Caucasus
Part I: The Frozen Inferno of Sarıkamış

The main theatre of operations was the region between the Lake of Van and the Black Sea. Due to the characteristics of the terrain, this region was definitely unsuitable for offensive campaigns, but it offered some advantages for defensive actions. The western sector of this region was under the responsibility of the Turkish Third Army, and the eastern sector was given to the Second Army.

30 October 1914 was the first day of the religious feast and in Erzurum, where the headquarters of the Third Army was located, the Turkish troops were enjoying this special day. However, the ceremony had to be cancelled due to a cable arriving from the Ottoman High Command in Istanbul. There had been an exchange of fire between Russian and Turkish vessels in the Black Sea and the Imperial Russian Army was expected to cross the Ottoman border at any time.

The Third Army, which was under the command of Hasan İzzet Paşa, was composed of the IX, X and XI Corps. Its headquarters was in Erzurum, where the IX Corps was located as well. The X Corps was stationed in Sivas, whereas the XI Corps was in Mamuretülaziz (Harput). Units of the Third Army were covering an area, which was nearly 1250-1500 kilometres wide and where the transportation infrastructure was far from adequate. The total manpower was 190,000 men including regular troops (83,000), reserves, personnel of the Erzurum Fortress, transportation units, depot regiments and military police. Additionally, there were around 60,000 animals in the service of the army.

The Russian offensive began on 1 November 1914, i.e. one day before the official Russian declaration of war. The Russian I Corps crossed the border and moving from Sarıkamış it proceeded to the direction of Köprüköy. The Russian IV Corps moved from Yerevan to Pasinler Plains.

By 4 November, Russian forces had already reached Köprüköy. They were also moving along the Karaköse-Muratsuyu line. Their total strength was 25 infantry battalions, 37 cavalry units and 120 artillery guns.

On that day, Enver Paşa’s orders arrived at the headquarters of the Third Army: “The enemy does not seem to be superior. The X Corps needs another 2-3 weeks to arrive in the frontline. In order to win some time and boost the morale of the army, I am considering separate attacks on the enemy. You will attack to the rear of the Russians, Kurdish Tribal Regiments will infiltrate beyond the enemy line and the forces in Van will attack to the Persian Azerbaijan.”

Hasan İzzet Paşa was not in favour of an offensive action in the harsh winter conditions. He was planning to remain in defence, pull the Russians to the Erzurum Fortress and launch a counter attack at the right time. However, he was ordered to attack. There was nothing he could do.

The Second Battle of Köprüköy was followed by the Azap Offensive between 17-20 November. The Russians were anxious and their commanders were even cabling the High Command of the Caucasian Army in Tbilisi saying that the war is lost. Meanwhile the conditions of the Third Army were also not very good. The weather was getting worse. Despite territorial gains, Turkish casualties were high: 9000 killed, 3000 taken prisoner and 2800 deserters. According to eye-witnesses, Hasan İzzet Paşa was having a nervous breakdown. He knew that an unorganized offensive under such weather conditions would be a fiasco. But he had to attack. Such was the order from Istanbul. By the end of November, the front had stabilized with the Russians clinging to a salient 25 kilometres into Turkish territory along the Erzurum-Sarıkamış axis.

On 8 December, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Colonel Hafız Hakkı Bey, arrived in Trabzon on board the cruiser Mecidiye. He was sent by Enver Paşa to energize the Third Army. Hasan İzzet Paşa was planning to hold on to the defensive positions, spend the winter there and launch the offensive in spring when the weather was better. However Hafız Hakkı Bey gave instructions immediately to begin planning a new offensive. Hasan İzzet Paşa and corps commanders doubted the feasibility of this plan. In a cable dated 18 December 1914, Hasan İzzet told Enver: “We have to consider 8 or 9 days for a large scaled encircling manoeuvre. However, during this time the XI Corps, which will remain at the front, might be jeopardized. Even if we execute the manoeuvre with two corps, they will probably face difficulties against the enemy.”

Enver Paşa wanted complete annihilation of Russian forces through a winter offensive which would have an encircling manoeuvre as its main component. He decided to take charge, and left Istanbul for the Caucasian front, arriving in Erzurum on 21 December. He was accompanied by the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army, General Bronsart von Schellendorf, his assistant Kazım Bey and the head of the Operations Office, Lieutenant Colonel Feldmann.

