Gallipoli
Part I: Opening Shots and the Victory of 18 March

The Gallipoli Campaign – or the “Battle of Çanakkale” as it is known in Turkey – has a special place among all the fronts Turks have fought in the First World War. It is not only the strategic importance of the Straits and the decisiveness of the campaign, which make it so important. It was an epic drama, where the human aspect of the war was much more significant. Soldiers fought on hills and valleys under a rain of fire. Trench fighting was tragic in Gallipoli, where the size of the no man’s land was no more than just a few meters in some cases. Visitors to the Gallipoli Peninsula today cannot help losing themselves under the spell of the beautiful landscape. In 1915, the peninsula was synonymous with death and suffering.

“Çanakkale” has a very important meaning for Turks. It was the place where the army fought against a might multinational force supported by the strongest navy of the time and managed to stop the enemy and prevent them from invading the Turkish homeland. The size of the loss makes the importance of the campaign even bigger. Turks lost around 250,000 men in casualties, with more than 50,000 dead. The “Spirit of Çanakkale” has become a phrase commonly used phrase in Turkish language defining a spiritual power, which helps the human to `achieve the impossible`.

The Dardanelles is 63 kilometers long, measured between the town of Gelibolu (Gallipoli)  to Kumkale and Seddülbahir at the entrance of the straits. Its width varies between 1400 and 7800 meters. The Gallipoli Peninsula is 90 kilometers long. The narrowest part of the peninsula is at Bolayır (Bulair) where the distance between the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara is just 5500 meters. The landmass gets wider to the south and between Akbaş and Kemikli it is 20 kilometers wide. From that point on, it gets narrower again. The terrain is not plain and there are several hills, valleys and ravines.

The fortifications of the Dardanelles consisted of the outer, intermediate and inner defences. The outer defences were the two historical forts at the entrance of the straits: Kumkale and Seddülbahir. These forts were equipped with 13 heavy and 7 medium guns, which were obsolete. The intermediate defences were protecting the interior minefields and they were equipped with medium guns. The inner defences were the most powerful ones, but their guns were also antiquated and ammunition was scarce.

The forts protecting the shores of the Dardanelles were reinforced with guns dismantled from old battleships. There were 230 artillery guns of different sizes (howitzers, mortars, etc), but most of them were around 25-30 years old and only 82 pieces were good enough to match the artillery of the Allied fleet. Guns brought from the defensive lines close to Istanbul (in Çatalca and Edirne) and the depots of the Ministry of War were in use as well. The German General Staff dispatched Vice Admiral von Usedom, who was an expert in coastal defences. He was accompanied by 500 German specialists.

After the passage of Goeben and Breslau on 10 August, existing two mine belts were strengthened with new ones and by the time of the major Allied offensive there were 11 mine belts in the Dardanelles.

Meanwhile, on 13 December 1914, Turks received a dire warning when the British submarine B11 entered the Turkish waters and torpedoed the warship Mesudiye which was anchored at the Bay of Sarısığlar. After this incident, new submarine nets were installed at the Dardanelles.

The Allied fleet, commanded by the British Vice Admiral Carden, was blockading the Dardanelles since the initial attacks of 3 November. The fleet was composed of 49 British and 13 French ships of different kinds.

The “Carden Plan”, which was accepted on 15 January 1915 at the meeting of the War Council in London, had four main points regarding the Allied attack to force the Dardanelles: (a) Destroying the forts at the entrance of the straits; (b) Destroying the inner defences from the entrance of the straits until Kepez; (c) Silencing the batteries at the Narrows; (d) Cleaning the mines, destroying the defensive positions at the Narrows and entering the Sea of Marmara.

