charge when there is a need to use a larger part of the division."2 The remaining regiments of the 19th Division, the 72. and 77. Regiments, would join the fight in the evening.

At 10:24 am, the 57. Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Avni Bey, attacked the enemy and it was at this moment when Mustafa Kemal issued his famous order: “I do not order you to attack, I order you to die! In the time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can take our place.” They successfully held the right flank of the Turkish defence. The 1. Battalion of the 57. Regiment attacked along Edirnesırtı towards Kılıçbayırı (Baby 700) from the inland side whereas the 2. Battalion had swung around behind Düztepe (Battleship Hill) and advanced down the range on the seaward side of Kılıçbayırı.

At the same time the 27. Regiment engaged the Australians on the left flank. Anzacs were repeatedly forced to withdraw. They resisted until 4:00 pm when a second major counterattack was launched by the 57. Regiment in the afternoon on Kılıçbayırı, simultaneously with the 27. Regiment’s attack to Kanlısırt-Merkeztepe-Kırmızısırt (Johnston's Jolly). With the aid of artillery fire, they broke through the Anzac line forcing them to abandon the hill. The survivors retreated to the southern slopes of Kanlısırt. Fighting went on until the sun went down. Supported from accurate and efficient artillery fire from mountain batteries, Turks managed to keep the Anzacs at their beachhead and the dominating hills remained under Turkish control.

The weakest link of the Turkish line on 25 April was the 77. Regiment. It had followed the 27. Regiment on the battlefield and launched a bayonet charge against the Anzacs. However, as the enemy opened fire, this regiment, which was made up mostly of Arab soldiers, dissolved at once and soldiers panicked. Some of them randomly began to shoot, which killed friendly units of the 27. Regiment in the front. On that night, commander of the 77. Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Saip Bey, reported the situation to Mustafa Kemal Bey, who believed that it was not the soldiers' fault: "He (Saip Bey) reported that some soldiers have deserted but he did not confess that the real cause was his suspicious, irrelevant and impossible order to move the battalions to a rear position that he gave based on the news supplied to him by some weak hearted officers. He put the blame on the soldiers. I asked him to do whatever is necessary to reassemble the troops." 77. Regiment's failure disrupted the 19th Division's operational plans and made it impossible to give a final blow to the retreating enemy.

Landings at Seddülbahir

Meanwhile, as Turks were defending their land against the Australians and New Zealanders in the northern part of the peninsula, British troops had landed at five different points in the southern part. The landing at the Seddülbahir sector (Cape Helles) was made by the British 29th Division under the command of General Aylmer Hunter-Weston. Landings began after 1.5 hours of naval gunfire starting at 4:30 am on 25 April.

Major Mahmut Sabri, commander of the 3. Battalion of the 26. Regiment, was observing: "A number of battleships had approached our coast between Teke Bay and Eski Hisarlık; they were continuously firing. Ridges at Seddülbahir were boiling with countless explosions. Enemy fire was concentrated on our frontline trenches. It was not possible to tell which units we had there and what the damage was because of black, white and green smoke clouds caused by explosions... The 3.7 cm light artillery that was at the disposal of our battalion was hit during the shelling and had lost 2 guns. Unfortunately we could not make any use of this battery, which was the only heavy gun of the battalion and had a vital improtance for the beach battles. The heavy naval gunfire destroyed our trenches at Teke Bay and Ertuğrul Bay. Half completed communication trenches were completely wiped away and obstacles established by our frontline units were damaged." 3

The landing at Pınariçi Bay (Y Beach) started simultaneously with the opening of the naval gunfire. Turks were caught off guard there since they were not expecting landings at this bay and their attention was directed to the Ertuğrul and Teke Bays (V Beach and W Beach) anyway. Facing no opposition, the British brigade established a beachhead and took a narrow gully that went up to Sarıtepe (Gurkha Bluff) and proceeded to the village of Kirte (Krithia - modern day Alçıtepe). It was 9:30 am when information about this landing began to arrive at the headquarters of the 26. Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hafız Kadri Bey. Some minor units engaged the British around Sarıtepe. In the afternoon, a battalion, a field battery and 2 machine guns from the 25. Regiment, which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel İrfan Bey, were deployed to this area to support the Turkish defence and fighting went on until the early hours of the next day. Both sides suffered heavy losses and the British forces evacuated Pınariçi Bay at 11 am the next morning. Göncü and Aldoğan  point out that the Turkish side was too slow to realise the scale of the enemy operation in this area, however the British failed to take advantage of this weakness.

Another landing beach that was intended to support the two main landings (at Ertuğrul and Teke Bays) was the İkiz Bay (X Beach) located 2 km northwest to the village of Seddülbahir. It was weakly defended by the Turks, who suffered badly from the naval gunfire. By 7:30 am, around 1,000 British troops managed to establish a beachhead and began to proceed inland. Two small groups of Turkish of around 40 troops each arrived in this area from Zığındere and Teke Bay and opened fire on the British. The Turkish defence was soon supported by a company arriving from Kirte. Turks were owerwhelmingly outnumbered, but they managed to slow down the enemy, which was proceeding to the ridge overlooking Teke Bay. The decision made by the headquarters of the 9th Division to move the reserves to this area proved to be an appropriate one. When the sun set down on 25 April, the British had landed around 3,000 troops at İkiz Bay and managed to capture Karacaoğlan Hill (Hill 114) but they failed to break through the Turkish defence and remained stuck at their beachhead. Turks stopped them from reaching the Ertuğrul Bay and moving towards Kirte.

