Caucasus
Part II: Against the Russians in East Anatolia

Hafız Hakkı Paşa, commander of the Third Army, died of typhus on 12 February 1915 and was replaced by Brigadier General Mahmut Kamil Paşa. The army had been completely devastated after the disastrous winter campaign and it was Mahmut Kamil’s task to put the army in order. Reinforcements were coming from the First and Second Armies and by March 1915, X and XI Corps could be deployed again, although they were no stronger than a division. A new IX Corps was established with the remaining artillery and support units and was appointed a defensive position.

The strategic situation was stable. The Russians were not advancing deeper into the Anatolian mainland. They stayed at their pre-war border in the north while keeping the Turkish towns of Eleşkirt, Ağrı and Doğubeyazıt in the south. This stability gave the Turkish Third Army the opportunity to recover, reorganize and position itself on new defensive lines. However, there were simply not enough forces to secure the whole East Anatolian region.

When the weather conditions became milder, the new Russian offensive began. On 6 May 1915, Russians began to advance through the Tortum Valley towards Erzurum. Turkish 29th and 30th Divisions managed to stop this assault and in an attempt to take back the lost territory, the X Corps counter-attacked the Russian forces. By 13 June, Russian units were back to their starting line.

In the southern part of the Caucasian theatre of war, Turkish forces were not as successful as they have been in the north. On 17 May, Russian forces entered the town of Van and they continued to push back the Turkish units. Malazgirt had already fallen on 11 May. Supply lines were being cut, whereas the Armenian rebellions were causing additional difficulties. This region, south of Lake Van, was extremely vulnerable. Turks had to defend a line of more than 600 kilometers with only 50,000 men and 130 pieces of artillery. They were clearly outnumbered by the Russians. The region was mountainous, thus difficult to defend.

On 19 June 1915, Russians launched another offensive, this time northwest to Lake Van, and Russian forces began to march from Malazgirt towards Muş. However, they were not aware of the fact that the Turkish IX Corps, together with the 17th and 28th Divisions was moving to Muş as well. Although the conditions were extremely difficult, Turks were executing a very efficient operation of reorganization. 1st and 5th Expeditionary Forces were positioned to the south of the Russian offensive force and a “Right Wing Group” was established under the command of Brigadier General Abdülkerim Paşa. This group was independent from the Third Army and Abdülkerim Paşa was directly reporting to Enver Paşa. Turks were ready to face the Russian attacks.

The Russian offensive was halted by 16 July, and the IX Corps approached from northwest, joining the fresh forces of the 5th Expeditionary, chasing the Russians. Malazgirt was liberated on 26 July. This was the much-needed victory for Turks. It was achieved at a high cost, casualties were rising rapidly, but the morale was high.

Encouraged from this achievement, Abdülkerim Paşa cabled Istanbul and asked for permission to continue with the assault. Enver Paşa was delighted and he asked Abdülkerim to attack to the direction of Eleşkirt and Karaköse and clean up the border region from all Russian elements.

By 5 August, the Right Wing Group had advanced 20 kilometers into the Russian territory, but the left wing of the IX Corps was left vulnerable, because Abdülkerim Paşa was repeating the mistakes made in Sarıkamış, allocating all of his forces for offense and not leaving any units in reserve. Russians spotted this vulnerability and attacked there. The 29th Division came to help, but the Turkish offensive formation was already in danger of being encircled. Abdülkerim Paşa had no option but to retreat and Malazgirt fell to Russians again. By 15 August, hostilities had ended. 10,000 Turkish soldiers died and 6,000 were taken prisoner by Russians as the result of the Turkish offensive.

Reorganization of Turkish forces in East Anatolia in spring 1915 was truly a great achievement. However this new spirit was wasted again. Casualties were so high that it was not possible anymore for the IX Corps to gain its strength through reinforcements. X and XI Corps were weak. However, Russians had suffered casualties as well. Guns remained silent in the Caucasian front for the rest of the year.

The Ottoman High Command failed to make up the losses of the Third Army during the rest of the year. The war in Gallipoli was sucking all the resources and manpower. The IX, X and XI Corps could not be reinforced and in addition to that the 1st and 5th Expeditionary Forces were deployed to Mesopotamia. The Caucasian front was deemed to be of secondary importance, and the Third Army was left weak. As of January 1916, the total strength of the Third Army was 126,000 men, with only 50,539 being infantry. There were 74,057 rifles, 77 machine guns and 180 pieces of artillery. They were facing a Russian force of 200,000 men and 380 pieces of artillery. The IX, X and XI Corps were defending the Erzurum road and taking defensive positions concentrated around Köprüköy. The defensive strategy was based on the assumption that the Russians would not bother to attack.

On 10 January 1916, the Russian General Yudenich launched a major winter offensive. At that time, the commander of the Turkish Third Army, Mahmut Kamil Paşa, was on leave in Istanbul, and his chief of staff, Colonel Felix Guse, was recovering from typhus in Germany. The attack came as a shock for both the Third Army and the Ottoman High Command in Istanbul. The initial offensive was directed at the XI Corps and in four days the Russians managed to break through the Turkish defensive line. During the following days, the Turkish units were forced to leave the Köprüköy lines and by 18 January, the Russian forces had already approached Hasankale, a town on the road to Erzurum and the new location of the Third Army headquarters.