Enver, who was convinced that Russians could be encircled and annihilated at Sarıkamış, was disturbed by Hasan İzzet’s cable. When these two generals, who had completely different perspectives regarding the campaign met in Köprüköy, Enver did not hide his disappointment. This scene was later described by Kazım Bey, who was not only the assistant of the Chief of Staff but also Enver’s brother-in-law. Kazım Bey (Orbay) quotes Enver addressing Hasan İzzet: “You have made mistakes and you have failed. The Russian Army was supposed to be annihilated here. Now, you will take action immediately and you will destroy the Russians at Sarıkamış…”

What Enver wanted to do was to duplicate the German success at Tannenberg. He was going to use the same manoeuvre plan. But he was ignoring one thing: conditions at Sarıkamış were completely different from Tannenberg. The terrain was much worse, it was Caucasian winter and not European summer and the Turkish Army was not as well equipped as the Germans. But the German High Command supported Enver’s plan. What mattered for the Germans was that Russians would withdraw some of their forces in Poland to strengthen their operations in the Caucasus.

There is also an interesting section about this issue in the memoirs of General Liman von Sanders: “Before the Caucasian campaign began, Enver explained to me his plans in detail. At the end of our meeting, he told me about his intentions, which were really buoyant, but also a little weird. He was going to march to India and Afghanistan after he was done with the Caucasus.”

Meanwhile a special detachment was formed from the 3rd Division, stationed in Thrace. This detachment would be deployed to the vicinity of Çoruh and its purpose was to pin down the Russians on the coast near Batumi. This would allow the X Corps to relinquish its defensive coastal operations and concentrate for offensive operations. The detachment was given to the command of the German Major Stange and became known as “Stange Bey Detachment”.

Unhappy with the leadership in the Third Army, Enver Paşa made further changes. Ahmet Fevzi Paşa, commander of the IX Corps, was replaced by Colonel İhsan Bey and the commander of the X Corps, Ziya Paşa, was replaced by Colonel Hafız Hakkı Bey. These two new commanders had little or no experience at the operational level.

The Sarıkamış Disaster

The Turkish Operation Plan involved a single envelopment using three corps. On the right flank, XI Corps would fix the Russians in place and conduct feint attacks. In the centre, IX Corps would fight in the direction of Sarıkamış Pass. Hafız Hakkı’s X Corps, which was to be on the left flank, would drive on Oltu, cross the Allahüekber Mountains, cut the Kars road and drive the Russians to the Aras Valley, where the Russian forces would be destroyed by all three corps acting in unison. Meanwhile the Stange Bey Detachment would conduct highly visible operations to distract and pin Russian units.

Hafız Hakkı was excited and he could not wait to launch the attack. However, for him, the fine line between his ideals and the truth was blurred. Excerpts from his letter to İhsan Paşa, commander of the IX Corps, dated 19 December 1914, shows us that he was not making his plans based on facts: “We have to make sure that the IX and X Corps arrive at Sarıkamış and Kars before the Russians. To achieve this aim, there are two conditions to meet: first, the initial attack has to be a sudden one and, second, after concluding the initial attack within a few hours, both corps should proceed at full speed. I am planning to destroy the enemy within one or two hours and then move to Oltu… I hope that the assault at İd will be concluded by the afternoon on 22 December. Then we will march 30 kilometres a day and arrive in the Kars-Sarıkamış line by 25 December…”

One of the most important sources about the Sarıkamış Campaign is the memoirs of Köprülülü Şerif Bey, who was the chief of staff of IX Corps. He mentions that they did not even possess a proper map of the region. He criticizes Hafız Hakkı: “The most unfortunate thing was that nobody, not even he himself, was asking ‘What if these plans fail?’ He was not consulting the experienced officers in his staff.”

As the major offensive began, the total available offensive strength of the Third Army was 118,660 men, 73 machine guns and 218 pieces of artillery. Turkish intelligence estimated the Russians to have a rifle strength of about 65,000.

Hostilities began on 22 December 1914. The X Corps began its movement towards Oltu, which was occupied the next day. 1000 Russian troops were taken prisoner, 4 artillery guns and 4 machine guns were captured. IX and XI Corps were advancing as well.