Gürsel Göncü and Şahin Aldoğan wrote that the plan of the Turkish defence had four main elements:
1. Two batteries on each side of the entrance of the Dardanelles (Kumkale and Orhaniye on the Asian side; Seddülbahir and Ertuğrul on the European side) were to prevent the Allied warships from entering the Straits.
2. If the enemy warships manage to enter the Dardanelles, howitzers in Erenköy and Tengerdere will open fire and prevent the warships from maneuvering inside the Bay of Erenköy.
3. Smaller batteries that consist of guns dismantled from old warships and mortars will protect the mine belts and prevent enemy minesweepers from operating in the area. The Dardanos battery at Kepez and the Baykuş battery (later renamed as the Mesudiye battery because guns salvaged from the same named warship were installed there) in Soğanlıdere will either support the howitzers in Erenköy and Tengerdere or provide fire support to the Çanakkale-Kilitbahir group.
4. The central batteries in Çanakkale and Kilitbahir will open fire when the enemy warships enter their firing range.1

Admiral Carden tried to stage the first phase of the Allied plan on 19 February. That day, at 9:51 am, six Allied battleships opened fire on the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles. They pounded the forts until 2:00 pm without receiving any return fire. They were firing from a distance of 10-12 kilometers and hence out of range of the Turkish guns.

At 4:00 pm, Carden ordered the battleships to get closer to the forts. When Vengeance was around 5 km off Seddülbahir, Turks opened fire from Orhaniye and Ertuğrul. Having realized that they could not inflict any damage to the Turkish forts, Admiral Carden called off the attack at 6:00 pm. This attempt to destroy the forts at the entrance had been a disappointment for the Allied fleet.

Strong wind and bad weather conditions caused the Allied fleet to postpone their renewed attack to accomplish the first phase of Carden’s Plan. On 25 February, the Allied fleet stroke back, this time. At 10:13 am, Queen Elizabeth opened fire on Seddülbahir. She was followed by Irresistible, Agamemnon and Gaulois, which began to shell Orhaniye and Ertuğrul forts. Turkish batteries fired back and after receiving serious hits Agamemnon and Gaulois had to retire. Bombardment continued until 5:30 pm and at the end of the day the Turkish batteries at the entrance of the Dardanelles were silenced.

Allied troops also landed at the Kumkale and Seddülbahir ports, but they had to retreat after facing a serious counterattack. However they managed to destroy 4 cannons at Seddülbahir before their retreat.

March 1915 started with small scaled attacks of the Allied fleet. Nearly every day one or two battleships entered the Dardanelles, shelled the Turkish coastal batteries and retreated. On the other hand, mine sweeping efforts of the Allied fleet did not prove to be successful due to Turkish artillery fire.

Meanwhile Vice Admiral Carden collapsed from the accumulation of strain and worry and left his post. He was replaced by Vice Admiral de Roebeck on 16 March.

The Victory of 18 March

18 March 1915 was a day with a very fine weather and a calm sea. Early in the morning that day, German Captain Serno and Captain Schneider were flying above the peninsula for reconnaissance. At around 9:00 am, they sighted something unusual: “We were flying at an altitude of 1,600 meters. We counted 40 battleships in front of Tenedos. We saw 19 dreadnoughts and heavy cruisers of which 15 were British and 4 were French. There were also 3 light cruisers and several cargo ships. Submarines could be hardly recognized… 6 dreadnoughts were sailing towards the Straits… The French battleship Bouvet opened fire on our airplane. We did not have time to lose and we returned to our base to give our report.”

After receiving the pilots’ report, all the Turkish units were alerted and they took their defensive positions. At command posts, binoculars were directed at the entrance of the Dardanelles. Turkish batteries were ready to defend the Straits with 74 shore guns (8 of them dismantled from older warships), 82 mortars and howitzers, 58 pieces of smaller cannons. They were to face a total of 250 guns directed at the Turkish soil from Allied warships.

The Allied fleet was coming in three groups. The first group consisted of De Roebeck’s flagship Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Lord Nelson and Inflexible. The second group consisted of French ships: the flagship of the French Admiral Quepratte, Gaulois, as well as Charlemagne, Bouvet and Suffren. The third group was composed of older British battleships: Prince George, Majestic, Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Triumph, Swiftsure, Cornwallis, Canapos.

At 10:05 am, the Allied fleet began to enter the Straits. There was absolute silence at the Dardanelles as the huge fleet was moving ahead. This silence was brought to an end when the Triumph opened fire on the Halileli hills. It was returned by artillery fire from the Intepe battery. By 11:30 am, with the entry of four French ships, the total number of battleships inside the Dardanelles had risen to ten. The first wave of British warships reached the Tengerdere-Halileli line.