Landing at Morto Bay on the southern tip of the peninsula took place at the shore next to the Eski Hisarlık Burnu (S Beach), which was defended by a Turkish squad. As soon as the boats landed at the shore, the Turks opened fire and inflicted heavy casualties on the British. The Turkish commander decided to pull his forces back after having realised the attempts of the British to outflank them. Turkish troops went back to the ridges and it was a wise decision which prevented a possible threat against the Seddülbahir-Kirte supply line. Reinforcements came in time and the British were pinned down to the ruins in Eski Hisarlık (De Tott's Battery).

On the first day of the land battles in Gallipoli, 25 April, two major landings took place at the Seddülbahir sector. One of them took part at Teke Bay (W Beach) which was one of the coastal points where the Turkish defence was the strongest. A company from the 3. Battalion of the 26. Regiment was in charge here, around 240 men, against more than 1,000 Britons who started to land at 6:15 am.

Turks were positioned at the northern side of the bay; they watched the invaders coming and as the boats hit the shore, all hell broke loose. Intensive Turkish fire, combined with extensive barbed wire entanglements caused severe damage to the British. Additionally they realised that their wire cutters were not good enough to cut the thick Turkish barbed wire, for which they paid dearly. Turkish defence was effective, but their numbers were too low. At 7:30 am, British forces managed to established a beachhead. Karacaoğlan Hill fell at 11:00 am and Aytepe (Hill 138) was captured in the evening. Although they were suffering from heavy casualties, Turkish defenders did not retreat. They insisted on keeping their positions, continued to fight, continued to die and at the end of the day managed to stop the British advance.

The largest contingent of British troops landed at Ertuğrul Bay (V Beach), near the village of Seddülbahir, a short distance to the east on the other side of Teke Bay. 6,000 men were intended for this landing site and the first wave of 3,000 began to arrive at 6:00 am after an initial pounding of the Turkish positions by Allied naval gunfire. The covering force of around 2,000 men was landed from a converted collier, River Clyde, which was run aground beneath the Seddülbahir Fort so that the troops could disembark directly via ramps to the shore. An Irish battalion landed from open boats. This area was defended by another company from the 3. Battalion of the 26. Turkish Regiment, which opened fire from the heights overlooking the bay and from inside the fort. The result was immediate slaughtering the men in the boats. A few made it ashore and sought shelter under a sand bank at the edge of the beach where they remained, pinned down. The faith of those inside the River Clyde was no different. The troops emerging one by one from the sally ports on the collier presented perfect targets to the Turkish gunfire. Only 200 men made it onto the beach.

Landing at Ertuğrul Bay was completed by 9:30 am. In the afternoon, the British attempted to capture Gözcübaba Hill (Hill 159) overlooking the bay. A small contingent led by Sergeant Yahya from the 10. Company of the 2. Battalion of the 26. Regiment heroically defended the hill and drove the enemy out with a bayonet charge. Meanwhile, the 1,000 men remaining aboard the River Clyde waited until nightfall before making another attempt to land.

It has to be noted, that although most British sources claim the opposite, during the landings of the first day, Turkish defenders had no machine guns at their disposal. Both at Arıburnu and Seddülbahir, Turks opened fire on the invasion forces with infantry rifles. It was only on the night of 26 April when the first machine guns were taken to the defensive lines at the beaches. 4

Diversions at Bolayır and Kumkale

The main objective of the first day for the allies was to reach the Kilitbahir Plateau, which was not achieved. Simultaneously with the landings at Arıburnu and Seddülbahir, there were two more operations that aimed to divert the Turks' attention and manpower. A diversion took place at the Gulf of Saros, to the north of the peninsula, where General Liman von Sanders was actually expecting the Allied landings. The town of Bolayır was bombarded and a British officer swam ashore where he began lighting flares so as to distract the defending Turkish forces. This attempt was successful. Turkish 5th and 7th Divisions, a total of 20,000 men were kept at this region at a time when the real landings were met by a handful of Turkish defenders.

It was by late afternoon on 25 April when General von Sanders was convinced that the Allied presence at Bolayır was a diversion. He responded to the calls of Esat Paşa for reinforcements but it was not earlier than the evening of 26 April when these Turkish forces could arrive the actual war zones.

Another diversion took place at the Asian shore, which was defended by the Turkish XV Corps. The Allies wanted to prevent the Turkish troops stationed there from moving to the peninsula and to silence the Turkish guns that could shell the landing units. After 3.5 hours of naval gunfire that commenced at 5:00 am, French units began to land at Kumkale. This area was under the responsibility of the 31. Turkish Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel İsmail Hakkı Bey.

The Turkish headquarters was informed about the French landing on time and although they were outnumbered the defenders managed to stop the French advance. By afternoon, around 3,000 troops had landed at Kumkale, whereas the Turkish side was reinforced by the 39. Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nurettin Bey. After the sunset, Turks launched three night attacks, however they failed to draw the enemy back to the sea. Soon the fighting went into stalemate.

The Turks soon realised that it was only a diversion at Kumkale. Captain Celaleddin Bey wrote later in his memoirs: “By the afternoon of 25 April, the situation had become clear. The real landings were taking place on the European side. It was obvious that the forces landing in Kumkale were no more than one to three battalions.”5 The French kept their beachhead for one more day and evacauted the Asian shore on the night of 26 April. They had already achieved their objective and prevented the Turkish 3rd and 11th Divisions from supporting the defence of the peninsula.