The second day of the campaign was marked by an unfortunate event. For nearly 4 hours at Narman, the 31st and the 32nd Divisions fought each other. This big mistake is said to have been caused by problems with the maps. By 24 December, the X Corps was well beyond Oltu after having marched a hard 75 kilometers in just over three days. It had reached the point where it would pivot toward the southeast to outflank and envelop Sarıkamış.

On 25 December, Enver Paşa issued a historical order-of-the-day:

“1. Yesterday at Oltu, we captured 1000 men, some officers and a colonel, 6 cannons, 4 machine guns, some rifles and other equipment from the enemy. At the sectors under the responsibility of IX and X Corps, some of the enemy forces were thrown back towards Ardahan and some were driven to the mountains. There is no news from the XI Corps or the 2nd Cavalry Division.

2. The army will cut the roads connecting the enemy with Kars.

3. On 25 December 1914, the 29th and the 17th Divisions of IX Corps will arrive in Sarıkamış. The front line will be moved to the southeast; passages and the town of Sarıkamış will be occupied and a defensive formation will be established. The 28th Division will occupy Bardız and block attacks from the Yeniköy direction.

4. The X Corps will move towards Sarıkamış. It will inform the army command as to how it will move and when it can arrive.

5. The XI Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division will not be given any orders for the time being. They will arrange their operations according to the general aims. If the enemy begins to retreat, it will be destroyed at Sarıkamış. If it stops, the IX and the X Corps will attack to its rear.

6. The army headquarters will remain in Bardız until noon on 25 December. Then it will move to Sarıkamış where it will spend the 26 December.”

At 7:00 am on that day, the 29th Division departed from Bardız. Snow was not falling but the Bardız Plain was already covered with snow up to soldiers’ knees. It was extremely difficult to walk, and the animals pulling the howitzers were stuck in the snow. On the way, the division commander Colonel Arif Bey wanted to give the troops a break at the village of Kızılkilise, but Enver Paşa asked them to keep moving.

The troops did not have proper footwear. What they were wearing was nothing more than sandals. When they got wet, they turned to ice blocks around the feet. They were not allowed to have a break and warm themselves around a camp fire. They were doing their best to prevent frostbite, but for some, it was impossible. First the toes, and then the wrist. A few more steps on the snow and the wrists are locked, and then the frostbite spreads to the rest of the body. This was the inevitable for most of the Turkish youth on the plains of East Anatolia.

Around afternoon, Russian positions were visible. Colonel Arif approached the corps commander Colonel İhsan, and asked him if they could spend the night there, so that the troops could have a chance to rest, and attack the enemy before the dawn the next day. İhsan Bey agreed, but Enver was planning a night attack. He was ignoring the facts that the battalions were down to less than 200 men and the temperature was 26 degrees below zero Celsius. Allahüekber Mountains were like a white inferno of snow.  In the darkness, the silence of death was deafening.

That night, the 86th and the 87th Regiments managed to push back the Russian forces and capture the hill Çamurludağ. The town of Sarıkamış was believed to be located beyond that hill, but soon the Turkish officers realized that this was not the case. The town was actually 8 kilometers from the hill. The reason for this mistake was the poor quality of the maps. Fortunately, reinforcements were arriving. The 17th Division had reached Çamurludağ after a non-stop walk of 22 hours.

Meanwhile, the units of the X Corps, commanded by Colonel Hafız Hakkı, have been marching for 14 hours. They were exhausted. Because of fatigue and hunger, the fear of frostbite and Russian machine guns was slowly being replaced by absolute indifference. In the early hours of 26 December, at the 18th hour of its march, the 91st Regiment of X Corps came under enemy fire. After nearly two hours of fighting, the Russians left the scene. The regiment hit the road again and soon a snow storm began. Under these conditions the 91st Regiment managed to reach Kosor in 21 hours after leaving Penek, a distance of just 8 kilometres. Other units had reached their destinations at a similar rate. While Enver Paşa was ordering the night attack in a rush to reach Sarıkamış, elements of the X Corps were spending the night in the villages of Kosor, Arsenik and Patsik, which were 40, 35 and 30 kilometres from Sarıkamış respectively. The Allahüekber Mountains were in front of them. It would take them at least two more days to reach Sarıkamış.