At 11:40 am, the four mighty battleships of the first wave began to fire on Turkish forts. Queen Elizabeth’s 38 cm cannons were pounding the Anadolu Hamidiye battery, whereas the Inflexible was pouring a rain of fire on the Rumeli Mecidiye battery. Turkish guns were silent. They could not return fire because the ships were out of their range.

At 11:45 am, a shell from Queen Elizabeth fell in the town of Çanakkale causing a big fire and panic. Meanwhile Agamemnon and Lord Nelson opened fire on the Rumeli Mecidiye battery and the cruiser Weymouth began to shell Yenişehir. Triumph was pounding the Dardanos battery. After 35 minutes of one-sided bombardment, Vice Admiral de Roebeck ordered the French group to move ahead.

At 12:20 pm, the ammunition depot at the fort of Çimenlik received a direct hit, causing a serious damage. In those early hours, Turkish commanders found it hard to maintain their optimism about the situation. Lieutenant Colonel Selahattin Adil wrote about the situation at the Hamidiye battery in his memoirs: “We saw that our strongest battery, the Hamidiye, was under heavy enemy fire and there were water columns and dust clouds appearing due to the direct hits received by the battery. I phoned the battery commander and he said that trenches are receiving direct hits and some guns are covered with earth, however they are now being cleaned and there is no serious damage. He also told me that they were going to open fire as soon as the enemy ships enter their range. This answer made me relax a little, however I know that the situation was going against us.” 2

Meanwhile the French battleships were getting closer and entering the effective range of Turkish guns and the tide began to change. Turkish guns began to return fire. Rumeli Mecidiye battery started first and then they were followed by Dardanos and Mesudiye batteries.

The first battleship to be hit was the Inflexible. Turkish-German artillery fire was so intense that in a very short period of time Allied warships received several hits. At 1:20 pm, the Bouvet, which was trying to get closer to Dardanos, was damaged heavily by the shells of the Hamidiye battery. Gaulois and Charlemagne were damaged as well. Suffren received 14 direct hits within only 15 minutes.

By 1:30 pm, the battle was at its peak. Both sides were firing at their full potential. The Allied fleet had had a clear advantage in terms of the number of guns in action. The batteries on the European side (Mecidiye, Hamidiye and Namazgah) were suffering most from the Allied fire. Phone lines were broken and the cable connecting Çanakkale and Kilitbahir was cut. Dardanos and Mesudiye batteries were also under heavy fire.

At around 2:00 pm, Turkish artillery fire got slower. Some guns were damaged and the forts were pounded so badly that it was not possible to fire at full capacity. A German officer, Karl Mühlman, wrote in his memoirs: “Turkish and German artillery were sending their greetings to the enemy. They were breaking into their armored walls and annihilating their bodies. Above this scene, there was a wonderful oriental spring day with a blue sky and a shining sun. The air was shaken with the explosions at the forts. At around 2 o’clock in the afternoon the hell noise calmed down. Firing from the defences got weaker and the enemy thought that he is getting closer to his aims hoping that the forts are destroyed. The French fleet, which had been under heavy wire, was called back. It was replaced by a third fleet of 6 old British ships, which commenced fire.” 3

De Roebeck’s plan was good. But something that happened 10 days before the Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles changed the fate of the campaign. On the night of 7/8 March 1915, a small minelayer ship called Nusrat, commanded by Captain Hakkı Bey, had sailed to Karanlık Harbour, where the Turkish mines laid before were already cleaned by De Roebeck’s minesweepers. Nusrat laid 26 new mines, but this time parallel to the shore.

On 8 March, Captain Nazmi Bey, the mine officer on Nusrat, wrote in his diary: “After receiving the orders, at 5:30 in the morning, Nusrat established a line of 26 carbonic mines starting from the Paleokastro point to the level of Erenköy and returned safely. The enemy did not see this operation. The distance between the mines is 100-150 meters and they are positioned at a depth of 4.5 meters.”

At around 2:10 pm on 18 March, Allied battleship began to turn to starboard to allow the minesweepers access to the mine belts and return to the base. That was the moment when disaster struck the Allied force. The damaged French battleship Bouvet struck the unexpected mines, laid by Nusrat 10 days ago, and sunk within 3 minutes.