Within just one week, the Turkish defensive formation was dissolved. Casualties totaled 10,000 and an additional 5,000 had been taken prisoner. 16 pieces of artillery had been lost and 40,000 men had found refuge in Erzurum Fortress. Losses of the XI Corps were especially high. Meanwhile the Russians were now planning to take Erzurum, a heavily fortified Turkish stronghold. Erzurum was considered as the second best defended town in the Empire, after Edirne. The Fortress was defended by 235 pieces of artillery.

Commander of the Third Army, Mahmut Kamil Paşa, finally returned from Istanbul on 29 January. He could feel that the Russians would not only attack to Erzurum but also renew the offensive around the Lake of Van. The Fortress was under Russian threat, both from north and east. Mahmut Kamil Paşa tried to strengthen the defensive lines.

On 11 February, Russians began to shell the fortified formations around Erzurum. Fierce fighting erupted. Turkish battalions of 350 men had to defend against Russian battalions of men 1,000 men. Reinforcements were arriving but there were only very few of them. In three days Russians managed to reach the heights overlooking the Erzurum plain. It was now obvious for the command of the Third Army that the town was lost. Turkish units began to retreat from the fortified zones at the front and also evacuate the town of Erzurum.

Early in the morning on 16 February 1916, Russian troops marched into Erzurum. Turkish units had successfully withdrawn and avoided encirclement, however casualties were already high. 327 pieces of artillery were lost to Russians. Support units of the Third Army and around 250 wounded lying at the hospital of Erzurum were taken prisoner. Meanwhile remnants of the X and XI Corps established another defensive line, 8 kilometers east to Erzurum.

Istanbul was still celebrating the victory in Gallipoli. However, news from the eastern front and the loss of Erzurum changed the atmosphere in an instant. Enver Paşa ordered the V Corps (consisting of 10th and 13th Divisions) to be deployed to the Caucasian front. On 27 February, he replaced Mahmut Kamil Paşa with Vehip Paşa, then commander of the Second Army and one of the heroes of Gallipoli. Vehip Paşa arrived in Erzincan, the new location of the Army HQ, on 16 March. His first task was to bring an order to the Third Army, which at that time had only 25,500 men, 76 machine guns and 86 pieces of artillery battle ready. Erzurum was lost, together with its hospitals and logistics support.

In late June, Fevzi Paşa’s V Corps attacked into the Eastern Black Sea Mountains (Pontic Alps) in order to recapture the port of Trabzon, which was now used by the Russian for seaborne reinforcements. Although minor successes were registered, the main objective was now achieved due to lack of adequate forces. By June 28, the Turks were ten kilometers to the sea, however they had to stop there due to a strong Russian defense.

Meanwhile the Russians were preparing for a counteroffensive aiming to relieve the pressure on Trabzon and threaten the Turkish city of Sivas. They launched their attack, which came to be known as the Çoruh Campaign, on 2 July; and as they were on the outskirts of Bayburt, they engaged the Turkish X Corps. The Turks fought bravely, but they could not hold the ground. Bayburt fell on 17 July.

The Russians did not stop at Bayburt. Using the town as a bridgehead they renewed their attacks, crossed the Karasu River, pushing back the Turkish IX and X Corps. On 25 July, Russian advance forces entered the city of Erzincan. Vehip Paşa had no option but to leave the town to the Russians and retreat to west in order to prevent further Russian penetration into Anatolia. Çoruh Campaign had gone on for 12 days during which the Turks have not only lost important cities, but also 17,000 men killed and around the same number taken prisoner.

Although the Turks had received a remarkable blow, Ahmet İzzet Paşa decided to attack one week after the conclusion of the Russian offensive. It was now the Second Army’s task to save the Third Army from disaster and recapture the town of Erzincan. The Turkish offensive commenced on 2 August 1916, in three corps-sized groups, III, IV and XVI Corps. In the earlier periods of the campaign, Mustafa Kemal’s XVI Corps managed to take Bitlis and Muş, however this initial success did not bring victory. Russians were strengthening their lines and two weeks after the launch of the Turkish offensive they were strong enough to respond with counteroffensives. At the same times, the Turks were suffering from severe supply and logistics problems. By late September, the Turkish attack was finished. During these two months, the Turks had gained some ground, at the cost of around 30,000 killed and wounded.

The rest of the year 1916 was spent by the Turks with organizational and operational changes in the Caucasian front. Fortunately for the Turkish commanders, the Russians were quiet during this period. The winter of 1916-17 was extremely harsh, which made fighting nearly impossible. This situation did not change during the spring. Meanwhile Russia was in political and social turmoil, which was also influencing the army ranks. The chaos caused by the October Revolution put a stop to all Russian military operations and the Russian forces began to conduct withdrawals. Neither the Russian soldiers nor the Russian people wanted to go on with the war anymore. The Turks on the other hand, could not take advantage of this situation; since their units were not in good shape either. They were under great pressure from the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, therefore withdrawing the majority of their forces (five divisions) and sending them south. The year 1917 passed by without fighting in the Caucasian front. The Russian army slowly disintegrated until there was no effective military force. The Armistice of Erzincan, signed on 16 December 1917, officially brought an end to the hostilities.