In the morning of 26 December, Enver Paşa, General Bronsart von Schellendorf and other senior officers were watching Sarıkamış through their binoculars. Inside the misty forests of Çamurludağ, the village of Çerkezköy stood, and behind this village was Sarıkamış. With its train station, Russian barracks and churches with tall towers, Sarıkamış was waking up to a winter’s day. Enver Paşa wanted to take the town with IX Corps and then encircle the Russian forces, preventing their retreat to Kars and annihilating them.

The attack was launched at 7:30 am. Russian units were positioned in the forest north of Çerkezköy. When the Turkish troops began to advance, they were met with heavy machine gun fire. At the same time, Russian artillery was pounding the Turkish howitzers. Turkish guns were repositioned and they opened fire, but to no avail. The Russian artillery was doing its job without facing any significant resistance. The fighting went on for the whole day. In the evening, commander of IX Corps, İhsan Paşa, approached Enver Paşa and said: “Sir, we are lacking the forces we need for an assault. We are out of reserves. The enemy can take the Yeniköy road and take Çamurludağ, hence occupying our rear positions. Since we do not have any reserves, we are not able to move units there. With your permission, we can regroup and put the units back in order. By doing that, we can launch an offensive tomorrow morning.” Enver Paşa accepted this suggestion.

After spending the night of 25/26 December in three villages, units of X Corps, i.e. the 30th, 31st and 32nd Divisions, began to march again. They departed at 5 am and they had to cross the Allahüekber Mountains. This was the beginning of the end…

There was no snow falling on the mountains and the sun was shining. The higher the troops climbed, the stronger became the wind and the colder it got. Walking in thick snow was extremely difficult. One by one, the soldiers began to fall. They were freezing to death. It was a terrible sight. Those marching in the back could see two columns of gray dots climbing up the mountains. One row was slowly proceeding whereas the other one was standing still. As they moved higher, the number of the gray dots in the not moving column increased. The troops were tired, hungry and sleepless. They did not have proper winter suits and boots. The conditions were extremely harsh. Most of them did not have any chance at all. They fell on their knees when they ran out of energy. They could not move or speak. Soon they felt dizziness. This feeling spread all over their body and they began to sleep, never to wake up again…

The “death march” was completed in 14 hours and the remainder of X Corps managed to reach its first destination, the village of Beyköy. A headcount was made and the result was terrible. The casualty rate was a massive 90 percent! Only 1,400 men of the 30th Division could make it to Beyköy. The mountains had swallowed 15,000 souls! The figures were no better for the other two divisions. So many men lost, without a single bullet being fired. In his memoirs, an anonymous officer from the 93rd Regiment of the 31st Division, which took a parallel road to that of the 30th Division, describes the fatal march as follows:

“We left the village when it was still dark. The privates were following the corporals in complete silence. We had local guides and according to the maps we had, we believed we could reach the summit in 3 hours. We walked twice that long, and the road was still going up. As we climbed higher, the scenery became wilder, but more beautiful. It looked as if the whole place was made of endless snow and rivers. We could see the hills covered with snow and ice below us. I could not imagine how our artillerists could make it up this steep snowy mountain. We were climbing under difficult circumstances but we kept order and discipline. Finally, we reached the highest point, which was a wide snow plain... We were exhausted. A sharp wind blew over us, and then came a snowstorm. Visibility was nil. Nobody could speak or say anything, let alone help each other. The long marching column dissolved. Soldiers went away wherever they could see a black point at the edge of a forest or a riverbank, any place where they could see smoke from a fire...

The 93rd Regiment, initially of 5,000 troops, reached its destination, the village of Başköy, with only 300 men. In order to save the other regiments from the same fate, commander of the 31st Division, Colonel Hasan Vasfi, gave the following order:

“1- The order for all units to arrive in Başköy tonight is invalid. The walking distance between Arsenik and Başköy is not less than 7 hours. The road passes through a plain in curves. Both men and animals freeze to death there. I saw many frozen soldiers and animals on the road. Ammunition, machine guns and other equipment are scattered all over the field. It was a very sad scene. Attempting to cross the plain at night will be nothing but murder.

At the west side of the plain, to the direction of the village of Yayla, there is a big pine forest. If the units have already left the village of Arsenik, they must spend the night in the forest and make sure than fires are lit to warm themselves. They must not sleep or they will get frost bite. They can arrive at Başköy the next day and stay in the village.

2- Tomorrow is a rest day for all units.