Witnessing the sudden disappearance of Bouvet, Suffren stopped and other French battleships, Gaulois and Charlemagne sailed to the site in order to salvage the survivors of Bouvet. At that moment Gaulois received two direct hits and had to retreat because of the serious damage she had.

Now both sides were firing at each other at full strength and Allied minesweepers were doing their best to clean the mines. At 3:15 pm, Irresistible struck a mine and so did Inflexible, at 4:10 pm. The wound of the Inflexible was 8 meters long and 4 meters wide. The engine room was filling with water and the ship was paralyzed. However, it managed to leave the Straits and at around 5:45 pm it ran aground off Bozcaada (Tenedos). Meanwhile, another damaged battleship, Gaulois, realized that she could not make it to Bozcaada. After leaving the range of Turkish guns, she ran aground at the Rabbit Island.

After this unexpected series of losses, Vice Admiral de Roebeck realized that it was impossible to reach the objectives. At 5:50 pm, he called off the attack and ordered the minesweepers and battleships to leave the Dardanelles and return to their bases.

Meanwhile another battleship, Ocean, was ordered to salvage Irresistible. She tried to pull the damaged ship out of the Straits, but it was impossible because of the strong currents. At 6:00 pm, Ocean left Irresistible and in 5 minutes she struck another mine laid by Nusrat.  Under the heavy Turkish fire, the crew had to evacuate the ship. Both Ocean and Irresistible were now left to their destinies. After floating for a while they both sank.

On that fateful day of 18 March, Turkish batteries fired a total of 1,935 rounds. Long range shore guns at Hamidiye, Mecidiye and Namazgah batteries, as well as the long range medium sized guns at Baykuş and Dardanos batteries performed especially well. They did not stop firing although they were seriously hit and played a decisive role in the victory.

Total casualties of the day were 118 men for Turks. 4 officers and 40 men were killed in action, 74 men were wounded. German casualties were 3 dead and 15 wounded. 4 The most tragic incident from the Turkish point of the view was the losses at the Dardanos battery. They received only one direct hit, but it fell on the small field hospital. Commander Captain Hasan, his Surveillance Officer Lieutenant Mevsuf and 9 privates lost their lives. After this incident, this unit was renamed as “Hasan-Mevsuf Battery”.

Turks also lost 9 cannons and nearly all of the forts were heavily damaged. There were fires in the town of Çanakkale and the village of Kilitbahir. Around 35-40 houses in Çanakkale collapsed and many civilians were wounded.

Losses of the Allied forces were much higher. 3 warships were lost and another 4 were out of service. Human casualties were around 800. The loss of Bouvet was the biggest shock for the Allies.

18 March is celebrated as the Victory Day in Turkey. It was the day when the mightiest navy of the time was brought to its knees with obsolete guns, insufficient ammunition and inadequate fortification. Turkish troops knew that they were actually defending Istanbul and the entire homeland. Their gallantry and sacrifices were combined with the fact that the mines laid by the tiny minelayer Nusrat were unknown to Allied commanders, producing this outcome.

This was the last attempt of the Allied fleet to force the Dardanelles. They came to the conclusion that the navy could not carry the Dardanelles alone. The Turks were prepared for a renewed naval attack but the situation was not favourable. The ammunition they had left was enough for only another 2 days. 3 artillery guns had no shell left at all and some guns had only 18-50 shells remaining. 8 mine belts were still intact but there were no replacements left. Turkish soldiers repaired the damaged fortifications as much as they could.

What would happen if the Allied fleet stroke back the next day? It is difficult to guess, but the fact is that the defenders of the Dardanelles were worried. Karl Mühlman wrote in his memoirs: “We could not sleep because of the anxiety of the 19 March. With the first lights of the day our binoculars began to scan the horizon. Neither on 19 March nor on the following days could we see any ships except the regular patrol boats. Everyone was relieved.” 5

In the evening of 18 March, as the sun was going down and the last few of the warships were disappearing on the horizon, Turkish commanders were on a hill observing the retreat of this mighty fleet. Cevat Paşa, commander of the Çanakkale Fortified Zone, said: “They are gone… They could not break through… They will not break through…”