3- If you have not left Arsenik yet, take good guides with you and use the Issızdere road.

Division Commander
Hasan Vasfi”

The next day, when the sun rose, the scale of the disaster became clear. Only 3,400 from the 30th and 31st divisions had survived the Allahüekber Mountains (out of 32,300) and most of them were sick. The 32nd Division was stuck in Bardız, pinned down by a superior Russian force. The Russians had separated the 30th and 31st Divisions in the rear.

Responding to Enver Paşa’s orders, Colonel Hafız Hakkı cancelled the rest day and ordered what was left from his corps to move to Divnik-Çatak line, destroy the Russian units at Novoselim and encircle the enemy retreating from Sarıkamış. But the Russians were not retreating. In fact, they were strengthening the defense of Sarıkamış. Meanwhile Enver Paşa himself ordered the 29th Division of the IX Corps to launch a renewed attack on Russian positions around Sarıkamış. 

The 87th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lütfullah, managed to enter Çerkezköy. This victory however was short lived, because the troops immediately found themselves trapped in the village. The Russian unit led by Colonel Barkovski had not evacuated the village. Fighting went on during the day, and the next morning the Turkish soldiers in Çerkezköy were taken prisoner.

Enver Paşa saw that it was futile to attempt to force Sarıkamış with the IX Corps alone. He decided to wait for Colonel Hafız Hakkı’s X Corps and declared 28 December a rest day. His optimism knew no limits. Meanwhile the X Corps had reached the Sarıkamış-Kars railroad and destroyed the track. The same day the 31st Division reached Sarıkamış. Colonel Hafız Hakkı wanted to order his troops to attack, but what he saw was only around 1,000 shivering men left from the division’s initial power of 14,000. He ordered a retreat so that the troops could rest and save their energy for an attack the next day. As the Turkish troops came to the village of Yağbasan, they came under Russian machine gun fire. After a brief clash, Russians went back to Sarıkamış.

Enver Paşa was with the IX Corps. The commander of this unit, İhsan Paşa, was frustrated due to Enver Paşa’s frequent intervention in his own command. He could see that Enver Paşa was dreaming, but the only thing he could do was to remind him of the facts. On 28 December, he submitted to Enver Paşa a written report about the current situation of the corps. Enver Paşa's reply was: “Today I saw corps and division commanders in the rear. Everyone must be in the front. Our reports always mention low numbers of men. I can observe myself that the Russian companies do not have more than 20 men either”.

Enver Paşa was thinking that the Russians were retreating to Kars. In fact, what Enver thought to be a retreat, was actually an encircling movement. He was delighted, but this feeling was soon replaced with disappointment when a Russian prisoner of Turkic origin was brought to his presence. The prisoner said: “Russians are preparing to encircle your forces at Sarıkamış with a force of five regiments.” This shock enabled Enver Paşa to see the truth. The IX Corps, which reached Sarıkamış, had melted away. The X Corps, which was supposed to come to the rescue, had lost 90 percent of its men on the slopes of Allahüekber Mountains. The XI Corps was at the Aras region, fighting the Russians there. A regiment had entered Çerkezköy, only to be taken prisoner there. And now the Russians were about to encircle the remaining Turkish forces. 

29 December began with Hafız Hakkı’s attempts to take Sarıkamış with what was left of X Corps. First the 88th Regiment was sent, but it was pushed back. Then the 31st Division organized another offensive. The German Colonel Lange took a regiment from the south and Colonel Hasan Vasfi attacked from the north. They reached the defensive line just 250 meters to the town. However, Russian resistance was strong. The attack was halted for a while, then launched again at around 4 PM. Morale was high and the Turks knew that this was their last chance. The Russians were surprised by this attack. They panicked and left their line, retreating to the town. The Turkish troops followed. There was now street fighting in Sarıkamış. Turkish soldiers were both fighting against the Russians and searching for food.
That day, the first good news from the Caucasus arrived in Istanbul. Ardahan was taken. The “Stange Bey Detachment” which had left Istanbul on the battleship Yavuz, was disembarked in Rize. The detachment was then reinforced with nearly two thousand volunteers. It had moved south and entered Ardahan on 27 December. Unfortunately, the detachment was not strong enough to keep the town. A few days later, three Russian infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment threw the detachment back. The “Stange Bey Detachment” managed to resist the Russians for more than two months and on 1 March 1915 it went back to its initial line.

By the evening of 29 December, Turkish troops had occupied the western outskirts of the town, as well as the train station and the barracks of the Russian Yelizavetpolski Regiment. General Prejevalski, commander of the Russian forces in Sarıkamış, decided to use his last reserves in a final attempt to draw the Turks out of the town. His chief of staff, Colonel Temrin, managed to take the train station with a bayonet charge. Now the Russians were gaining the upper hand and the Turkish troops were forced to leave the town.

Russian artillery fire caused severe casualties on 30 December. Enver Paşa received two reports on that day. One was from the chief of staff of the IX Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Şerif, and the other from Colonel Hafız Hakkı. Both reports were saying the same thing. The corps did not have any capacity to launch another attack. They were simply too weak. Enver’s response was: “The offensive is to go on at full strength.”

On the last day of 1914, bad news arrived at Enver’s headquarters from Bardız. The 32nd Division had had to abandon its positions to the Russians. This mean that Bardız and Kızılkilise roads were now in Russian hands and the Turkish forces were inside a semi-circle. Retreat through the open mouth of the circle would be the rational decision, but Enver Paşa ordered them to attack. This could bring nothing but more casualties and it did.

Enver Paşa was obviously in some sort of psychological disorder. First he was extremely optimistic, describing every move of the Russians as a retreat to Kars; then he began to give orders based on imaginary victories. His order of the day on 2 January is worthy of note:

“1- The enemy confronting the 32nd Division near Bardız was defeated. It retreated and never appeared again.

2- The enemy confronting the 30th Division crossed the River Aras on 30 December has retreated, pushed by our forces, to the east.

3- No enemy units could make it to the north of the Bardız-Kızılkilise road and there is no enemy in Kızılkilise. If the enemy has left the front held by the 32nd Division, the division will chase it and merge with the XI Corps.

4- The army will maintain its positions.”

In an analysis published after the war, Lieutenant Colonel Selahaddin Bey commented as follows: “There can be no greater proof that Enver Paşa was inventing situations in the absence of reports, and making his decisions accordingly.”

Meanwhile, around 40 kilometres south to Sarıkamış, the XI Corps led by Galip Paşa was renewing attacks on Russian lines in an attempt to relieve the pressure on the IX and X Corps positioned in front of Sarıkamış. Enver Paşa slowly accepted the truth and focused on securing the routes for retreat instead of insisting on new attacks to take Sarıkamış. He combined the two corps there, renamed it the “Left Wing Army” and gave the command to Hafız Hakkı, whom he promoted to Brigadier General and gave the title of “Paşa”.

Hafız Hakkı Paşa was hoping for reinforcements. Since he believed it could be still possible to take Sarıkamış, he did not order his army to retreat. However, the Russians were advancing now. The circle was getting narrower. In the afternoon of 4 December, after touring the front line on his horse, he returned his headquarters and said in French: “Tout est perdu, sauf l’honneur.” (Everything lost, except honor.) Then he smiled and said to İhsan Paşa, this time in Turkish: “It is over.” He was hoping that some of the troops left on Allahüekber Mountains could be still alive. This was not the case.

Suddenly, the headquarters found itself under Russian fire. The Russians had captured the entire 28th Division. Hafız Hakkı Paşa managed to save himself, but 8 senior officers including İhsan Paşa surrendered to the Russians. The 17th and 29th Divisions were taken prisoner as well. The captives, 108 officers and 80 soldiers, were taken to Sarıkamış. Hafız Hakkı Paşa safely reached the headquarters of the X Corps. There he found out that the IX Corps fell to the hands of Russians and ordered a total retreat. Early in the morning of the next day, they began to march towards Erzurum.

It took four days for Enver Paşa and the German officers accompanying him to reach Erzurum. He cabled Istanbul:

“To the Sublime Porte,

Although the offensive against the Russians has not been concluded with the absolute defeat of the enemy, it enabled us to drive the enemy outside our frontiers, occupy some parts of enemy territory and damage its army.

Our efforts will be concentrated first on resting the army after fifteen days of continuous fighting, then on a renewed offensive.

I shall depart for Istanbul now, leaving the command of the army to Hafız Hakkı Paşa.

I request that all this and my move will be kept confidential.”

Enver also sent a farewell message to those he left behind:

“Friends,

For nearly one month I have been with you and I saw how you attacked the enemy in battles which went on for days. Although the weather was harsh, you ignored all kinds of poverty and broke the resistance of the enemy. You drove the enemy out of the motherland and you took enemy territory. These efforts of yours will never disappear. The entire nation, including the Sultan himself, congratulates you. I am now returning to Istanbul. God willing, you will achieve much more, you will destroy the enemy and you will bless the souls of our martyrs. I leave you to God’s protection. Don’t forget that God is always by our side. 11 January 1914”

Enver left Erzurum with his staff for Istanbul via Sivas. At the train station in Ulukışla, he met his uncle, Halil Paşa, and said to him: “The entire force has been lost.”

Memoirs of Colonel Mustafa Kemal include an interesting passage about his encounter with Enver Paşa: “When I came to Istanbul from Sofia, Enver Paşa had already returned from the Sarıkamış campaign. First I went to his office and left a message. I was expecting a reply, but suddenly we came face to face. He looked weak and his face was pale. I said:
-          You are tired…
-          No. Not really.
-          What happened?
-          We fought. That’s all.
-          What is the situation now?
-          Very good.
I didn’t want to upset him. The conversation was over.”

Upon his arrival in Istanbul, Enver Paşa banned all kinds of publications about Sarıkamış. His pretext was a patriotic one: “Preventing spies and traitors from demoralizing the public through propaganda and lies.”

There are no exact figures about the Turkish casualties in Sarıkamış. The official history published by the Turkish Army states that Turkish losses amount to 60 thousand men. This figure is based on Russian accounts that 7,000 prisoners have been taken and 23 thousand Turkish dead have been buried. To these numbers, 10 thousand dead in the area of the XI Corps and another 20 thousand dead behind the battle lines are added. All these Turkish soldiers have died because of frost and sickness.

Today, most often the tragedy of Sarıkamış is associated with the personality of Enver Paşa. However, one should look more closely at the factors that led to the one greatest military disasters of the World War. Command mistakes have played a crucial role in this catastrophe, but other elements such as cold weather and frost, epidemics and insufficient logistics were also important. The combination of all of these caused thousands of Turkish soldiers to perish on mountains without firing a single shot.

In his memoirs, Şerif Bey writes: “Let us make up our mind about this: For us, Sarıkamış has not only been a great lesson, but also a bright chapter of our history. Future generations should know that we met this fate because we sought salvation following a wrongly created man. History has witnessed that a great Turkish army has fought due to the greed of an ignorant and mad commander.”

It can be said, that Şerif Bey has been too harsh on Enver Paşa. His mistakes played surely an important role in the disaster, however Enver Paşa should not be seen as a scapegoat. Balcı provides a well-written analysis of Enver’s role: “He had climbed up the ranks too fast, which did not allow him the time to do field service. He was lacking the practical knowledge on how to command armies. This shortcoming was causing him to underestimate the hardships faced by the soldiers and he was also failing to analyze the operational necessities. Enver and Hafız Hakkı have been very active, but they failed to calculate the difficulties the army would face.

Both during the period when the Third Army was gathering around Erzurum and during the operations, soldiers were ordered to walk extremely long distances. Under the hard conditions of winter, physical limits of a human being should have been calculated better. Naturally, units failed to reach their walking targets and they dissolved. Operations to be executed under this kind of extreme conditions require an absolute consensus among commanders and soldiers. However even the high ranked officers did not have the same level of determination.”

The official history of the Turkish Army makes the following conclusion: “The mistake was not that the campaign was carried out in winter. It was the way how it was executed that had the fault.  A logistically better planned assault that conforms with strategic and tactical rules and enables combined action could well make it possible to beat the Russians in winter and this could only be possible with the Turkish soldier… If the timing had been better, even Enver Paşa’s plans could be appropriate. However the plan was executed in a wrong time and it was followed by a chain of further mistakes. The fact that the chain of command did not function properly is one of the main reasons of losing the battle of Sarıkamış.”

Let us conclude with Şerif Bey’s memoirs: “Turkish troops fought on the top of tall mountains under snowstorm against the artillery of an enemy of centuries and they were completely annihilated, but not a single soldier has ever turned his back to his nation... In Sarıkamış, there was no panic.”